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Some Kind of Religious Freedom:
National Prohibition and the Volstead




Employment Division v. Smith' represents, in the view
of many, a low-water mark in American constitutional free
exercise jurisprudence,2 at least at the doctrinal level.3 The
United States Supreme Court held that Oregon was within its
rights to apply an Oregon statutory prohibition against the
possession of peyote to members of the Native American
Church, effectively subordinating religious freedom to Oregon's
war against drugs.4 That many other states and the federal
government had found a way to accommodate the religious use
of peyote by expressly exempting the sacramental use of peyote
from the reach of their anti-drug laws, 5 was of no avail in the
* Copyright Michael deHaven Newsom 2005. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor, Howard University School of Law, B.A. Amherst College 1964,
LL.B. Harvard Law School 1967.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 See, e.g., Steven H. Aden and Lee J. Strang, When a "Rule" Doesn't Rule:
The Failure of the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith "Hybrid Rights Exception",
108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 573, 581-87 (2003) (stating that "Smith has the rather unusual
distinction of being one case that is almost universally despised.., by both liberals and
conservatives').
3 Regardless of doctrine, religious minorities, especially non-Christians, have
fared poorly in seeking judicially-mandated accommodations. See Lyng v.
Northwestern Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988) (denying
exemption for lands sacred to Native Americans from a government road-building
program); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987) (denying
accommodation for prison inmates attending Islamic Friday afternoon religious
services); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (denying an exemption to
the military dress code for a yarmulke).
4 Smith, at 890, 906 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
5 Id. at 890.
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face of the Court's obsequious deference to majoritarianism, a
deference arising out of an unsubstantiated and undocumented
fear of anarchy and judicial activism. As Justice Scalia warned:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices
that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 6
Justice Blackmun, writing for himself, and Justices
Brennan and Marshall dissented. They would have required
the state of Oregon to meet a tougher standard in order to
justify the refusal to exempt the religious use of peyote: that
the statute was the least restrictive means to achieve a
compelling state interest. 7  Justice Blackmun noted that
6 Id. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, made no attempt to connect his
fears with real-world facts. Whether there is an empirical basis for these fears,
particularly an imagined, make-believe world in which everyone could reasonably
become a "law unto herself' by reason of religious choice is, of course, a highly
contestable matter, and Scalia offers no evidence to support his parade of horribles.
Scalia uses parades of horribles merely as a rhetorical device. See Michael Frost,
Justice Scalia's Rhetoric of Dissent: A Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia's Advocacy in the
VMI Case, 91 KY. L.J. 167,174 (stating that "[s]ome judges, Justice Scalia among them,
use their dissents to publicly rebuke their colleagues or to provide a parade of horribles
that will inevitably flow from the ruling'). And use them he does. See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586-06 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); PGA Tour v. Martin, 532
U.S. 661, 702-03 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 738
(1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 161-62
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 414-15 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 660, 727-34 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Scalia's dire predictions in Morrison v. Olson indeed came to pass. See
Michael deHaven Newsom, Independent Counsel? No. Ombudsman? Yes: A Parable of
American Ideology and Myth, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 141 (2000). But all that one can
fairly say is that Scalia got lucky in that case. Lawrence v. Texas still has yet to play
itself out. It is most unlikely that same-sex marriages will become part of the American
social and legal terrain anytime soon, if ever. The fact that Scalia authored the
majority opinion in Smith does nothing to make Scalia's cheap and tawdry rhetorical
technique any more defensible there than when he employs it in his bombastic
dissents. However, one would hope that in writing opinions, the Justices would not
indulge in rhetorical flights of contestable fancy. See Michael deHaven Newsom,
Common School Religion: Judicial Narratives in a Protestant Empire, 11 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 219, 328 (2002) [hereinafter Common School Religion] (arguing that
"[tlhere is virtue in requiring the law to offer the best explanation possible for its
decisions").
7 Smith, 494 U.S. at 907-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
also would have required Oregon to satisfy a tougher standard, but the Justice
managed to misapply the standard largely by failing to adequately assess that many
jurisdictions granted exemptions for the religious use of peyote. Id. at 893-905
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). These jurisdictions necessarily challenged any
claim that Oregon had a compelling state interest in not exempting the religious use of
peyote from the reach of its anti-drug laws. The hard factual question is why Oregon
found it impossible to do what other states had managed to do; why Oregon was
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"[d]uring Prohibition, the Federal Government exempted [the
sacramental use of wine by the Roman Catholic Church] from
its general ban on possession and use of alcohol."8 The clear
intendment of Blackmun's remark is that Congress was far
more attentive to the religious freedom or liberty interests of
Roman Catholics when it passed the National Prohibition Act
(the Volstead Act)9 than the state of Oregon was to the free
exercise rights of members of the Native American Church
when it enacted the anti-drug law at issue in Smith. 1o
The Volstead Act consisted of three titles, but only Title
II, which concerned the "Prohibition of Intoxicating Beverages,"
is of relevance here." Its exemption for the religious use of
wine actually consisted of several provisions. The first, the one
to which Justice Blackmun referred, found in § 3, established
the general rule of prohibition:
No person shall on or after the date when the eighteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States goes into effect,
manufacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish
or possess any intoxicating liquor except as authorized in this Act,
and all the provisions of this Act shall be liberally construed to the
end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be
prevented. 12
Section 3 then provided that "wine for sacramental
purposes may be manufactured, purchased, sold, bartered,
transported, imported, exported, delivered, furnished and
possessed, but only as herein provided .... ,13 This is a clear
and succinct statement of an exemption for the use of wine--for
somehow different from these other jurisdictions. In other words, what is it about
Oregon that compelled it not to accommodate the religious use of peyote? Justice
O'Connor had no answer.
8 Id. at 913, n.6. The exemption appears in a different form and guise
elsewhere in the National Prohibition Act. See infra notes 16-23 and accompanying
text.
9 The National Prohibition Act is frequently referred to as the Volstead Act,
see HERBERT ASBURY, THE GREAT ILLUSION: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF PROHIBITION
112 (1968); NORMAN H. CLARK, DELIVER US FROM EVIL: AN INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN PROHIBITION 130-31 (1976) [hereinafter DELIVER]; THOMAS M. COFFEY, THE
LONG THIRST-PROHIBITION IN AMERICA: 1920-1933, at 8 (1976); MARTIN E. MARTY,
PILGRIMS IN THEIR OWN LAND 376-78 (1984) [hereinafter PILGRIMS], named for the
Congressman who introduced the Act, see JAMES H. TIMBERLAKE, PROHIBITION AND
THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT: 1900-1920, at 181 (1970), and will be so referred to in
this article.
1o OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992 (1987).
11 The Volstead Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 307 (1919).
12 Id. at 308.
13 Id. at 307-08.
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at least Christian religious purposes 14-from prohibition,
although not from regulation.
Title II went further. An amendment to § 6 of Title II of
the Volstead Act added by the Senate as part of its
consideration of H.R. 6810, the Act as passed by the House of
Representatives, 15 stated the exemption in strikingly different
terms:
14 The crux of the problem involves the use of the word "sacramental" in title
II, § 3 of the Volstead Act, as it relates to the use of wine or other forms of alcoholic
beverages. The term "sacramental" usually connotes Christian religious usage of wine.
See Sweeney v. Webb, 76 S.W. 766, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903) (stating that "[t]he
Jewish mode of worship knows no sacraments, but the same requires the use of wine
on a number of occasions during each week and each year" and that "[s]uch use of wine
has no symbolical or mystical meaning, and is in no sense for sacramental purposes,
but is used on such occasions as a beverage"). See also WEBSTER DICTIONARY (1913 ed.)
available at http://machaut.uchicago.edu/cgi-binlWEBSTER.sh?WORD=sacramental
(defining "sacramental" as "[o]f or pertaining to a sacrament or the sacraments; of the
nature of a sacrament; sacredly or solemny [sic] binding; as, sacramental rites or
elements") (April 30, 2004); id. at http://machaut.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/WEBSTER.sh?
WORD=sacrament (April 30, 2004) (defining "sacrament" as "[o]ne of the solemn
religious ordinances enjoined by Christ, the head of the Christian church, to be
observed by his followers..."). But see Weiss v. State Board of Equalization, 256 P.2d
1, 4 (Cal. 1953) (stating that, while irrelevant to the outcome of the case, the plaintiffs
intended "to sell wine to customers of the Jewish faith for sacramental purposes");
Williams v. Bright, 632 N.Y.S. 2d 760, 767 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (noting that "a law
prohibiting all consumption of alcohol may impose a special burden on the use of
sacramental wine in Catholic or Jewish rites, and without an exemption, the law of
general application may in fact fail the test of religious neutrality").
Justice Souter wrote:
A secular law, applicable to all, that prohibits consumption of alcohol, for
example, will affect members of religions that require the use of wine
differently from members of other religions and nonbelievers,
disproportionately burdening the practice of, say, Catholicism or Judaism.
Without an exemption for sacramental wine, Prohibition may fail the test of
religious neutrality.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 561 (1992)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Souter clearly meant to
say that Catholic and Jewish religious use of wine was "sacramental." This passage
influenced the court in Williams v. Bright. (In a footnote to this passage, Souter noted
that "[tihe prohibition law in place earlier this century did in fact exempt 'wine for
sacramental purposes.' National Prohibition Act, Title II, § 3, 41. Stat. 308." Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 561 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). He, like Justice Blackmun, missed the form of the
exemption found in Title II, § 6 of the Volstead Act.) Justice O'Connor put it this way:
"A state law prohibiting the consumption of alcohol may exempt sacramental wines,
but it may not exempt sacramental wine use by Catholics but not by Jews." Bd. of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715-16 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Sweeney may be bad law today, as the foregoing discussion suggests, but it
is altogether possible that Sweeney would have been followed by many courts in the
years leading up to National Prohibition, as the dictionary definitions quoted above
would suggest. For further consideration of Sweeney and its implications, see infra
notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
15 See S. REP. No. 151, at 5 (1919).
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Nothing in this title shall be held to apply to the manufacture, sale,
transportation, importation, possession, or distribution of wine for
sacramental purposes, or like religious rites, except section 6 (save
as the same require a permit to purchase) and section 10 hereof, and
the provisions of this Act prescribing penalties for the violation of
either of said sections. No person to whom a permit may be issued to
manufacture, transport, import, or sell wines for sacramental
purposes or like religious rites shall sell, barter, exchange, or furnish
any such to any person not a rabbi, minister of the gospel, priest, or
an officer duly authorized for the purpose of any church or
congregation, nor to any such except upon an application duly
subscribed by him, which application, authenticated as regulations
may prescribe, shall be filed and preserved by the seller. The head of
any conference or diocese or other ecclesiastical jurisdiction may
designate any rabbi, minister, or priest to supervise the manufacture
of wine to be used for the purposes and rites in this section
mentioned, and the person so designated may, in the discretion of
the commissioner [of Internal Revenue], be granted a permit to
supervise such manufacture. 16
Leaving to one side the regulatory regime to which the
religious use of wine was made subject by National
Prohibition,17 the text of the § 6 form of the exemption makes it
abundantly clear that the Senate understood that specific
religions-Judaism, liturgical and evangelical Protestantism
(including Lutheranism), Roman Catholicism, Eastern
Orthodoxy, and Episcopalianism-would benefit from the grant
of the exemption. The phrase "rabbi, minister of the gospel,
priest, or an officer duly authorized for the purpose of any
church or congregation" encompasses, certainly in 1919 or
thereabouts, the congregational, parish, or local clergy of these
religions. 18 The exemption, as it appeared in § 3 of the Volstead
16 The Volstead Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 311 (1919) (emphasis added).
17 The regulation of the religious use of wine may well have been problematic.
However, the workings of that regime lie beyond the scope of this Article. It suffices for
present purposes to note that religious officials evidently registered few complaints
regarding the practical workings of the regulatory system prescribed by the Volstead
Act. On the other hand, it may well be that far too much wine found its way into non-
religious hands, regulations notwithstanding. See FLETCHER DOBYNs, THE AMAZING
STORY OF REPEAL: AN EXPOst OF THE POWER OF PROPAGANDA 297-98 (1940).
18 With regard to "rabbis," see In re Silverstein's Estate, 75 N.Y.S.2d 144,145
(N.Y. Sur. 1947) (referring to a New York statute which defined "minister" as a "rabbi
or other person having authority from . . . the church, to preside over and direct the
spiritual affairs of the church"). See also ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA (1911 ed.)
available at http://44.1911encyclopedia.orgRRA1RABBI.htm (Mar. 25, 2004) (stating
that the term "Rabbis" referred to "modern Jewish clergy").
With regard to "ministers," see Pfeiffer v. Board of Education, 77 N.W. 250,
251 (Mich. 1898) (defining "minister" as a "religious teacher"); In re Silverstein's Estate,
supra. See also WEBSTER DICTIONARY (1913 ed.) available at http://machaut.uchicago.
edu/cgi-bin/WEBSTER.sh?WORD=minister (last visited Mar. 25, 2004) (defining the
term "minister" as "[o]ne who serves at the altar; one who performs sacerdotal duties;
2005]
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Act, arguably limited the scope of the exemption to the
religious use of wine by Christians. The § 3 form of the
exemption appeared in the whole array of National Prohibition
bills introduced in the House and the Senate.19 The Senate
Judiciary Committee broadened the exemption in its § 6 form
to cover the religious use of wine by Christians and Jews.20 Of
course the Senate, the Conference,21 and the House concurred
in this second form of the exemption because it became a part
of the law enacted by Congress. The text of the § 6 form shows
that Congress intended to designate as explicitly as possible
which religions would benefit from the exemption. Section 6
may or may not alter the scope of the accommodation as it
appears in § 3 of the Volstead Act, but it surely communicated
the intentions of Congress to benefit Jews, evangelical
Protestants still using wine,22 liturgical Protestants, Catholics,
and Eastern Orthodox Christians.
Justice Blackmun was correct then in his comparative
assessment of the Volstead Act and the Oregon statute,
although his reference to Roman Catholics was underinclusive.
The § 3 form applied at least to the use of wine by Christians,
and the § 6 form applied to the religious use of wine by
Christians and Jews. Oregon, however, had no interest in
the pastor of a church duly authorized or licensed to preach the gospel and administer
the sacraments").
With regard to "priests," see Nikulnikoff v. Archbishop and Consistory of
Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, 255 N.Y.S. 653, 661-62 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1932)
(defining "priest" as, inter alia, "[o]ne whose office is to perform public religious
functions; an official minister of religious worship" who "[iln hierarchical Christian
churches [is] a clergyman in the second of the holy orders (above a deacon and below a
bishop), having authority to administer the sacraments and pronounce absolution")
(citing THE OXFORD DICTIONARY (1909 ed.)). See also Webster Dictionary (1913 ed.)
available at http://machaut.uchicago.edu.cgi-bin/WEBSTER.sh?WORD=priest (last
visited Mar. 25, 2004). The term "priest" is defined as:
A presbyter elder; a minister; specifically: (a) ([Roman Catholic Church] &
[Greek Church]) One who is authorized to consecrate the host and to say
Mass; but especially, one of the lowest order possessing this power .... (b)
([Church of England] & [Protestant Episcopal Church]) a presbyter; one who
belongs to the intermediate order between bishop and deacon. He is
authorized to perform all ministerial services except those of ordination and
confirmation.
Id.
19 See, e.g., S. 555, 66th Cong. (1919), S. 611, 66th Cong. (1920), H.R. 3458,
66th Cong. (1919) (introduced by Congressman Volstead), H.R. 5549, 66th Cong.
(1920).
20 The writer is unaware of any use of wine by religions other than
Christianity and Judaism. The writer is also unaware of the religious use of alcohol,
other than wine, by any religion. It suffices to note, however, that should such uses
exist, they were probably not covered by the exemption contained in the Volstead Act.
21 See H.R. Con. Res. 118, 66th Cong. (1st Sess. 1919)
22 See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
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accommodating the religious usages, practices, and needs of
the members of the Native American Church. But it does not
follow that the reason for the Volstead Act exemption, in either
its § 3 form or its § 6 form, necessarily reflected any particular
theory of religious freedom, nor does the Justice make any
claim as to the reason for the exemption.
This Article will explore the meaning of the Volstead
Act exemption for the religious use of wine by Christians and
Jews. The Act itself has to be seen in its larger context before
the exemption can be understood as an expression of a
particular theory of religious freedom or liberty. I have earlier
argued that the United States was, and still is, a Protestant
Empire,23 a religious polity "fueled by the Anglo-American
Reformation and shaped by [a series of] Religious Settlements"
beginning in 1534 and continuing through the founding of the
United States and the incorporation of the Religion Clauses
into the Fourteenth Amendment.24 This religious polity:
[E]xhibits five major 'procedural' characteristics. The first is an
opposition to Roman Catholicism. The second consists of a dedication
to convert the people of the United States to Protestantism. The
third is a fluctuating commitment to the idea that the various
Protestant denominations constitute an affinity group participating
in a complex tapestry of competition and cooperation. The fourth
amounts to a belief that the perfect society, the "purified" Protestant
Empire, is only one or more social reforms away. The fifth is a
pragmatic commitment to attrition and restraint to achieve the goals
of the Protestant Empire, rather than the use of the most violent
forms of coercion in furtherance of those goals, though these forms
remain in the background. 25
National Prohibition was a social reform that enjoyed
the support of virtually all American evangelical Protestants.26
23 See Michael deHaven Newsom, The American Protestant Empire: A
Historical Perspective, 11 WASHBURN L.J. 187 passim (2001) [hereinafter Protestant
Empire].
24 See Common School Religion, supra note 6, at 222.
25 Id. at 222-23.
26 See Protestant Empire, supra note 23, at 253 n.546. See also SYDNEY E.
AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 901 (1972) (stating that
evangelical and liberal Protestants led the drive for National Prohibition); JERALD C.
BRAUER, PROTESTANTISM IN AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 252 (1965) (stating that
American Protestants, excepting Lutherans and Episcopalians, "favored either a
drastic reduction of or prohibition of all alcoholic beverages"); ROBERT T. HANDY, A
CHRISTIAN AMERICA: PROTESTANT HOPES AND HISTORICAL REALITIES 90 (1971)
(declaring that "[tihere was a high degree of evangelical consensus on temperance");
PILGRIMS, supra note 9, at 374-77 (arguing that the Volstead Act was the work of "the
old-stock English Protestants"); MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 299 (1992) (stating that "Prohibition... illustrated the
power of the nation's public Protestants-generally evangelical, almost all white,
2005]
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It can be seen, therefore, as a paradigmatic work of the
Protestant Empire, a pan-Protestant social reform. And since
the Protestant Empire is not only a grand historical idea, but
also an organizing or structural principle, it may make sense to
view the complex intersection of theology, politics, culture,
sociology and economics that constitutes the ultimate reality of
National Prohibition through the lens or prism of the five
characteristic traits of the Protestant Empire.
All five of these traits present themselves in the grand
drama that constitutes National Prohibition. Demonstrated
commitment to pan-Protestantism and belief in Prohibition as
a "purifying" social reform stand as virtual givens.27 As to the
largely of British background-in translating their moral vision into the law of the
land"); TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 21 (noting that except for Episcopalians and
German Lutherans, "most of the Protestant churches aligned themselves solidly behind
the prohibition movement").
27 Drys found ostensible secular reasons for drying up America. See DELIVER,
supra note 9, at 12-13 (noting that "fe]xcept as we can see the Temperance-Prohibition
Movement as an expression of [a] bourgeois interior, the movement will always appear
either irrational or repressive. The purpose of Prohibition was to protect the values
sheltered by the American nuclear family"); JOHN ALLEN KROUT, THE ORIGINS OF
PROHIBITION 298 (1925) (describing Prohibition as "a movement against disease and
poverty, against filth and misery, against drunken husbands who beat their wives and
sent their children into the street to beg, against liquor dealers who grew rich while
their customers filled the alms-houses and debtors' prisons"); JOHN J. RUMBARGER,
PROFITS POWER, AND PROHIBITION: ALCOHOL REFORM AND THE INDUSTRIALIZING OF
AMERICA, 1800-1930, at xxiv (1989) (stating that "prohibition triumphed because
enough urban capitalists believed such a ban was, in existing circumstances, a
necessary precondition of the social reform required to ensure successful and
permanent transformation of American society into an industrial order characterized
by political stability and labor's social quiescence"); Larry Daniel Engelmann, 0,
Whisky: The History of Prohibition in Michigan 169 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with author) (arguing that the Anti-
Saloon League won over moderate voters with the argument that "once the saloon was
gone, the drinker would spend his money on other consumption goods ... furniture, a
car, a house, clothes, or groceries").
Economic arguments would seem to be purely secular. However, they may
have a religious predicate. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM (Stephen Kalberg, ed. and trans., 2002) (connecting certain Calvinist
doctrines to modern capitalism). A full exploration of Weber's thought lies beyond the
scope of this paper. But the fact that there is a link between evangelical Protestant
religion and capitalist economics in America would seem to be beyond serious question.
See infra note 509 and accompanying text; ROBERT A. WAUZZINSKI, BETWEEN GOD AND
GOLD: PROTESTANT EVANGELICALISM AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1820-1914
(1993). The argument of family protection similarly has a religious predicate as the
agenda of the Women's Christian Temperance Union plainly establishes. William
Elliott West, Dry Crusade: The Prohibition Movement in Colorado, 1858-1933, 143-45
(1971) (unpublished thesis, University of Colorado) (on file with author). Finally, two
arguments often advanced in support of Prohibition, taming the cities, see JOSIAH
STRONG, OUR COUNTRY 171-86 (Jurgen Herbst ed., 1963) (1891), and destroying the
saloon, see infra notes 223-36 and accompanying text, were nothing but proxies or
covers for attacks on non-evangelical Protestants. One may fairly conclude, therefore,
that the secular case for Prohibition was, in fact, largely, if not entirely, a religious case
for Prohibition.
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other three characteristic traits of the Anglo-American
Protestant Empire, Part II of this Article will examine the
phenomenon and the reality of anti-Catholicism,
Protestantization, and the dynamic relation between suasion
and coercion, as they all relate to National Prohibition.
Part III will next take up the exemptions contained in
various state and federal laws enacted in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Exemptions for the religious use of
wine by Christians were fairly common. But exemptions
sufficiently broad to cover the religious use of wine by Jews
were rare.
In the twentieth century, the question of exemptions
took on a new meaning. Evangelical Protestants had largely
abandoned the use of wine in their communion services, so any
exemption would basically accommodate the practices of
religious minorities. The question whether to have an
exemption at all, and, if so, what its scope should be, therefore,
became a matter of some debate and controversy in the two
decades leading up to National Prohibition.
The very existence of the exemption for the religious use
of wine by Christians and Jews compels at least two readings
or understandings of the exemption in the Volstead Act: the
authors of the statute did not intend to use National
Prohibition as a means of destroying the Catholic Mass-or any
other Jewish or Christian rite that was dependent upon the use
of wine; and the authors of the statute did not intend to use
National Prohibition as a means of forcing those who make
religious use of wine-Catholics, Episcopalians, Jews, Eastern
Orthodox Christians, Lutherans, and any evangelical
Protestants still using wine28-to routinely beg judges and
prosecutors (most of whom presumably would be evangelical
Protestants29) for permission to use wine for religious purposes,
and thus for mercy, although they might have to beg Congress,
from time to time, to keep the exemption in place. Part IV will
discusss these two textual readings and how they necessarily
implicate "some kind of religious freedom," but they offer little
insight into the reason or reasons why the exemption existed.
Part IV will thus discuss four possible contextual
reasons for the exemption of the religious use of wine contained
in the Volstead Act. The first holds that the exemption may
28 See infra Part II.A.4.
29 See 2 KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 1258 (rev.
ed. 1975) (1953) (noting that in 1914 America was overwhelmingly Protestant).
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simply have amounted to propitiation to Episcopalians,
American Anglicans,3o notwithstanding the language of § 6 of
Title II, with others benefiting solely by reason of interest-
convergence. 31 The second supposes that the exemption may
simply have reflected a series of pragmatic or strategic
judgments by Drys as to how to make National Prohibition
work given the social and demographic realities of 1919
America. The third propounds the theory that the exemption
for the religious use of wine may have reflected a desire to wait
out Roman Catholics, and for that matter, Jews, Eastern
Orthodox Christians, and even Episcopalians and Lutherans,
relying on other social dynamics to convert them in the fullness
of time into evangelical Protestants. And the fourth argues that
the exemption may have been a principled statement of a
broad, generous, liberal conception of religious freedom, a
theory that celebrates religious diversity as a social good.
It is the conclusion of this Article, the third in my
Protestant Empire series,32 that a reading of the exemption
based on some broad and liberal principle of religious freedom
and liberty that exalts diversity and pluralism is implausible.
Rather, the setting and the context of the exemption make the
propitiation reading very probable, and make the two strategic
restraint readings likely. Thus, as Justice Blackmun correctly
noted, Catholics fared better under National Prohibtion than
the members of the Native American Church do under
Oregon's anti-drug laws. But this is only to say that Catholics
did not have to confront the destruction of their religious
practices, and beg prosecutors and judges for mercy, whereas,
given the result in Smith, members of the Native American
Church did.
II. ANTI-CATHOLICISM, PROTESTANTIZATION, AND THE
DYNAMIC RELATION OF SUASION AND COERCION
This Part explores the relationship between the
Protestant Empire's anti-Catholicism, its desire to
30 The Episcopal Church is the American branch of the now-worldwide
Anglican communion. See 2 WILLIAM STEVENS PERRY, THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
EPISCOPAL CHURCH 1587-1883, at 101-118 (Boston, James R. Osgood & Co. 1885). The
Church of England, established by Henry VIII, is the "mother church" of that
communion. Id.
31 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518 (1980).
32 See Common School Religion, supra note 6; Protestant Empire, supra note
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Protestantize America, and the dynamic relation of suasion
and coercion, as they all relate to the undoubtedly Protestant
endorsed temperance movement. Indeed, the origins of
Protestant Empire anti-Catholicism are complex and varied.33
To begin, though, subpart A will discuss the anti-Catholicism
inherent in the evangelical Protestant doctrine of the
Eucharist, the central act of Christian worship. In particular, it
will address how the Protestant doctrine of the Eucharist, in
contrast to the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist, allowed for a
Protestant attack on alcohol.
Subpart B then will discuss the development of a
political basis or predicate for the anti-Catholicism of the
English and then the Americans. Subpart C will explore the
general outlines of Anglo-American Protestant Empire anti-
Catholicism as it relates to the temperance-prohibition
movement and its full flowering in National Prohibition.
Subpart D will look at Protestantization, also a
characteristic trait of a Protestant Empire, and the resistance
of Catholics and other non-Protestants thereto. Inasmuch as
National Prohibition was, in many ways, seen as a way to
convert non-Protestants, to Protestantize them, that
resistance, in and of itself, could also--and did-contribute to
the anti-Catholicism of the Drys.34 Catholics, together with
other religious groups, resisted the siren call of National
Prohibition, but the Drys were bound and determined to
prevail, and the resistance of Catholics and others made them,
at the least, impatient. A liberal theory of religious freedom
might not fare well in such rocky soil. Lastly, subpart E will
explore the complex relation between attrition and restraint
and moral suasion on the one hand and coercion and the
sanction of state violence on the other, the fifth characteristic
trait of a Protestant Empire, again a circumstance that puts a
liberal conception of religious freedom to the test.
33 See Protestant Empire, supra note 24, at 189-92.
34 See Common School Religion, supra note 6, at 238-44 (discussing the
dynamic relation between evangelical Protestant persistence and Roman Catholic
resistance to prayer and Bible reading in the public schools).
20051
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
A. The Theology of Anti-Catholicism
1. The Setting or Context: The Catholic Doctrine of the
Eucharist
Christian theology at its core is about the Eucharist.
This holds equally true for those Christians for whom the
Eucharist sits at the center of religious life and for those
Christians who ascribe little or no importance, value, or
meaning to the Eucharist. 35 This is a very large claim indeed. It
subordinates the Christian ethic 36 to a cultic ritual, or at the
very least supposes that the cultic informs and shapes the
ethical. But this claim also rests on the fact that the
Eucharistic liturgy has been the central act of Christian
worship from the very beginning of Christianity itself,37 and
that a cultic ritual of this sort indeed must inform and shape
the ethical life of the religious community.
The second claim made here is that there is a
fundamental dynamic in Western Christianity which is driven
by personal, political, cultural and social responses to the
Roman Catholic Church as that Church has manifested itself
in history. If anything counts for truth in Western Christianity,
it is that Western Christians are not neutral about the Roman
Catholic Church. 38 Because the Roman Catholic Church
developed a definitive and authoritative doctrine of the
Eucharist, Protestant Eucharistic theology can be understood
as a doctrine or set of doctrines that sit in apposition, if not
outright opposition, to Catholic teaching.
35 Martin Marty notes that Protestants took over the Eucharistic liturgy "in
some revised form," although they "tended to reduce the numbers of occasions when it
was celebrated from daily to weekly, from weekly to monthly or quarterly and even
annually." MARTIN E. MARTY, PROTESTANTISM 167 (1972) [hereinafter
PROTESTANTISM]. He concluded:
Given such neglect, it is also surprising to the student of history to see how
much ink was spilled in polemics over the Catholic version and how much
controversy and infighting ensued between Protestant parties over its
meaning. Even twentieth century discussions of intercommunion in the
ecumenical movement occur with an intensity not always shared by the
faithful in their congregations. It might almost be said that the Lord's Supper
(or Mass, or Eucharist, or Holy Communion, or Lord's Table) was more fought
over than enjoyed in Protestantism.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
36 Perhaps the quintessential expression of the Christian ethic is found in the
Beatitudes. See Matthew 5:3-12.
31 GREGORY Dix, THE SHAPE OF THE LITURGY 1-11 (2d ed. 1945).
38 Nothing else can explain the sharp cleavage between Protestants and
Catholics. In the context of Protestant Empires, this cleavage manifests itself in a
characteristic anti-Catholicism. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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For present purposes, the doctrine of transubstantiation
sums up Catholic Eucharistic theology. The Roman Catholic
Church's understanding of the doctrine was reaffirmed in the
middle of the sixteenth century. Partially in response to the
Protestant Reformation, the Roman Catholic Church convened
the Council of Trent. It consisted of twenty five sessions held
between 1545 and 1563. At the Thirteenth Session held in
1551, the Council issued a decree on the subject of
transubstantiation.
First of all, the holy council teaches and openly and plainly professes
that after the consecration3 9 of bread and wine, our Lord Jesus
Christ, true God and true man, is truly, really and substantially
contained in the august sacrament of the Holy Eucharist under the
appearance of those sensible things [bread and wine]. For there is no
repugnance in this that our Savior sits always at the right hand of
the Father in heaven according to the natural mode of existing, and
yet is in many other places sacramentally present to us in His own
substance by a manner of existence which, though we can scarcely
express in words, yet with our understanding illumined by faith, we
can conceive and ought most firmly to believe is possible to God ...
Since [the Institution Narratives]4 0 embody that proper and clearest
meaning in which they were understood by the Fathers, it is a most
contemptible action on the part of some contentious and wicked men
39 There is a discrete moment in the Mass called the moment of consecration.
It occurs during the Eucharistic Prayer. In Roman Catholicism, that moment
transpired when the celebrant recited the Institution Narrative. DIX, supra note 37, at
299-302.
4o There are four Institution Narratives in the New Testament, all of them
quite liturgical in their structure. See Matthew 26:26-30; Mark 14:22-25; Luke 22:19-
20; 1 Corinthians 11:23-26. They all account for what Jesus said and did at the Last
Supper and the meaning He gave to it. In Paul's first letter to the Church at Corinth,
by way of example, the Institution Narrative proceeds as follows:
The Lord Jesus on the night when he was betrayed took a loaf of bread, and
when he had given thanks, he broke it and said, 'This is my body that is for
you. Do this in remembrance of me." In the same way he took the cup also,
after supper, saying, "his cup is the new covenant in my blood. Do this, as
often as you drink it in remembrance of me."
1 Corinthians 11:23-25.
In the prayers uttered by the priest in the liturgy similar words are used in
the recounting of what happened at the Last Supper. For example, in Eucharistic
Prayer II in the Roman Catholic Mass, the following words are said:
Before he was given up to death, a death he freely accepted, he took bread
and gave you thanks. He broke the bread, gave it to his disciples, and said:
Take this, all of you, and eat it: this is my body which will be given up for you.
When supper was ended he took the cup. Again he gave you thanks and
praise, gave the cup to his disciples, and said: Take this, all of you, and drink
from it: this is the cup of my blood, the blood of the new and everlasting
covenant. It will be shed for you and for all so that sins may be forgiven. Do
this in memory of me.
NEW ST. JOSEPH, SUNDAY MISSAL: PRAYERBOOK AND HYMNAL FOR 2004, at 30 (2003).
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to twist them into fictitious and imaginary tropes by which the truth
of the flesh and blood of Christ is denied .... 41
The Council continued:
[B~y the consecration of the bread and wine a change is brought
about of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the
body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into
the substance of His blood. This change the holy Catholic Church
properly and appropriately calls transubstantiation.
42
One of the clear consequences of this teaching is that the
bread and wine become something holy and divine at the
moment of consecration. The Eucharist consists of at least two
parts: the bread and the wine (the first part) are the signs of
the Body and Blood of Christ (the second part), that which the
bread and wine signify.43 An important part of Catholic
teaching is that the sacraments are "instrumental causes of
God's grace."44 The Council reaffirmed this doctrine. 45 The
Eucharist, therefore, has three parts: the sign (the bread and
wine), the reality signified by the sign (the Body and Blood of
Christ), and the grace or the virtue of that reality.46
Writ somewhat larger, the Catholic understanding of
the Eucharist presupposes that the divine (the Body and Blood
of Christ) can enter into union with the created material order
(the bread and wine) for the purpose of dispensing grace. The
divine does not sit or act apart from the material world but
rather joins with it in order to aid in the salvation of the
faithful Christian. Catholic sacramental theology ultimately
rests on a broad view of reconciliation. Catholic teaching
necessarily ascribes an importance to the material world in the
salvation economy, and therefore ascribes a soteriological
meaning or value to the created order. There is, in a literal as
well as a theological sense, a kind of "earthiness" or "earthy" or
"earthly" realism in Catholic Eucharistic theology. It is as if
God gets His hands "dirty" in the stuff of His created order, it is
41 CANONS AND DECREES OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT 73 (H. J. Schroeder,
trans., TAN Books & Publishers, Inc. 1978) (1941) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
CANONS AND DECREES].
42 Id. at 75 (footnotes omitted).
43 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, § IlIla q.73-74, at 3-25
(William Barden trans.) (McGraw Hill Co. 1965) (1273).
44 Id. at § IIla, q.62, at 51.
45 See CANONS AND DECREES, supra note 41, at 52.
46 See, e.g., CHARLES E. SHEEDY, THE EUCHARISTIC CONTROVERSY OF THE
ELEVENTH CENTURY 109-24 (1980) (using the terminology sacramentum, sacramentum-
et-res, and res sacramenti).
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as if God somehow joins with us, here, not in Heaven, not in
some rarified way-station between Heaven and Earth suffused
only with power, energy or virtue, and not in some "purified"
soul, heart or mind. Reconciliation and realism, which are
captured in the Catholic Eucharistic doctrine of Real Presence,
are the touchstones of the Catholic sacramental
Weltanschauung. 47
This, then, is the doctrine that the Protestant Reformers
of the sixteenth century decided to refute and overthrow. Once
transubstantiation falls, the rest is easy: all that remains is a
mopping up. The papacy, the ordered ministry, the
sacramental system, the meaning of "Church" only require a
slight push or shove to cause them to topple over once
transubstantiation has been done in.
Protestants have tended to react somewhat differently
to this "mopping up." The more conservative Reformers
contented themselves with trashing transubstantiation.
Anglicanism, for example, retained at least the outward
forms-if not the inner or hidden reality-of the ordered
ministry, the sacramental system and the sense of "Church" as
something more than a mere voluntary association of like-
minded believers.48 In contrast, the more radical Reformers,
the progenitors of evangelical Protestantism, overthrew the
ordered ministry and the sacramental system as well as the
traditional doctrines of the "Church," of ecclesiology. 49 They
took "mopping up" very seriously indeed.
47 For a discussion of the differences, if such they be, on the matter of
Eucharistic theology as between Tridentine Catholicism and Vatican II Catholicism,
see G.C. BERKOUWER, THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL AND THE NEW CATHOLICISM
(Lewis B. Smedes, trans., 1965); CHRISTOPHER BUTLER, THE THEOLOGY OF VATICAN II
(1967); AVERY DULLES, THE RESHAPING OF CATHOLICISM: CURRENT CHALLENGES IN THE
THEOLOGY OF THE CHURCH (1988); MODERN CATHOLICISM: VATICAN II AND AFTER
(Adrian Hastings, ed., 1991); GEORGE A. LINDBECK, THE FUTURE OF ROMAN CATHOLIC
THEOLOGY: VATICAN I1-CATALYST FOR CHANGE (1970); JOHN O'MALLEY, TRADITION
AND TRANSITION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON VATICAN 11 (1989); and KARL RAHNER,
THE CHURCH AFTER THE COUNCIL (D.C. Herron & R. Albrecht, trans., 1966).
48 The Anglican forms, however, had different meanings for the various
parties or groupings in the Anglican churches. See E. CLOWES CHORLEY, MEN AND
MOVEMENTS IN THE AMERICAN EPISCOPAL CHURCH 181 (1946) (stating that 'The
Evangelicals thought of the Church as the blessed company of all faithful people
[essentially the Protestant view of "church," but] [t]he High Churchmen looked on the
other side of the shield [for t]o them the Church was the Body and Bride of Christ; the
pillar and ground of truth; built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus
Christ Himself being the chief corner-stone").
49 Id. at 181-83.
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2. The Evangelical Protestant Doctrine of the Eucharist
a. The Doctrine Explained
The giants of the Protestant Reformation were Martin
Luther and John Calvin. It fell to another reformer, however,
to prescribe what would become the normative evangelical
Protestant doctrine of the Eucharist, 50 the German Swiss
Reformer, Ulrich (Huldrych) Zwingli. He built his Eucharistic
theology on a series of rigid dualisms which were, for him, with
one interesting exception, utterly incapable of reconciliation
because of certain "rules" upon which he insisted.51
The first dualistic "rule" concerned the situs or location
of the body of Christ. Zwingli declared flatly that "the body of
Christ must be in one place, and that is at the right hand of
God,"52 and "Christ's body must be in some particular place in
heaven in virtue of its character as a real body."53 Thus, the
Body of Christ, according to its essence, could not be present in
the Eucharist, and thus no close ontological relation between
the bread and wine and the Body and Blood of Christ could
exist. 54 Zwingli necessarily denied, therefore, that God could, in
the Eucharist, in the liturgy, bridge the gulf between Heaven
and earth. He was contemptuous of those who would "drag
Christ down from heaven and the Father's throne,"55 and he
had "no use for that notion... of a real and true body that does
not exist physically, definitely and distinctly in some place."56
A second dualism central to Zwingli's theology
separated matter and spirit, body and soul: 57 "for the first line
50 See infra Part II.A.2.b.
51 The source of Zwingli's "rules" is far from clear.
52 Ulrich Zwingli, An Account of the Faith, reprinted in ON PROVIDENCE AND
OTHER ESSAYS: ULRICH ZWINGLI 33, 55 (William John Hinke ed., 1983) [hereinafter An
Account] (emphasis added).
53 See Ulrich Zwingli, Exposition of the Christian Faith, reprinted in ON
PROVIDENCE AND OTHER ESSAYS: ULRICH ZWINGLI, supra note 52, at 235, 249
[hereinafter Exposition].
54 Id. at 249-50.
56 Id. at 250.
56 Ulrich Zwingli, Letter to the Princes of Germany, reprinted in ON
PROVIDENCE AND OTHER ESSAYS: ULRICH ZWINGLI, supra note 53, at 105, 120
[hereinafter Letter].
57 Zwingli's favorite "proof text," see G. R. POTTER, HULDRYCH ZWINGLI 91
(1977), for his rigid matter-spirit dualism was John 6:63: "It is the spirit that gives life;
the flesh is useless." The difficulty with this text as proof of a system of rigid
unreconcilable dualisms is that Zwingli utterly failed to place this verse in the context
of the Sixth Book of John from which it comes. The Sixth Book is, in its grand
structure, an outline of the Mass, as written by a gospeler who belonged to a faith
community deeply committed to a sacramental-Incarnationist view of the world, a view
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of division between all things and all substances is that they
are either body or spirit. This division was so far reaching that
it even included God, and the angels and all spirits."58 Zwingli
continued:
As the body cannot be nourished by a spiritual substance, so the soul
cannot be nourished by a corporeal substance. But if the natural
body of Christ is eaten, I ask whether it feeds the body or the soul?
Not the body, hence the soul. If the soul, then the soul eats flesh, and
it would not be true that spirit is only born of spirit.
59
Again, "between material or physical and spiritual there
is no middle term. Though you put together everything there is,
both creator and created things, you will have either spirit or
body."60 Zwingli plainly taught that there can be no
reconciliation across this vast divide that he conjured up. He
derided Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation: "They have
invented some third thing between the real and material body
of Christ and His sacramental body, not that spiritual body
which we eat, but a kind of thing that does not exist, being
neither material nor sacramental, that is symbolical and
significative."61 He declared that "it is wrong for us to be so dull
as to attribute to a material thing what belongs to God alone,
and to turn the Creator into the creature and the creature into
Creator."62 All of these statements evinced a fundamental
rejection of reconciliation in the created order.
Zwingli found yet one more dualism, derived from the
first two, to block any reconciliation of the divine and the
human: "Christ's humanity is not eternal; therefore it is not
rooted in a this-world reconciliation, and as such, utterly inconsistent with the rigid
dualisms upon which Zwingli insisted. The best "simple" proof of the error of Zwingli's
reading of John 6:63 is John 1:14: "And the Word became flesh and lived among us."
The correct reading of John 6:63, of course, is that ordinary flesh is useless, but not so
for the Word made flesh, for that Word made flesh is "true food," John 6:55, in the very
realist sense of reconciliation. Zwingli's rejectionism is real enough, but it comes not
from scripture.
98 Exposition, supra note 53, at 278. John Calvin held the same view:
[Blody must be body, spirit must be spirit, every thing must be subject to that
law, and retain that condition which was fixed by God at its creation. And the
condition of a body is such, that it must occupy one particular place, and have
its proper form and dimensions.
JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION at IV, XVII, XXIV.
59 An Account, supra note 52, at 53.
60 Letter, supra note 56, at 120.
61 Id. at 119.
62 Ulrich Zwingli, On the Providence of God, in ON PROVIDENCE AND OTHER
ESSAYS: ULRICH ZWINGLI, supra note 52, at 128, 192.
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infinite. If it is not infinite, it must be finite. If it is finite, it is
not everywhere."63 And he continued:
[E]ven if the things that belong to Christ's divinity are attributed to
His humanity, and, on the other hand, the things that belong to His
humanity to His divinity, yet the natures are not confused, as if the
divinity had degenerated and been weakened to humanity, or the
humanity changed into divinity. 64
Zwingli concluded with a fourth dualism: "[Christ] is not
to be looked for in the world according to His humanity in
literal, substantial, bodily presence, but only in a spiritual and
sacramental sense."65 For Zwingli, spiritual eating meant
merely trusting "in spirit and heart upon the mercy and
goodness of God through Christ,"66 and sacramental eating
means merely spiritual eating "with the accompaniment of the
sacrament," the bread and wine. 67 It was .'.impossible,' Zwingli
declared, for Christ to have both a mortal [eucharistic] body
and at the same time immortal body [sitting at the right hand
of the Father] ."68
Faith, for Zwingli, was the sum and substance of
reconciliation. Catholic sacramental theology anchors
reconciliation in the church-sacrament system, with the
Church and the Eucharist serving as instrumental means of
grace. 69 Zwingli's doctrine, however, thanks to his rigid
dualisms, left the Christian to her own individual devices. God,
for Zwingli, provided no help, aid or succor, other than faith, to
enable her to experience reconciliation in the midst of life, of
creation, of other people. Faith, for Zwingli, trumped his four
dualistic "rules," and faith, so understood, provided the
predicate for Zwingli's theology of the Eucharist. What he had
to say about the sacrament stands in stark contrast with the
Catholic conception of the Eucharist.
Zwingli defined the sacraments, including the
Eucharist, as
[A] sign of a sacred thing, i.e., of grace that has been given. I believe
that it is a visible figure or form of the invisible grace .... a visible
example which presents an analogy to something done by the Spirit.
[T]he sacraments, which are sacred ceremonies . .. should be
63 Exposition, supra note 53, at 250.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 251.
66 Id. at 252.
67 Id.
68 Exposition, supra note 53, at 255-56.
69 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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religiously cherished .... For though they are unable to bestow
grace, they nevertheless associate visibly with the Church us who
have previously been received into it invisibly; and this should be
regarded with the highest veneration, since with their
administration the words of the divine promise are declared and
pronounced. 70
Zwingli effectively reduced the sacrament to the bare
material elements alone, the bread and the wine, the sign. He
made absolutely no provision here whatsoever for either the
Body and Blood of Christ or the gift of grace because "sacred
ceremonies" and the declaration of "words of the divine
promise" are a far cry from the traditional understanding of the
reality-the Body and Blood of Christ-and the benefit-the
grace or virtue of the sacrament. Zwingli did recognize that the
Body and Blood of Christ exist but only in Heaven, and that
God bestows grace on his faithful believers. However, he did
not connect either of them to the material elements of
sacrament. Quite the contrary, he distanced them from the
bread and wine. 71
Thus, the most that the sacraments could do was,
"acting as a sort of a stimulant, call into action the faith or
promise which is already there and bear witness to the other
members of the Church"72 because grace "belongs to God
alone,"73 and it was "frivolous... to teach that either the saints
or the sacraments remove sins and bestow grace upon us. For
who remitteth sins save God alone?" 74 The "virtues" of the
Eucharist, such as they were for Zwingli, lay in the fact that
they: (1) "are sacred and venerable rites";75 (2) "bear witness to
an accomplished fact";76 (3) "take the place of the things they
signify, whence also they get their names";77 (4) "signify
sublime things";78 (5) are an "analogy between the symbols [the
bread and wine] and the thing signified [the Body and Blood of
70 An Account, supra note 52, at 48.
71 Zwingli was quite clear that the Eucharist was not an instrumental means
of grace: "[i1t is apparent that the sacraments cannot justify nor give grace, for we
know no other justification than that of faith. It follows also that grace is not bound up
with the sacraments." Letter, supra note 56, at 113.
72 Id. And again Zwingli wrote "I, however, say that the sacraments do not
bestow grace, but call it into activity and testify to it when already bestowed." Id. at
118.
73 Exposition, supra note 53, at 241.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 256.
76 Id. at 257.
77 Id.
78 Exposition, supra note 53, at 256.
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Christ]";79 (6) "bring increase and support to faith, and this the
Eucharist does above all others";80 and (7) "fill the office of an
oath of allegiance."1
The centrality of faith as the sum and substance of the
Eucharist for Zwingli became clear:
I believe that in the holy Eucharist, i.e., the supper of thanksgiving,
the true body of Christ is present by the contemplation of faith. This
means that they who thank the Lord for the benefits bestowed on us
in His Son acknowledge that He assumed true flesh, in it truly
suffered, truly washed away our sins by His blood; and thus
everything done by Christ becomes as it were present to them by the
contemplation of faith.8 2
There was no objective reality, no objective presence for
Zwingli. The only reality in the Eucharist, apart from the bread
and wine, consisted of the "contemplation of faith."83 Zwingli's
true meaning lies in the use of phrases like "as it were
present," implying a mere figure. In other words, far from any
Real Presence of the Body and Blood of Christ, far from a close
ontological relation of the reality or the thing of the Eucharist
with the bread and wine, there is only a figurative one.
Zwingli's thinking became even clearer in the following
passage:
But that the body of Christ in essence and really, i.e., the natural
body itself, is either present in the supper or masticated with our
mouth and teeth, as the Papists or some [the Lutherans] who look
back to the fleshpots of Egypt assert, we not only deny, but
constantly maintain to be an error, contrary to the Word of God.
Here the presence of the body alone is denied, for according to
His divinity He is always present, because He is always everywhere,
according to His other word: "Lo, I am with you always, even unto
the end of the world," viz., according to divinity, power and
goodness. 84
The dualistic "rules" had led Zwingli to teach that the
natural body of Christ was in Heaven and could not be present
in the Eucharist.85 This in turn required Zwingli to tackle
Scripture itself: "[W]e are compelled to confess that the words:
79 Id.
80 Id. at 258.
81 Id. at 259.
82 An Account, supra note 52, at 49 (second emphasis added).
83 In a certain sense, the Body and Blood of Christ are present only in the
mind. See Letter, supra note 56, at 107, 109, 113.
84 An Account, supra note 52, at 49.
85 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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'This is my body,' should not be understood naturally, but
figuratively."86 Accordingly, Zwingli rewrote the Institution
Narratives, 81 turning them merely into a large metaphor or
trope.
"Do this in remembrance of me, giving thanks and offerings and
pouring out prayer and praise because I, the spouse of your souls,
have redeemed you." . . . So in the Eucharist [Christ], when going
away to a distant country, gave Himself to us in the bread and wine
far more vividly and intimately when He said, 'This is my body,"
than if He had said, "This is a symbol of my body," though He was
going to take away His material body and place it in heaven. Yet by
these words He gave Himself just as entirely, as far as faith and
grace are concerned, as if He had said, "Now I am going to death for
you, and a little later [at the Ascension] I shall go away from here
again, but I do not want you to doubt of my love and care for you. I
am wholly yours in all that I am. In witness of this I entrust to you a
symbol of this my surrender and testament, to awaken in you the
remembrance of me and of my goodness to you, that when you see
this bread and this cup, held forth in this memorial Supper, you may
remember me as delivered up for you, just as if you saw me before
you as you see me now, eating with you and presently to be taken
away from you to suffer for you."88
All of Zwingli's major themes, which combine to deny
the Real Presence, found themselves here. The meaning that
he ascribed to the Institution Narratives meant that there was
no consecration. Nothing happens for Zwingli in the liturgy
except memory and contemplation. Christ says, in Zwingli's
"restatement" of the Last Supper, that He entrusts to us a
symbol to "awaken" in us the memory of past events. But
memory and contemplation are entirely mental, subjective, and
highly individualistic acts. There really is no need for "church"
in this view. Nothing was present, in any meaningful sense of
the word, apart from the individual, private act of memory,
because what was recalled was entirely past, and the past did
not participate in the present.
What had to be remembered, for Zwingli, was Jesus and
his "goodness" towards his followers. This meant, therefore,
that there could be no sacramental relation between the bread
and wine, on the one hand, and the Body and Blood of Christ
and the grace or virtue of the sacrament on the other hand. The
only sacramental relation, if such it be, involved the bread and
wine and the individual, private act of memory.
86 An Account, supra note 52, at 52.
87 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
88 Letter, supra note 56, at 122-23.
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Zwingli's teaching took private individual meditation, of
the sort contemplated merely as an accompaniment of the
medieval Catholic liturgy,89 and made it the essence of the
meaning of the liturgy itself. In so doing, the liturgy could not
survive, at least not in any form remotely resembling the
traditional Catholic Mass.90 The private individual meditation
became the basis for evangelical Protestant Sunday morning
church services. 91
Having rejected Real Presence, Zwingli arguably taught
a "Real Past," to be honored and venerated.92 Veneration,
therefore, becomes the true meaning of "liturgy" for Zwingli.
The bread and wine, while not in an ontological sacramental
relation with the Body and Blood of Christ, while not Really
Present, nonetheless serve as mind-enhancers, 93  again,
providing content for the meaning of the "liturgy" for Zwingli.
[T]hese signs [the bread and wine] were so instituted by Christ
Himself, that by their very analogy they might be especially effective
for bringing one to the consciousness of the actual thing through
faith and contemplation. Hence, since the sacraments were
instituted to give teaching, suggestion, delight through the senses
just as much as the external word, it happens that, when given the
names of the things of which they are the signs and which are
themselves the real refreshment of the mind, they kindle the mind
more effectively than any one can do by contemplating the divine
goodness, however faithfully it may be, without the signs. And since
this is so, the most learned and holy men have rightly made frequent
use of the sacraments for the things of which they are the
89 See DIX, supra note 37, at 605-12.
50 The earliest understanding of the Eucharist was as a corporate rite, in
which every member of the faith community had an active role to play. See id. at 1-2,
12-35, 607. Thus liturgy was first understood literally as the work of the people. This
conception of the liturgy changed, and it came to be seen as the work of the priest, and
the mass became something "said" rather than "done." Id. at 13. And it was this latter
conception against which the Protestant Reformers, including Zwingli, reacted.
However, the connection between the liturgy and Real Presence was no less great in
the second context than in the first. The doctrine of the Council of Trent makes that
abundantly clear. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
91 Truth be told, Zwingli tried to hold on to a Eucharistic liturgy of some sort
or another, but he failed. Dix explains why:
If this tradition of subjective individual devotion to the passion and
atonement were to be maintained, and the catholic doctrines of the priesthood
and the conversion of the elements were to be removed, what need would there
be for maintaining the performance of the eucharist as the centre of christian
worship? It would surely be inevitable that some form of worship more closely
directed to the stimulation of devout affections on the passion would be found
more suitable. So it was-after the Reformation.
Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
92 Exposition, supra note 54, at 240.
93 While Zwingli denied that the sacraments bestowed grace, he nonetheless
found some value for the bread and wine. An Account, supra note 53, at 48.
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sacraments and signs, being well aware how much must be
attributed to each. 
94
One could hardly imagine two Eucharistic theologies
more diametrically opposed than those of Catholics and of
Zwinglians. 95 The differences lie mainly in the meaning or role
of Zwingli's dualistic "rules." Roman Catholics, of course, have
no use for Zwingli's "rules" because in the Catholic sacramental
worldview, reconciliation, effected through the church-
sacrament system, forms the normative proposition or
underpinning of that worldview. For Zwingli, on the other
hand, the "rules" drive his theology.
b. The Triumph of Zwinglian Eucharistic Theology in the
Evangelical Protestant Nomos
The Protestant Reformation gave rise to several
doctrines of the Eucharist.96 Zwinglianism had the virtue, if
such it be, of radical simplicity, and utter opposition to Catholic
sacramental teaching, thereby representing a radical form of
theological anti-Catholicism.
Zwinglian thought emerged fairly early on in England,
much to the supposed displeasure of Henry VIII.97 In fact,
Zwinglian ideas may have profoundly influenced the 1552 Book
of Common Prayer,98 thus certainly making its way into
English Protestantism.
Anglicans and Puritans have disagreed about the
subsequent course of Zwinglianism in non-Anglican English
Protestantism. E.C.E. Bourne, an Anglican priest, insisted that
by the early seventeenth century, Puritans had become
thoroughly Zwinglian in their theological outlook.99 Stephen
Mayor, a non-Anglican English Protestant Pastor, took a
different view of the matter. At the dawn of the seventeenth
century, non-Anglicans had an "ambiguous" theology of the
Lord's Supper because they had had little to say about what
the Eucharistic rite accomplished.100 However, Mayor strongly
94 Letter, supra note 56, at 111.
95 Unless one were to abandon any pretense of the sacraments altogether, as,
for example, the Quakers have done. See J. WILLIAM FROST, THE QUAKERS 4, 30, 64, 83
(1988); RUFUS M. JONES, THE FAITH AND PRACTICE OF THE QUAKERS 71 (2d ed. 1965).
9 See Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 23, at 196 n.65.
97 Id. at 202.
98 Id. at 215.
9 See E.C.E. BOURNE, THE ANGLICANISM OF WILLIAM LAUD 59, 66-68 (1947).




suggested that Separatism had begun to drift towards a
Zwinglian position largely because of its aversion to liturgy of
the Calvinist, much less Catholic, sort.' 0' Separatists also
taught that the sacraments "were of less than central
importance, even while preserving them."102 Examining the
theology of two important Seventeenth Century Separatist or
Nonconformist divines, Mayor concluded that they and their
contemporary dissenters generally leaned towards
Zwinglianism.13 Mayor and Bourne disagree merely about the
timing of the drift to a Zwinglian understanding of the
Eucharist. But it is, of course, clear that the English Puritans,
Separatists and Nonconformists of whom Bourne and Mayor
wrote, were the progenitors of American evangelical
Protestants.
It fell to John W. Nevin, a Nineteenth Century Calvinist
theologian, to document the triumph of Zwinglianism in
American evangelical Protestantism. 1°4 Nevin had set out to
accomplish three objectives: "(i) to show that American
Protestantism had fallen away from Calvin and was quite
content with Zwingli's eucharistic theology; (ii) to re-establish
and re-interpret Calvin's doctrine; (iii) and to correct Calvin's
'psychology,' or his 'sursum-corda' mechanics.105 His first goal
concerns us here.
Nevin launched a thunderous attack on contemporary
American evangelical Protestant Eucharistic theology, finding
it utterly different from the teachings of John Calvin, and
utterly wanting.106 His theory for the American evangelical
Protestant embrace of Zwinglian Eucharistic doctrine was that
(1) rationalism and (2) the tendency to splinter into
innumerable sects, to which Protestants had fallen prey, had
undermined the objectivity of orthodox Calvinism. 107 This was
so because for Nevin, both rationalism and sectarianism were
expressions of subjectivism.108 The powerful link between the
subjectivism that Nevin bemoaned and a Eucharistic theology
101 Id. at 48.
102 Id. at 97.
103 Id. at 114.
104 JOHN W. NEVIN, THE MYSTICAL PRESENCE: A VINDICATION OF THE
REFORMED OR CALVINISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY EUCHARIST (Bard Thompson &
George H. Bricker eds., 1966) (1846).
105 JACK MARTIN MAXWELL, WORSHIP AND REFORMED THEOLOGY: THE
LITURGICAL LESSONS OF MERCERSBURG 31 (1976).
106 Id. at 104-30.
107 Id. at 130-49.
108 Id.
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that stressed subjective, internal, mental recollection of what
Christ did for us-the essence of Zwinglianism-is manifestly
patent. And analysis of the doctrines of American evangelical
Protestants confirms Nevin's diagnosis.109
c. Revivalism and Millenarianism as Reinforcements of
Zwinglian Eucharistic Theology
The attempt by evangelical Protestants to find deeper
meaning, if not sustenance, in Zwinglianism failed. The
Eucharist, understood as corporate liturgy, simply could not
survive the limitations of Zwingli's rejectionist, alienation-
based theology, theology based not on reconciliation, but on un-
bridgeable-and thus distancing or alienatinglO--constituent
parts of the dualisms, like matter and spirit, one from the
109 The Baptists firmly hold to a Zwinglian understanding of the Lord's
Supper. They call it neither the Eucharist nor a sacrament, but instead an "ordinance,"
a word that evokes the sense of the Lord's Supper as a duty-driven bare memorial of
the sort that Zwingli had in mind. See J. LANSING. BURROWS, WHAT BAPTISTS BELIEVE,
AND OTHER DISCOURSES 96-111 (H. M. Wharton & Co. 1887); C. BROWNLOW HASTINGS,
INTRODUCING SOUTHERN BAPTISTS: THEIR FAITH & THEIR LIFE 63-71 (1981).
The Congregationalists are now a part of the United Church of Christ,
which lays claim, in unspecified ways, to Luther, Zwingli, and, most of all, Calvin.
DOUGLAS HORTON, THE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST: ITS ORIGINS, ORGANIZATION, AND
ROLE IN THE WORLD TODAY 92 (1962). However, before the time of National
Prohibition, Congregationalism was essentially Zwinglian. HOWARD G. HAGEMAN,
PULPIT AND TABLE: SOME CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF WORSHIP IN THE REFORMED
CHURCHES 85 (1962) (quoting S.J. ANDREWS, WILLIAM WATSON ANDREWS 14-15
(1900)).
The Methodists have held to a Zwinglian point of view for a long time. See
ROBERT MILTON WINTER, AMERICAN CHURCHES AND THE HOLY COMMUNION: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY IN SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY, PRACTICE AND PIETY IN THE
EPISCOPAL, PRESBYTERIAN, METHODIST AND GERMAN REFORMED TRADITIONS 1607-
1875, at 636 (1988). A Methodist writing in 1926 declared that the Zwinglian position
"has perhaps come to be the prevailing one in Methodist as well as in the usual
Protestant theology." NOLAN B. HARMON, THE RITES AND RITUAL OF EPISCOPAL
METHODISM 160 (1926).
Zwinglianism also prevailed in most quarters of the Presbyterian Church.
It was only in 1906 that the Presbyterians came to have a "comprehensive"
sacramental rite. WINTER, supra, at 485-87, 538-40. Contemporary Presbyterian
writers exercise care to distinguish Calvin's teachings from those of Zwingli, pointing
out that Calvin attempted to find a middle ground between Zwingli on the one hand,
and the Lutherans and Catholics on the other. See FELIX B. GEAR, OUR PRESBYTERIAN
BELIEF 67-70 (1980); JACK ROGERS, PRESBYTERIAN CREEDS 110-112 (1985); LOUIS B.
WEEKS, TO BE A PRESBYTERIAN 59-60 (1983). The modern view has come a long way
from the unabashed Zwinglianism of the Presbyterian Charles Hodge who in the mid-
nineteenth century challenged the Virtualism of Nevin. See NEVIN, supra note 104, at
12-13. For a discussion of Virtualism, see Protestant Empire, supra note 24, at 196
n.65. It remains to be seen, however, whether Presbyterian liturgical practice in fact
has adopted anything like Nevin's Virtualism and has abandoned Zwinglianism.
110 For a discussion of alienation, see Michael deHaven Newsom, Clarence
Thomas, Victim? Perhaps, and Victimizer? Yes - A Study in Social and Racial
Aleination from African-Americans, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 327, 328-30 (2004).
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other. Thus, Scotch-Irish Protestants, who were to have a
profound influence on American evangelical Protestantism,
could not maintain the powerful and necessary connection
between the Eucharist and the traditional Sunday liturgy.
Instead, they tied the celebration of the Eucharist to a
quarterly or annual weekend-long meeting.111 Having severed
the link to liturgy, the substitute celebration generated its own
dynamic in which the conversion of souls, the encoded message
of Zwinglian Eucharistic theology, rather than the conversion
of the bread and wine as a source of heavenly food for the
reconciled body and soul, became the center of attraction.
Hence the revival emerged.112 Revivalism, and its twin,
"Ii See generally PAUL K. CONKIN, CANE RIDGE: AMERICA'S PENTECOST (1990).
112 Id. Maxwell painted a vivid portrait of the development of revivalistic
evangelical Protestantism:
Revivalistic evangelicalism, the very death of historical sacramental and
liturgical worship, made its entry into the Reformed tradition through the
sacramental door, ironically enough. Whereas some of the Puritans-Wesley,
for example-increased the frequency of celebrating the Eucharist, the
overall effect of Puritanism was a reduction in the number of celebrations. In
spite of these annual or perhaps semi-annual occasions, the Puritans did
retain a "high" doctrine of the spiritual real presence in the sacramental
action. They surrounded the celebrations with lengthy "sacramental seasons"
of four-day duration, during which times hundreds, even thousands, would
prepare themselves to receive Communion. Since a number of the "un-
converted" would attend these meetings, which doubtless had all the
attractions of a major social gathering, the preaching gradually shifted its
emphasis from the sacramental to a concern to save the "lost", and thus the
revivalistic camp meeting.
Revivalism understood the Church to be "an assemblage of religiously
inclined neighbors", rather than the People of the Word, as Calvin had
argued. With this fundamental change came the erosion of much that was
characteristic of the classical Reformation [i.e. Calvinist] tradition: the "focus
on Word and Sacraments in the historic church as the loci and media of
salvation", for example. The "means of grace" became the conversion
experience itself with its attendant public confession of sin and profession of
faith. Objectivity in worship yielded to the maudlin sentimentality of
revivalistic hymns, and the "liturgy" lost its historic sense of a corporate
oblation in response to God's gift in Jesus Christ. The purpose of worship was
conversion and the "liturgy" became an instrument used by clergy and choir
to precipitate the sort of emotional crisis which would guarantee conversion.
MAXWELL, supra note 106, at 56-57. See generally AHLSTROM, supra note 26, at 429-54;
ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA, 1776-1990: WINNERS
AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY 87-108 (1992). Maxwell characterized the
theology of the "proto-revivalists" as a '"high' doctrine of the spiritual real presence in
the sacramental action." Not only do some commentators disagree, see BOURNE, supra
note 100, at 66-68, but Maxwell misses the central point that "high" theologies are
rooted in church, and in liturgy. High churchmen would not have sacramental
"seasons" but would have regular Sunday liturgies at which they would celebrate the
Eucharist. Even Mayor concedes that English non-Anglican evangelical Protestants
tended to undervalue liturgy, MAYOR, supra note 101, at 48, thus betraying a
Eucharistic theology that cannot be characterized as "high." Finally, a "high" theology
would not so easily give way to the maudlin sentimentality of revivalism. But in other
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millenarianism, became the hallmarks of American evangelical
Protestantism.113 Revivalism and millenarianism,114 however,
produce a world-view that sees everything in stark either-or
terms.11 5 This dualism, this rejectionism, reinforces and is in
respects, Maxwell's description of the origins of evangelical Protestant revivalism rings
true.
113 See Jerald C. Brauer, Revivalism and Millenarianism in America, in IN
THE GREAT TRADITION, IN HONOR OF WINTHROP S. HUDSON: ESSAYS ON PLURALISM,
VOLUNTARISM, AND REVIVALISM 147 (Joseph D. Ban & Paul R. Dekar eds., 1982)
[hereinafter IN THE GREAT TRADITION].
Having abandoned the church-sacrament system, evangelical Protestants
were still left to contend with the question of conversion. Revivalism is "a
particular way of becoming, being, and remaining Christian.... The absolute
necessity of a personal, highly self-conscious, individual conversion
experience is the bedrock on which revivalism is built. Without such an
experience, without being born again, one cannot be a Christian and certainly
one cannot minister to others.
Id. at 147-48.
114 Millenarianism has precisely the same "anti-sacramental" structure as
revivalism. Brauer writes:
At the center of millennialism is the belief in the rebirth of the cosmos,
carried out purely through divine agency just as is the salvation of the
individual in revivalism. The first stage is identical. There is a prolonged
conflict in which the forces of good fight the forces of evil....
Just as the individual soul is reborn in revivalism, so in millennialism old
history is ended and there is a totally new beginning-a new heaven and a
new earth.... [Tihe new heaven and the new earth do not appear until after
the fulfillment of the millennium and the utter triumph of Jesus as the
Christ. So it is that the converted ... await their death or their rapture so
that they will finally and ultimately be fully translated or reborn as totally
new creatures in Christ.
In both cases, the initiative is from God, and in both cases judgment is
brought to bear through the process of struggle, which culminates in divine
victory and the reconstitution of life, both personal and cosmic. In revivalism
and in millennialism there can be no salvation without personally
experienced conversion; and however long the process, it ends in a cataclysm
which destroys the past and recreates all that is for a new future.
Id. at 152-53.
By contrast, Catholics tend not to think in revivalist-millennialist terms
because the Catholic Eucharist is, in and of itself, a foretaste of the Second Coming, the
Kingdom of God. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH §§ 2816, 2821 (2d ed. 1994).
Thus for Catholics there is no need for cataclysmic conversion after a struggle with the
forces of good and evil. The church-sacrament system, itself the epitome of
reconciliation, provides a safe haven in which conversion by growth, development, self-
examination and scrutiny can take place. Furthermore, the objective truth of the
Eucharist, and the Real Presence means that Christ in fact returns to the Altar, by
means of the substance of His Body and Blood and by means of His saving power and
grace every time the Mass is said and done. Thus, "[mian's vocation to eternal life does
not suppress, but actually reinforces, his duty to put into action in this world the
energies and means received from the Creator to serve justice and peace." Id. at § 2820.
It does not follow that a Catholic cannot experience something like a revivalistic
conversion, or be born again. Rather, that experience is not necessary to salvation. The




turn reinforced by the dualism inherent in Zwinglian
Eucharistic theology.
3. Beverage Alcohol as Malum in se
The discussion has shown that Zwinglian dualism
unleashed powerful forces that would produce radically
different outlooks on life than those that flowed from Catholic
sacramental realism. As far as beverage alcohol is concerned,
however, it took time for the implications of Zwinglian
Eucharistic theology to work themselves out. John Calvin
enjoyed food and drink, and the Puritans "would have stared at
the idea of prohibiting alcoholic drink," and even as late as the
eighteenth century, John Wesley apparently had no objections
to beer and wine, even as he opposed distilled spirits.116
Wesley's contemporary, Benjamin Rush, author of the first
temperance tract, approved of moderate amounts of wine for
health, although he, like Wesley, objected to distilled spirits.117
It appears that generally in the eighteenth century, no one
argued for total abstinence.118 But in the nineteenth century,
something happened.
Zwinglian theology, as noted above, reduced the action
of the liturgy to an interior, subjective mental act. 119 Without
the church-sacrament system to intercede, the worshipper is
left solely to her own devices to remember what Jesus did for
Another emphasis shared by revivalism and millenarianism is a radical
distinction between nature and grace .... Grace is not the culmination of
nature but is purely from divine love and activity. Revivalism and
millenarianism always press for the radical distinction between God and
humanity, between evil and righteousness, and between salvation and
damnation.
Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the ethics, both public and private,
which develop in revivalism. For the converted believer, there is only right or
wrong and there is nothing in between.
Brauer, supra note 113, at 155-156.
Catholics, by contrast, do not see not radical distinctions but reconciliation
of nature and grace instead. This is the central ethical and moral meaning of the claim
that at the consecration the Body and Blood of Christ become Really Present. See supra
notes 40-43 and accompanying text. Sacramental Realism means that grace and nature
work, now reconciled, together in the salvation economy, that nature, the created
order, once reconciled, has soteriological meaning and value.
116 THOMAS PINNEY, A HISTORY OF WINE IN AMERICA: FROM THE BEGINNINGS
TO PROHIBITION 426 (1989).
117 JOHN KOBLER, ARDENT SPIRITS: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 42-43
(1973).
11s JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 36 (1963).
119 See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
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mankind, for this is all that Zwinglianism can offer. If anything
should interfere with her ability to remember, then she could
not communicate with God, at least not in any Eucharistic
sense. One preacher therefore declared: "Everything that ...
makes me forget God and eternity is dangerous and in the last
damnable."120 A commentator noted that for Nineteenth
Century revivalist Protestants, "the befuddled, rum-soaked
mind of the habitual drunkard patently lay beyond the reach of
God's saving grace."121 But since revivalism derives from
Zwinglianism, the observation reaches back to the complex
cultural and nationalistic-not to mention anti-Catholic-
impulses that spawned the Reformation.
Whatever broader social and cultural forces might have
been in play in the nineteenth century regarding beverage
alcohol, many evangelical Protestants had come to see beverage
alcohol as a substance that blocked or inhibited the ability to
perform the one Eucharistic act that survived Zwingli's assault
on the church-sacrament system: the individual, internal,
subjective, mental recollection of the Passion of Christ.
Beverage alcohol, therefore, became something evil in and of
itself.
Catholics and liturgical Protestants, at least those
liturgical Protestants with a relatively "high" Eucharistic
theology,122 resisted the idea that beverage alcohol could be
inherently evil.123 According to them, evil lay in the abuse of
alcohol, not in the substance itself.124 Theological
considerations explain this difference in outlook. Catholic
sacramental teaching rests on the fundamental principle that
there is a role for the material world in the salvation economy,
more specifically, the material world can become sanctified or
holy.125 The Eucharist, the central sacrament, puts the
proposition in its strongest form: bread and wine become the
120 GUSFIELD, supra note 118, at 30-32 (quoting from a sermon preached by
the Rev. Theodore Cuyler on October 24, 1858).
121 ROBERT SMITH BADER, PROHIBITION IN KANSAS: A HISTORY 11 (1986).
122 See Protestant Empire, supra note 23, at 196-97 n.65.
123 See, e.g., PATRICK W. CAREY, THE ROMAN CATHOLICS 19 (1993) (stating
that according to Catholic moral theology "there was nothing inherently evil in the
consumption of alcoholic beverages"); JIMMIE LEWIS FRANKLIN, BORN SOBER:
PROHIBITION IN OKLAHOMA, 1907-1959, at 69 n.57 (1971) (stating that "[t]he Episcopal
and Roman Catholic Churches . . . maintained that alcoholic beverages were not of
themselves an evil").
124 See FRANKLIN, supra note 123, at 69 n.57 (stating that "[t]he 'right use' of
intoxicants was the key").
125 See supra Part II.A.1.
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Body and Blood of Christ.126 It necessarily follows, therefore,
that wine cannot possibly be inherently evil, at least for
Catholics and some non-evangelical Protestants.
And this proposition holds quite true without regard to
the weaknesses and failings of those who drink wine. Catholic
sacramental theology rests on the premise of essentialist
objectivity, as well as a well-thought out conception of
reconciliation. The change of the bread and wine into the Body
and Blood of Christ takes place without regard to the moral
intentions of either the celebrant or the communicant. 127 Divine
law and divine will have ordained that wine shall play an
important role in the salvation, and the only condition is that
the Church intend that wine shall be used as matter in the
unfolding mystery of the church-sacrament system. Again,
wine cannot be inherently evil for Catholics and some non-
evangelical Protestants.
On the other hand, however, sobriety (which includes
moderate consumption of beverage alcohol) is a virtue and
drunkenness a vice.128 Indeed, a drunken communicant may
well receive the objectively real and present Body and Blood of
Christ, as St. Paul taught,129 to his detriment, not to his
benefit. 130 But, because wine plays a role in the salvation
economy, Catholics distinguish between the material
substance, alcohol, and the physical, psychological and rational
state of those who drink alcohol in excess. The critical
transformative action of the Eucharistic liturgy-the
transubstantiation of the bread and wine-does not depend on
the sobriety of the communicants, only the consequences so
depend.
Notwithstanding the formal doctrines and teachings of
the Church, Catholics tend to tolerate excessive drinking more
than evangelical Protestants.'3' This may happen because
Catholics do not limit the action of the Eucharist to the
Zwinglian subjective, mental, interior, memorial exercise.
Transubstantiation means that the action of the liturgy has
other, objective dimensions. Drunkenness, therefore, however
126 See supra Part II.A.i.
127 See CANONS AND DECREES, supra note 41, at 52-53 (footnotes omitted).
128 AQUINAS, supra note 43, §§ IHa-IIae, q.149-50, at 135-45.
129 1 Corinthians 11:29.
130 AQUINAS, supra note 43, § Ia, q.80, at 65.
131 See TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 5 (noting that Roman Catholics,
Episcopalians and Lutherans "were far more lenient and forgiving in matters of private
morality, such as drinking. But even these churches had evangelical wings.").
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bad it might be, does not strip the Eucharist of any sensible
meaning or value, because of the objective reality of the
sacrament for the worshipping community. Ultimately, the
objective reality of the sacrament means that there is hope,
even for the drunkard, that he will, some day, through the
actions of the Church, the workings of the church-sacrament
system, be a worthy recipient of the Eucharist, and therefore
benefit from the grace or virtue of the sacrament. But however
one understands Catholic teaching on sobriety, wine cannot be
inherently evil, even if abused by drunkards.
4. The Evangelical Protestant Switch from Wine to
Grape Juice
Given the concern, at the level of theology, of early
Nineteenth Century American evangelical Protestants for the
consumption of beverage alcohol, a pronounced tension
between religious practice-use of wine in the celebration of
the evangelical Protestant Lord's Supper-and religious
belief-that alcoholic beverages, including wine, were
inherently evil-emerged. An article appeared in 1848 calling
for the use of unfermented wine in religious services. 12 While
many evangelicals resisted the call then, the theology behind it
was unassailable, and straightforward, given evangelical
Protestant suppositions. As one commentator put it, "[t]o
change from wine to grape juice was a simple matter for the
evangelical churches, since they looked upon the sacrament of
the Lord's Supper as a memorial and regarded the elements of
bread and wine as purely symbolic." 133 To the extent that the
change to unfermented grape juice might present textual or
scriptural problems, evangelical Protestants justified the
switch, claiming that the Bible in fact refers to two wines, one
fermented, the other unfermented, and that the wine that
Jesus used at the Last Super was unfermented.134
Even in evangelical Protestant circles, some rejected the
two-wine theory, at least at the beginning. 135 Practical
difficulties, however, thwarted the use of either fermented or
132 JAMES BENSON SELLERS, The Prohibition Movement in Alabama, 1702 to
1943, at 62 in 26 JAMES SPRUNT STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 (1943).
133 TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 12.
134 See TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 10-12; Betty A. O'Brien, The Lord's
Supper: Fruit of the Vine or Coup of Devils?, 31 METHODIST HISTORY 203, 206-07
(1993).
135 O'Brien, supra note 134, at 207.
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unfermented wine. During much of the nineteenth century,
good wine, at a reasonable price, was hard to come by.136 But
much worse, a decent unfermented juice of the grape simply
did not exist. It was not until 1869 that a Methodist
communion steward named Thomas Bramwell Welch produced
a pasteurized grape juice.137
Perhaps not altogether coincidentally, starting in 1874,
the newly formed Women's Christian Temperance Union
(WCTU) began to agitate for the use of unfermented wine in
evangelical Protestant communion services.138 The efforts of the
WCTU were met with a great deal of success. By the end of the
nineteenth century, "the use of grape juice in [evangelical
Protestant] churches had become quite general."139
O'Brien captures the fundamental theological meaning
of the switch: "[w]ithin the space of a century, Methodist
churches joined many American churches in the move from a
sacrament using grape wine preserved by a natural, God-given,
life-changing fermentation process to a sacrament using grape
juice preserved by an artificial, human-made, life-destroying
pasteurization process."'140  Wine, of course, symbolizes
reconciliation-God and man working together to make
something good, something holy, something natural, a Catholic
understanding of the sacraments. Man plants and harvests the
grapes; God takes care of the natural processes, sun, water,
soil, and fermentation.141 Pasteurized grape juice tends to push
God into the background, and elevates, instead, the role of man
and man's inventions, most notably, in this instance,
pasteurization. Zwingli's dualisms similarly pushed God into
the background, leaving only man's inventions-the subjective,
interior, mental, recollection of what Christ did for mankind.
The switch to grape juice, then, fits comfortably in the
Zwinglian nomos. But this switch cannot operate in the nomos
of Catholics and most liturgical Protestants as they, of course,
continued to use wine in their Eucharistic liturgies. 142
136 Id. at 208.
137 Id. at 218-19.
138 SELLERS, supra note 132, at 62; O'Brien, supra note 134, at 211.
139 TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 17.
140 O'Brien, supra note 134, at 217.
141 At the beginning of the Liturgy of the Eucharist, the Preparation of the
Gifts, the celebrant says the following regarding the wine that will be consecrated:
"Blessed are you, Lord, God of all creation. Through your goodness we have this wine to
offer, fruit of the vine and work of human hands. It will become our spiritual drink."
See NEW SAINT JOSEPH SUNDAY MISSAL, supra note 41, at 21.
142 ANDREW SINCLAIR, PROHIBITION: THE ERA OF EXCESS 71 (1962);
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Deep and profound theological differences, and the
resulting divergent world views, set the stage for a serious test
of the principle of religious liberty and freedom. The path to
National Prohibition had now been irrevocably set, rooted in
the dualist, rejectionist Eucharistic theology of Ulrich Zwingli,
a theology that is quintessentially anti-Catholic and functions
solely as a way of encoding anti-Catholicism, of enabling a
distinctive evangelical Protestant world view to take hold
among those who, for whatever reason, separated themselves-
or were separated-from Rome.143
B. The Politics of Anglo-American Anti-Catholicism
In 1570 Pope Pius V excommunicated Elizabeth 1.144
However, he did not leave matters there. He also "declared her
'deprived of her ... crown,' absolved English people from sworn
oaths to her and ordered them not to obey her laws."'145 This
maladroit move, this blunder, "provided fodder for the
ideologically driven claim that [English Catholics] were traitors
with conflicting dual loyalties.146 A political basis or predicate
for the anti-Catholicism of the English, at least, had now been
TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 12; O'Brien, supra note 134, at 221-22. One might argue
that God gave man the ability to invent pasteurization, and that it could be applied to
religious uses and purposes, all as part of God's plan for His Creation. The problem
with this sort of reductionist argument is that it too easily assumes that the Eternal
Mystery, that is God, too easily yields up to mere human invention without carefully
considering the proper relation between the here and now and the Eternal Now, and
what, in the course of human history, warrants or justifies human beings reworking or
redefining that relation. As I have elsewhere suggested, the Protestant justification for
such a reworking, for abandoning the sacraments as Catholics understood them, lies in
"a new German ideology." See Protestant Empire, supra note 23, at 191. This is too
slender a reed to support the radical reordering of the understanding of the relation
between the here and now and the Eternal Now. In an effort to justify this reordering,
it fell to evangelical Protestants to develop, among other things, the notion of Manifest
Destiny. See infra notes 193-203 and accompanying text. The limitations of this notion
are all too clear.
143 But see PROTESTANTISM, supra note 35, at 168 (attempting to rationalize
the basic premises of evangelical Protestantism).
The Reformers found it necessary to break the Catholic link at its strongest
point. So long as the door of heaven was locked or unlocked in the acts of
confession and the mass, it would continue to have profound psychological
and political powers. It was the instrument that kept the hierarchy and
priestly castes in control. At the same time, popular piety-often with
ecclesiastical encouragement-associated many magical powers with the
changing of the bread to the body and the wine to blood, and this piety
seemed to keep people in superstition.
Id.
144 Pope Pius V, Regnans in Excelsis (1570), reprinted in THE TUDOR
CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 423-28 (G.R. Elton ed., 2d ed. 1982).




established: one could not be a good Englishman---or an
American, for that matter-if one were also a Roman Catholic,
or so the argument went.
Political anti-Catholicism was embedded in American
anti-Catholicism, its lineage directly traceable to the troubles
of the sixteenth century. Lyman Beecher stirred up a hornet's
nest of anti-Catholicism in Boston in 1834,147 and penned one of
the first, dramatic anti-Catholic diatribes with the publication
in 1835 of a book claiming that a vast Hapsburg-led Catholic
conspiracy was plotting to take over the then American West
by flooding the United States with large numbers of Catholic
immigrants. 148 Proving that silly ideas never seem to go away,
some Protestants erroneously believed, shades of Guy
Fawkes,149 that Catholics in America "kept guns hidden in their
churches and were awaiting the day when they could strike to
capture America for the pope."150
For Lyman Beecher, nothing less than the "political
claims and character of the Catholic religion" were at stake.151
The challenge was to undo Catholic belief-as he understood
it152-that Catholicism was something more than merely one of
many Christian denominations, that Catholicism might have
been entitled to special or unequal rights and privileges, that
Catholicism was the only church of Christ and the only way to
salvation, that Bible reading was to be controlled by the
priesthood, that no one could worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, that heresy was a civil crime,
that the pope and the councils of the Church were infallible,
147 See STUART C. HENRY, UNVANQUISHED PURITAN: A PORTRAIT OF LYMAN
BEECHER 156-57 (1973); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, The First
Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 667
(1998).
148 LYMAN BEECHER, PLEA FOR THE WEST 58-60, 69, 74-75, 116 (Cincinnati,
Truman & Smith 1835).
149 See Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious
Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1047,
1061 (1966) (stating that "[iln 1605 five Catholics dug a tunnel and placed thirty tons
of gunpowder under the Houses of Parliament, planning to blow it up on opening day,
when the King and all his ministers would be in attendance [and t]he plot was revealed
and the plotters were executed, [t]he plotter actually found in the chamber with the
gunpowder [being] Guy Fawkes...").
150 BRAUER, supra note 26, at 128.
151 BEECHER, supra note 148, at 69.
152 It is beyond the scope of this paper to adjudge the soundness of Beecher's
understanding of the character of the Catholic religion. For an analysis of the teachings
of the Catholic Church in Beecher's time, see GERALD A. MCCOOL, CATHOLIC
THEOLOGY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE QUEST FOR A UNITARY METHOD (1977);
MICHAEL J. SCHUCK, THAT THEY BE ONE: THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE PAPAL
ENCYCLICALS, 1740-1780 1-43 (1991).
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that ecclesiastical jurisdiction was enforceable by the civil
power,153 that the pope had the right to interfere in the political
concerns of nations by means of his authority over the
consciences of Catholics,154 and that the pope had the power to
sway Catholics by means of the power of life and death
eternal. 155 The abiding problem, Beecher insisted, was that
Catholicism had "always been, and still is, a political religion, a
religion of state,"' 156 committed to maintaining a despotic
government. 157
For Josiah Strong, a Congregationalist minister
schooled by Beecher's Lane Theological Seminary,158 and, like
Beecher, the author of an important popular work and window
into the meaning and ideological workings of the Protestant
Empire, 159 Catholicism suffered from precisely the same ills.
Strong saw Catholicism as a peril to the Protestant Empire,160
a religion implacably opposed to republican notions of popular
sovereignty.161 He called into question the loyalty of American
Catholics,162 arguing that they would, if called upon to do so,
follow the pope rather than the laws of the land.163 Strong
insisted that Catholic dependency on papal absolutism made it
impossible for Catholics to be sovereign: "Representative
government is the natural government of Protestant
populations. Despotic government is the congenial government
of Catholic populations.164 Thus, he concluded, with a
melodramatic flair, Catholics "blow no trumpets, are sparing of
statistics, but are at work night and day to break down the
institutions of the country, beginning with the public schools.
As surely as we live, so surely will the conflict come, and it will
be a hard one."165 And, "[i]f the liberties of the American people
are ever destroyed, they will fall by the hands of the Romish
clergy."166
153 BEECHER, supra note 148, at 70.
154 Id. at 70-71.
155 Id. at 71.
156 Id. at 151.
157 Id. at 160.
1658 RALPH E. LUKER, THE SOCIAL GOSPEL IN BLACK AND WHITE: AMERICAN
RACIAL REFORM, 1885-1912, at 269 (1991).
159 STRONG, supra note 27.
160 Id. at 59-88.
161 Id. at 60-75.
162 Id. at 61.
163 Id. at 64-65.
164 STRONG, supra note 27, at 75 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).




This drumroll continued unabated, as a review of some
of the religious journals published during the second decade of
the twentieth century reveals. An article in the Lutheran press
put it plainly: Catholicism was an enemy. "It is the old subtle,
well-organized foe and has done not a little to discredit the
Lutheran Church in the eyes of the American public during the
present war."167 The writer continued: 'The Lutheran Church
knows this ancient foe better than the Reformed churches168
and it should be a leader and not a follower in offsetting its
politico-religious propaganda in America. ' 169
The Baptists, one of the anchor denominations in
American evangelical Protestantism, pulled few punches. They
condemned Catholics for their efforts to win over the "negroes
of the South,"170 and fulminated against a franked pamphlet
which objected to a bill that would exclude "illiterates" from
prospective citizenship. They called the pope "an infallible
autocrat," asking "[h]ow is it possible for the [American]
cardinals to imbibe the sweet water of liberty from the bitter
fountain in the Vatican or gather the grapes and figs of
freedom from the briar bush on the Tiber?" 171
Methodism, the other great anchor of American
evangelical Protestantism, also weighed in. 172 An article set up
"Americanism" and "Catholicism" in apposition to each other,
finding Catholicism to be on the wrong side of such issues as
church and state, freedom of the press and speech,
establishment of religion, democracy, freedom of worship and
conscience.173 A week later, the same journal published an
167 G. W. Sandt, The Need of Lutheran Co-operation and What the Church
Papers Can Do to Bring it About, 2 LUTHERAN CHURCH HERALD 452 (July 19, 1918).
168 One of the predominant American "Reformed" churches was the
Presbyterian Church. See Fred J. Hood, Evolution of the Denomination Among the
Reformed of the Middle and Southern States, 1780-1840, in DENOMINATIONALISM 140-
41 (Russell E. Richey ed., 1977) (stating that Presbyterianism "maintain[ed] about 70
percent of the Reformed churches in the middle and southern states in 1820"). More
generally, "Reformed Christianity" refers to churches in the Calvinist orbit. See ALF
HARDELIN, THE TRACTARIAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE EUCHARIST 124 (1965). This
particular branch of Protestantism would, of course, exclude the Lutheran churches.
169 Sandt, supra note 167, at 452 (emphasis added).
170 Note, Roman Catholicism and the Negroes, 3 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 9
(Jan. 7, 1915).
171 Note, Men and Things, 6 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 1039 (Aug. 15, 1918).
172 The nineteenth century saw the spectacular growth of the Methodist and
the Baptist Churches. See FINKE & STARK, supra note 112, at 55 (displaying in graphic
form that Baptists and Methodists accounted for half of all religious adherents in
1850). See also LATOURETTE, supra note 29, at 1258 (noting that in 1914 America was
overwhelmingly Protestant and "Baptists far outnumbered any other type of
Protestants," followed by the Methodists).
173 Note, Americanism and Catholicism, 84 THE METHODIST PROTESTANT 5
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essay pursuing the same major themes. It referred to Catholics
as:
[T]he crowd that gathers in big conventions, is coddled and
complimented by sycophantic politicians, whose actions and speeches
are reported on the first pages of the press, and flaunted in big
headlines, and who denounce as bigots and narrow-minded
sectarians the American spirit which stands for protection and
perpetuation of our institutions. We may well pray for deliverance
from this awful menace. This "fair flock," made up in part of saloon
keepers and the off-scouring of foreign nations, is the flock that will
destroy this fair land whenever they have the power to do so. 1
74
The essayist had contrasted, favorably, the United
States, made "fair" by Protestants, with the "ignorance, squalor
and crime [in Mexico, Spain, Italy, and Austria] so common
that even the priests themselves are not safe," 175 and had
referred to Catholicism as "the organization that has three
hundred thousand armed knights who are kept ready to
enforce Catholic demands when the time to strike has come."176
Political or ideological anti- Catholicism certainly
obstructed Catholics in securing religious freedom. 177 The
possibility of establishing religious freedom would drift even
further away if a deep and abiding theological objection to
Roman Catholicism in the form of a rejectionist and
reactionary Eucharistic theology continued to function as the
normative doctrine of American evangelical Protestants-the
very ones bent on drying up America, the ones who believed
that wine was intrinsically evil and that Catholicism, if not
Catholics themselves, were intrinsically evil and anti-
American.
C. The Broad Contours of the Anti-Catholicism of the Drys
Given the culturally embedded anti-Catholicism of the
Anglo-American Protestant Empire, it followed almost
automatically that from the very beginning of the temperance-
(1914).




177 Anti-Catholicism, of course, also had social and economic dimensions. See,
e.g., THOMAS A. ASKEw & PETER W. SPELLMAN, THE CHURCHES AND THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE: IDEALS AND INSTITUTIONS 113 (1984) ("Anti-Catholicism in America was
never purely religious, for social and economic factors aggravated suspicion of the
stranger. Some of the recent arrivals could be less than orderly neighbors and also
crowded the labor market.").
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prohibition movement, a movement that took on coherent form
and shape in the 1830s or 1840s,178 the specter of anti-
Catholicism would rear its ugly head. The middle third of the
nineteenth century saw "[t]he rapid increase of Catholic
immigrants, the geographical spread of Catholicism, the
manifestations of institutional strength and stability .... and
traditional Protestant-Catholic theological antagonisms
brought about a virulent hostility toward American Catholics,
particularly after 1830."179 Anti-Catholicism continued to grow
and develop, "culminating in the Know Nothing political
movement of the 1850s."180 Catholicism had refused to go away,
however, and indeed, the Church had flourished.181
It did not take long for the link between temperance-
prohibition and anti-Roman Catholicism to show itself. Neal
Dow, the mayor of Portland, Maine, was one of the primary
backers of the first state-wide temperance-prohibition law in
the nation, s2 and developed something of a reputation and a
following as a result.183 Dow was virulently anti-Catholic, and
particularly scornful of the Irish Catholics who had immigrated
to his state.1 84 Indeed, "[h]is association with suspected Know-
Nothings grew so close as to suggest that he himself belonged
to one of the secret orders."185 Dow, however, could not trump
or evade the fundamental laws of politics. Those who opposed
him, including "the foreign-born and Catholic victims of his
bigotry... managed to prevent Dow's reelection" in 1852. 186
The dramatic events of the mid-nineteenth century
caused the nation, perhaps, to put its religious squabbles aside,
for the nonce, in order to address the matter of slavery.
However, the link between the temperance-prohibition ideal
and anti-Catholicism remained intact, if dormant. By the end
of that century, the animosity of the Drys towards Catholics
had once again come to the forefront, 157 reaching a crescendo in
178 See DELIVER, supra note 9, at 32-33; KROUT, supra note 27, at 262; PINNEY,
supra note 116, at 430-31.
179 CAREY, supra note 124, at 32.
180 Id.
181 ASKEW & SPELLMAN, supra note 177, at 111.
182 An Act for the Suppression of Drinking Houses and Tippling Shops, ch.
211, § 1, 1851 Me. Laws 210 (repealed 1934).
183 KOBLER, supra note 117, at 83.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 86.
187 One commentator writes: "Nativism, anti-Catholicism, and anti-Semitism
prepared the ground for both the Immigration Restriction League and the Anti-Saloon
League. They were prominent and functional features of the Protestant Establishment
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1928, the year of the doomed candidacy of the Catholic wet, Al
Smith, and nine years after the adoption of National
Prohibition. 188 During the 1920s, therefore, anti-Catholic
animus continued to play a prominent role in shaping the
evangelical Protestant nomos. 189 The open and visible link
between the Drys and anti-Catholicism persevered at least
until the 1940s.190
D. Protestantization: A Narrative of Persistence and
Resistance
The foregoing discussion clearly establishes that conflict
between Catholics and Protestants was a central feature of our
national life, culture, history, and experience. That conflict
becomes all the greater when one takes into account the second
characteristic trait of a Protestant Empire-"a dedication to
convert the people of the United States to Protestantism." 191
The goals and objectives of the American Protestant
Empire perhaps started small, but took on enormous
proportions in the nineteenth century as the idea of Manifest
Destiny took hold of the American imagination. In order to
accomplish these objectives, the minions of the Protestant
Empire established both preconditions and techniques for
doing this work. However, Catholics and others resisted
mightily the persistent attempt of evangelical Protestants to
convert them to the evangelical faith. 192
in America during the last troubled decades of its hegemony." AHLSTROM, supra note
26, at 856.
188 JEANNE BOZZELL MCCARTY, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOBRIETY, PROTESTANTS
AND PROHIBITION IN TEXAS: 1919-1935, at 14 (1980).
189 See GUSFIELD, supra note 118, at 124-25; PETER H. ODEGARD, PRESSURE
POLITICS: THE STORY OF THE ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE 24-25 (1928); David F. Wells &
John D. Woodbridge, Introduction to THE EVANGELICALS: WHAT THEY BELIEVE, WHO
THEY ARE, AND WHERE THEY ARE CHANGING 12 (David F. Wells & John D. Woodbridge
eds., 1975).
190 BADER, supra note 121, at 249.
191 See Common School Religion, supra note 6, at 222.
192 The story of common school religion is largely a recounting of the struggle
between the persistence of evangelical Protestants and the resistance of Catholics,
Jews, Free-thinkers and others regarding the outsized claim of evangelical Protestants
that the public schools were an appropriate forum for the evangelization of non-
evangelical Protestant schoolchildren. See id. passim.
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1. Persistence: The Goals and Objectives of
Protestantization
Protestantization came to have two aspects: one
internal to the Protestant Empire and one external. The
internal dimension of Protestantization was assimilation, the
Americanization of non-Protestant whites.193 Lyman Beecher
put it this way:
Let the Catholics mingle with us as Americans and come with their
children under the full action of our common schools and republican
institutions, and the various powers of assimilation, and we are
prepared cheerfully to abide the consequences. If in these
circumstances the Protestant religion cannot stand before the
Catholic, let it go down, and we will sound no alarm, and ask no aid,
and make no complaint. It is no ecclesiastical quarrel to which we
would call the attention of the American nation.194
Lest anyone think that Beecher had somehow
abandoned the cause of the Protestant Empire or had lost his
faith in its anointed historical role, Beecher entertained no
doubt but that if American Protestant political and religious
leadership maintained a watchful eye by checking and
regulating immigration, by instructing American Protestants
as to the truth of Catholicism, by ensuring that the education
of Protestant children never fell into the hands of Catholics,
and by kindness and perseverance, that leadership would
extend the light of evangelical Protestantism to Catholics, 195
Protestantism would not "go down," but Catholicism would.
But the American Protestant Empire never had defined
territorial or geographical limitations, and the original thirteen
states never marked its boundaries. America was to grow and
expand by the work of Providence: "The expansion in power,
prosperity, and territory of America was 'the manifest destiny'
of God for God's people [i.e. Americans]."' 196 Over the course of
193 The treatment of Native Americans, African Americans and other non-
white racial groups presents its own set of questions. But it is fair to say that the goal
of assimilation was limited to whites. See STRONG, supra note 27, at 211-12 (stating
that the race summoned by God to do the work of the Protestant Empire was a white
race, albeit an amalgamated one, comprised of Saxon, Norman, Dane, Celt, Gaul,
Welshman, Irishman, Frisian, Flamand, French Huguenot and German Palatine). The
character and nature of the racism embedded in Protestantization is more clearly seen
in the discussion of Manifest Destiny. See infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
194 BEECHER, supra note 148, at 63-64.
195 Id. at 175-90.
196 William G. McLoughlin, Religious Freedom and Popular Sovereignty: A
Change in the Flow of God's Power, 1730-1830, in IN THE GREAT TRADITION, supra note
113, at 190.
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the nineteenth century, the goal took on an ultraist dimension,
for the manifest destiny of America was to "Americanize and
Protestantize the world."197
In the hands of Josiah Strong, this grandiose idea of
manifest destiny took on a dark and sinister character. Strong
had laid out a grand religio-historiographical thesis of the
westward movement of human civilization,198 noting that the
end of that westward expansion had been reached-"our Pacific
coast."199 His "westward ho" principle, therefore, had to yield to
a new one: "the final competition of races for which the
[amalgamated] Anglo-Saxon is being schooled."200 He
continued:
[When the population pressures begin to pinch] this [amalgamated
Anglo-Saxon] race of unequaled energy.. . . - the representative, let
us hope, of the largest liberty, the purest Christianity, the highest
civilization - having developed peculiarly aggressive traits
calculated to impress its institutions upon mankind, will spread
itself over the earth.... And can any one doubt that the result of
this competition of races will be the "survival of the fittest." ...
Nothing can save the inferior race but a ready and pliant
assimilation. Whether the feebler and more abject races are going to
be regenerated and raised up, is already very much of a question.
What if it should be God's plan to people the world with better and
finer material?
To this result no war of extermination is needful; the contest is not
one of arms, but of vitality and civilization. . . . Whether the
extinction of inferior races before the advancing Anglo-Saxon seems
to the reader sad or otherwise, it certainly appears probable. I know
of no-thing except climatic conditions to prevent this race from
populating Africa as it has peopled North America.2 10
Strong backed off a bit from his prediction of an
Armageddon or apocalypse for the non-Anglo-Saxon races on
this planet, races that included non-Protestant white ethnic
groups. Maybe there was some hope for them after all, however
limited in reach, scope or even human dignity.22 Thus a milder
197 JAMES HENNESEY, AMERICAN CATHOLICS: A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES 173 (1981). See also MARTIN E. MARTY,
RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE: THE PROTESTANT EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 53 (1970) [hereinafter
RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE] ("To evangelize the world-that was the great goal of empire.").
198 STRONG, supra note 27, at 39-40.
'9 Id. at 213.
200 Id. at 214. See supra note 193 for a discussion of the composition of this
amalgamated Anglo-Saxon race.
201 STRONG, supra note 28, at 214-15.
202 Id. at 216. Someone, after all, has to do the laundry, sweep the floors, take
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form of Strong's vile vision took hold, finding expression as
imperialism.203
One cannot avoid, however, the conclusion that the idea
of Protestantization, suffused and radicalized by the grandiose
notion of manifest destiny, came to mean that white people, at
least, had to conform to the goals and objectives of this
manifest destiny, this American imperialism. To resist them
would only heighten the tension that already existed, from the
times of the Tudors and on, between evangelical Protestants
and Catholics. In short, the ideology of manifest destiny only
made matters worse as between evangelical Protestants and
Roman Catholics. The intensification of anti-Catholic animus
at the turn of the last century merely confirms this fact.
2. Persistence: Preconditions and Techniques for
Protestantization
The minions of the Protestant Empire, evangelical
Protestants, understood that Protestantization would not
happen just by itself. Early on, Robert Baird, like Lyman
Beecher before him and Josiah Strong after him, an important
figure in the literary canon of the Protestant Empire, wrote
that he was convinced that evangelical Protestantism would
win out because of Sunday-schools, Bible-classes, religious
societies, Home Missionary Societies and Boards, Maternal
Associations, and most importantly, the preaching of the
word.204 Subsequent events would suggest that Baird's
prescription was naive, romantic, or even silly. But Strong,
writing two generations later, argued that the answer to the
peril of Romanism, as reflected in the commitment of the
American Catholic hierarchy to a vast program of parochial
schools,25 was to make the public schools and their Bible-based
out the trash, pick the cotton and prance about, shuffling and half-stepping on far too
many TV sitcoms that are nothing but the modern version of minstrel shows.
203 See H. Richard Niebuhr, Institutionalization and Secularization of the
Kingdom, in DENOMINATIONALISM, supra note 168, at 243 (finding fault with the
vision, noting that "[iut is in particular the kingdom of the Anglo-Saxon race which is
destined to bring light to the gentiles by means of lamps manufactured in America.
Thus, institiutionalism and imperialism, ecclesiastical and political, go hand in hand.").
204 ROBERT BAIRD, RELIGION IN AMERICA: OR, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN,
PROGRESS, RELATION TO THE STATE, AND PRESENT CONDITION OF THE EVANGELICAL
CHURCHES IN THE UNITED STATES 320-21 (New York, Harper & Brothers 1844).
205 The handiwork of the Third Plenary Council of the American Catholic
Church, held in Baltimore, Maryland in 1884, represented the culmination of a line of
thought that had been developing in American Catholicism throughout the nineteenth
century. See generally BERNARD JULIUS MEIRING, EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE
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religious instruction so attractive that Catholic parents would
abandon schools wherein religious instruction was based on
Catholic Tradition, and embrace those schools wherein
religious instruction was premised on evangelical Protestant
Biblicism.206 Again, Strong's solution strikes one as strange,
quaint, and old-fashioned, and certainly idealistic. In the
decades after Strong offered up his suggestion, harsh reality
would make its presence felt.207
Both conservative and liberal Protestants appreciated
the problems that Protestantization confronted. They realized
that "cooperation for moral reform [must take] precedence over
theological disputes."208 An appeal to the third characteristic
trait of Protestant Empires, a commitment of varying intensity
over time to pan-Protestantism, to cooperation rather than
conflict between evangelical Protestant denominations,
certainly made a great deal of sense.
Evangelical Protestants, however, connected the
temperance-prohibition impulse with the goal or objective of
Protestantism. Weaving that impulse into the fundamental
fabric of the Protestant Empire strongly suggests that anti-
Catholicism would loom large in the meaning and purpose of
that impulse if only because anti-Catholicism was also a part of
the warp and woof of the American Protestant Empire.
Evangelical Protestants, therefore, came to understand
prohibition as a precondition for those who were to do the work
of Protestantization,209 as well as a precondition for its
objects.210
LEGISLATION OF THE COUNCILS OF BALTIMORE: 1829-1884 (1978). The Council decreed
that Catholic parents should "send their children to parochial or other truly Catholic
schools." Plenary Council Decrees, tit. VI, ch. I, § 196, reprinted in MEIRING, supra, at
296 (Bernard Julius Meiring trans.) [hereinafter Decrees]. In order to accomplish this
objective, the Council decreed that "[n]ear each church, where it does not exist, a
parochial school is to be erected within two years from the promulgation of this Council
.Decrees, tit. VI, ch. I, § 199, at 301.
206 STRONG, supra note 27, at 94.
207 See Common School Religion, supra note 6, passim.
208 NOLL, supra note 27, at 298; FERENC MORTON SZASz, THE DIVIDED MIND
OF PROTESTANT AMERICA, 1880-1930, at 64-65 (1982) (arguing that the liquor business
"served as the b~te noire for liberals and alcohol served the same role for
conservatives").
209 RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE, supra note 197, at 213.
210 HANDY, supra note 27, at 92 (stating that "[t]emperance was an
increasingly important part of the strategy of Christianization . . . . To [the
evangelicals], of course, a purified, reformed, Christian America must be a dry America
... if the country were to fulfill her destiny as a Christian nation."); TIMBERLAKE,
supra note 9, at 17 (noting a "faith in temperance reform as the prerequisite to a
successful revival"); David E. Ruth, The Georgia Prohibition Act of 1907: Its
Proponents and Their Arguments 25, 38-40 (1984) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Emory
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Reflecting the theological predicate for the Protestant
Empire, in general, and the American Protestant Empire in
particular, evangelical Protestants held to the view that the
revival211 was the most effective way to Protestantize non-
Protestants. Sydney Ahlstrom put the matter plainly:
"revivalism constituted the single largest response of
evangelical Protestantism to the challenge of the urban
frontier.212 H. Richard Niebuhr, in his scathing critique of
temperance, held that evangelical Protestants utilized the
revival to combat the evil of liquor, to be sure, but also "to
enforce the codes of capitalist industry, to overcome the
rebellion of workers and to foster the bourgeois virtues on
which the success of the industrial system depended."213 The
theological, the social, and the cultural have been thoroughly
mixed together. Protestantization and the revival, therefore,
establish that core or central values of the Protestant Empire
were at stake in the drive towards National Prohibition.
3. Resistance: Catholics Push Back
The final piece of the puzzle of Protestantization, and its
significance for the question whether the exemption for the
religious use of wine contained in the Volstead Act can
plausibly be read as a reflection of a commitment to a broad
and liberal theory of religious liberty and freedom consists of
the fact that Catholics-and others-fought back: they resisted
becoming Protestants. Revivalism did not work,214 and
evangelical Protestants were out of ideas, except National
Prohibition. Strong bemoaned the fact that even those
Catholics who abandoned their faith by and large did not
embrace Protestantism. Instead of "examining
Protestantism,"215 he explained, the apostate "[sank] into
skepticism, which is even worse than superstition. Apostate
Romanists are swelling our most dangerous classes.
Unaccustomed to think for themselves, and having thrown off
authority, they become the easy victims of the wildest and most
University) (on file with author).
211 See supra Part II.A.2.c.
212 AHLSTROM, supra note 26, at 743; TIMBERLAKE, supra note 10, at 17
(arguing that evangelical Protestants believed that revivalism was "the solution").
213 Niebuhr, supra note 203, at 244.
214 See, e.g., FINKE & STARK, supra note 112, at 138-39; PILGRIMS, supra note
9, at 311; RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE, supra note 197, at 138; TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 19,
115-16.
215 STRONG, supra note 27, at 83.
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dangerous propagandists."' 216 Gloomy pessimism pervades
Strong's bigoted rhetoric, acknowledging the fact that the
hated Catholics rejected the blandishments and importuning of
the evangelicals. Indeed, some Catholics had the temerity to
suppose that America should become Catholicized!217
The structural dimensions of Catholic resistance largely
took the form of separate or parallel institutions, creating, in
many instances, a separate society in which "an immense
system of schools and colleges" occupied a central position.218
The American Catholic hierarchy declared in 1884 that
Catholic parents should send their children to Catholic schools,
and that Catholic parishes should build such schools.219 The
purpose of these actions was to remove Catholic children from
the sway and reach of evangelical Protestants, all too eager to
bring these children into the Protestant fold through the means
or instrumentality of the common schools.220
At the same time, evangelical Protestants feared
Catholic schools, a fear that reached back into the early
nineteenth century, beginning with Lyman Beecher's concern
that Protestant parents might be gullible enough to entrust the
education of young impressionable minds to the wiles and
machinations of a priesthood bent on remaking America in a
Catholic image.22, Beecher wrote: "You may as well suspend the
attraction of gravity, or intercept the connection between cause
and effect, as to prevent the adverse action of Catholic
education on the minds of Protestant children."222 And that fear
continued unabated, as state after state adopted provisions in
their constitutions forbidding state aid to religious schools,223
and as Oregon went so far as to try to require children to
attend public schools by abolishing non-public schools, a radical
and foolish strategy that the Supreme Court had to lay to
rest. 224
216 Id.
217 See CAREY, supra note 124, at 78-81.
218 FINKE & STARK, supra note 112, at 139. See also Common School Religion,
supra note 6, at 239.
219 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
220 See generally Common School Religion, supra note 6.
221 See BEECHER, supra note 148, at 102-04.
222 Id. at 98.
223 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 721 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 301-05 (2001)).
224 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530-32, 534-35 (1925).
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Catholic resistance did not limit itself to the
establishment of a comprehensive system of Catholic schools.
Many Catholic parents sought to keep evangelical Protestant
religion out of the common schools.225 As a result, the education
of American children became a flashpoint in the dynamics
flowing from the persistence of evangelical Protestants in
seeking to protestantize Catholics and the resistance of
Catholics to that effort.
However, it is somehow fitting that in the decades
leading up to National Prohibition, another institution also
came to symbolize-for evangelical Protestants, at least-
Catholic and immigrant resistance to Protestantization. It was
the saloon. As between schools and saloons, it is perhaps not
surprising that the saloon proved to be more vulnerable to
evangelical Protestant attack. Indeed the organization believed
by many to have been primarily responsible for National
Prohibition called itself the Anti-Saloon League.226 It is by no
means clear, however, that Catholics--or other religious
minorities-viewed the saloon as an institutional defense
against temperance-prohibition. The saloon, therefore, cannot
be analogized to the Catholic parochial school or, for that
matter, the Catholic Church itself. Nonetheless, the saloon
captured the imagination of the Drys, and became the wedge
issue in their campaign for National Prohibition. Their anger
was directed not only against the owners of saloons,227 but their
patrons who arguably were disproportionately urban,
immigrant, poor, and Catholic.
Drys tended to paint the saloon as an inherently evil
institution, an unsurprising conclusion given the dualism of
Zwinglianism and the normative Eucharistic theology of
American evangelical Protestants.228 The saloon was, for the
Drys, "a sleazy, beery, spittoon-filthy iniquitous gathering
place,"229 and the locus of "crime, delinquency, poverty,
prostitution, disease and corruption."230 Some saloons were
probably decent business establishments, but they constituted
225 Id.
226 See AHLSTROM, supra note 26, at 871; JACK S. BLOCKER, JR., RETREAT
FROM REFORM: THE PROHIBITION MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 235-36 (1976);
NORMAN H. CLARK, THE DRY YEARS: PROHIBITION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN WASHINGTON
82-83 (rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter THE DRY YEARS]; West, supra note 27, at 169.
227 See Engelmann, 0, Whisky, supra note 27, at 87-89.
228 See supra Part II.A.2.b.
229 ELIOT ASINOF, 1919-AMERICA'S LOSS OF INNOCENCE 236 (1990).
230 THE DRY YEARS, supra note 226, at 9.
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a distinct minority in the eyes of the Drys.231 One commentator
wrote:
The American saloon was probably at its worst from the late 1880s
to 1917 .... As an institution the saloon was a blight and a public
stench. It was dingy and dirty, a place of battered furniture,
offensive smells, flyblown mirrors and glassware, and appalling
sanitary facilities. It encouraged drunkenness; few bartenders
hesitated to serve children, idiots, and known drunkards. It ignored
the law. It corrupted the police, the courts, and the politicians. It
was a breeding place of crime and violence, and the hangout of
criminals and degenerates of every type. It was the backbone of
prostitution .... ,,232
Race also factored into the demonizing of the saloon
because "[c]onservative whites found the racial liberality of the
saloons especially troublesome. The racially mixed crowd of
drinkers in many saloons challenged traditional white social
disdain for the inferior race." 23
Another view of the saloon sat at the opposite extreme:
To the immigrant, the saloon was escape from squalor and provider
of warmth and companionship. The occasional free lunch, billiards
and backyard bocce, club rooms for card tables, letter-writing and
reading matter. One could get hired out of a saloon or find help when
in trouble .... To take away their saloon and their drinking on the
grounds that it was for their own good was like drilling a hole in the
bottom of a boat to bail out the excess water....
Andrew Sinclair . .. compared [the saloon] with the Protestant
church. There was human fellowship and equality in the saloon[,] ...
a center of tradition, the spirit of community, a place of recreation. It
could be said that they were rivals in the same general business:
consolation. The church and the saloon, battling for the soul of the
city. 234
For the unchurched immigrant, including the apostates
of whom Strong was so contemptuous, 235 the saloon might well
have functioned as a "church." But the Catholic Church worked
tirelessly to aid immigrants make their way in their new
country,2 36 and the Church did not need the aid of the saloon.
231 See KOBLER, supra note 117, at 173.
232 ASBURY, supra note 9, at 113-14.
233 Ruth, supra note 210, at 22.
234 ASINOF, supra note 229, at 243-44.
235 See STRONG, supra note 28, at 83.
236 An exemplar of Catholic social ministry to poor immigrants was Saint
Frances Xavier Cabrini. See generally EDWARD V. DAILEY, CITIZEN SAINT: THE LIFE
AND MIRACLES OF SAINT FRANCES XAVIER CABRINI (1947); SEGUNDO GALILEA, IN
WEAKNESS, STRENGTH: THE LIFE AND MISSIONARY ACTIVITY OF SAINT FRANCES XAVIER
CABRINI 63-69, 111-14, 142-47 (1996).
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But none of this changes the hard fact that "the most
important function of the saloon was that of dispensing legal
opiates to the laborers and the impoverished inhabitants of the
city slums and failing farms, in pouring oil upon the disturbed
waters of the American melting pot."237 One certainly cannot
gainsay the possibility that large numbers of Catholics, trapped
in the poverty-stricken laboring classes of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, sought succor both in the
Church and in the saloon because the saloon "fulfilled
important needs-physical and psychological--of many
residents, [and thus] the dram shop became entrenched in
community life."238 Therefore, the extremist views of the saloon
miss the mark. Saloons were complex social institutions, with
large dollops of both good and bad in and about them. They
were pressed into service, warts and all, because of
fundamental social and human need. Saloon succor carried a
steep price, however--crime and debauchery come to mind.
Indeed, saloon succor was very real, even as it provided cover
for the excesses and the outrages of the Industrial Age.
The attack on the saloon was, therefore, emblematic of
an attack on a culture, a way of life, and non-evangelical
Protestant religions. Drys had met up with a resistance with
which they found it difficult to cope, and they revised their
approach and strategy accordingly. The very real and
legitimate needs that the saloon fulfilled, however, apparently
counted for naught.239 Sometimes drying up America seemed to
be all that mattered to the evangelical Protestants, both liberal
and fundamentalist.
E. The Nature of the Relation Between Suasion and
Coercion and the Transformation of the Temperance-
Prohibition Idea into National Prohibition
Lyman Beecher, writing in 1827, set out a strategy for
temperance-prohibition that drew heavily upon legal coercion,
but also had ample room for suasion.240 Beecher clearly
237 LARRY ENGELMANN, INTEMPERANCE: THE LOST WAR AGAINST LIQUOR 6
(1979).
231 West, supra note 27, at 20.
239 See Niebuhr, supra note 203, at 244 (arguing that the point of revivalism
and Protestantization was not to save people from "the frustration, conflict, futility and
poverty of life which they sought to escape in the saloons; they were saved from
whiskey.").
240 LYMAN BEECHER, SIX SERMONS ON THE NATURE, OCCASIONS, SIGNS, EVILS,
AND REMEDY OF INTEMPERANCE (New York, American Tract Society 10th ed. 1843)
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believed that "[hluman laws may not be able to prevent the
wrong [of intemperance], but the cries of widows and orphans
will be heard in heaven, and a retribution which human
tribunals cannot award, will be reserved for the day of
judgement."241 But he had much to say about solving the
problem of temperance in this life, whatever justice may or
may not be had in heaven. He began by asserting that self-
government and voluntary abstinence on the one hand and
"mere" civil coercion on the other were not adequate
remedies.242 He insisted that the remedy for intemperance was
"[t]he banishment of ardent spirits from the list of lawful
articles of commerce, by a correct and efficient public
sentiment; such as has turned slavery out in half our land, and
will yet expel it from the world."243
Beecher's prediction, if one may call it that, of the Webb-
Kenyon law, enacted by Congress in 1913244 which "banished"
beverage alcohol from the protection of the Interstate
Commerce Clause,245 and which set the stage for the adoption
of the Eighteenth Amendment, is nothing short of
breathtaking. But his call for a specific legal strategy makes
sense only in the context of moral suasion because the law that
he wanted depended on "efficient public sentiment." Here
again, Beecher was remarkably prescient. The failure of
National Prohibition may well have reflected a lack of an
"efficient public sentiment" in favor of it. 246
Beecher must have understood the powerful and close
relation between public opinion and law in democratic
politics.247 To those who insisted that nothing could be done to
[hereinafter SIX SERMONS].
241 Id. at 78.
242 Id. at 62-63.
243 Id. at 64.
244 Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1919) [hereinafter "the Act"]. The
title of the Act reads as follows: "An Act Divesting Intoxicating Liquors of Their
Interstate Character in Certain Cases." The Act was-upheld in Clark Distilling Co. v.
W Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
245 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
246 See BLOCKER, supra note 223, at 239, 243-44 (arguing the Drys "w[o]n the
battle" but "lost the war" with the enactment of prohibition because of the lack of a
"consensus of values" supporting the movement, coupled with the Anti-Saloon League's
refusal to undertake "a long campaign of persuasion'); PINNEY, supra note 117, at 435-
36 (maintaining that "Prohibition . . . created a nation of lawbreakers. All the
provisions of the act were defied systematically and persistently by large sections of the
population."). For further discussion of the repeal of National Prohibition, see
ENGELMANN, supra note 237, at 188-227; see generally DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING
NATIONAL PROHIBITION (1979); KENNETH D. ROSE, AMERICAN WOMEN AND THE REPEAL
OF PROHIBITION (1996).
247 For the definitive treatment of the relation, see V.0. KEY, JR., PUBLIC
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remedy the problem of intemperance, Beecher responded that
the answer lay in the creation of "a rectified public opinion248
because, in strangely modern tones, if one built the right public
opinion, then the right public law would follow.249 He produced
a subtle and supple synthesis of moral suasion and legal
coercion. He outlined a program of suasion: making
information on the subject of intemperance universally
known;250 forming an association responsible for publicizing
this information, delivering addresses and the like;251 and
encouraging employers to exclude "ardent spirits as an
auxiliary to labor,252 young men to voluntarily abstain from
drinking and form associations to advance the same, and
OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 14 (1961) (defining public opinion as "those
opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed"). Key
wrote:
Although all regimes must pay heed to the opinion of their peoples, obviously
in democratic orders opinion plays a different role than in dictatorial states.
When the doctrine prevails that citizens have a right to be heard and
governments have a duty to hear, private opinion may have an impact on
most major public actions. For the maximum participation of the public (or
the publics) a practice of disclosure or notice of prospective actions and of
announcement of the considerations underlying actions must be followed.
Freedom of association and freedom of expression of opinion on public
matters need also to exist .... Communication of views to the government is
not essential to transform opinion into public opinion, although
communication may be the general rule.
Id. at 17. Key's ideas have undergone refinement, particularly with respect to the
process by which public opinion becomes law. See IRVING CRESPI, PUBLIC OPINION,
POLLS, AND DEMOCRACY 131 (1989) (arguing that public opinion was manipulable by
powerful special interests, thus undermining the democratic principle enunciated by
Key, and that "public opinion is a social process in constant flux, always changing in
focus, direction, and definitiveness in reaction to both direct personal experiences and
to the appeals of those who have control or access to mass communications"); DENNIS S.
IPPOLITO ET AL., PUBLIC OPINION AND RESPONSIBLE DEMOCRACY 312 (1976) (arguing
that "[plublic opinion is a process ... which links the governed to their governors; and
a process which provides a portion of the energy upon which democratic regimes are
run"). Superimposed on what is now recognized as the socially contingent nature of
public opinion is the older debate as to whether the political elites should even bother
with public opinion, except in some vague, non-specific way, relying, instead, on their
own judgment as to what policies best serve the public interest. See, e.g., RUSSELL J.
DALTON, CITIZEN POLITICS: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN ADVANCED
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES 261-83 (2d ed. 1996). But even the "elitist" theory of
representative democracy must concede that if the elite offend the sensibilities of the
masses, notwithstanding the manipulation of the masses by those who control the
media or access to the media, the masses can, at least in theory, vote the elite out of
office.
248 SIX SERMONS, supra note 240, at 83.
249 Id. at 84-85.
250 Id. at 86.
251 Id. at 87.
252 Both moral suasion and legal coercion appear to be elements of an
integrated personnel management strategy. See ROBERT C. SEDWICK, PEOPLE,
MOTIVATION, AND WORK 1-3 (1975).
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churches to form a national society to aid in the cause of
excluding "the use and commerce in ardent spirits."253 The
ultimate act or expression of moral suasion would occur "when
the use of ardent spirits will be proscribed by a vote of all the
churches in our land, and when the commerce in that article
shall, equally with the slave-trade, be regarded as inconsistent
with a credible profession of Christianity." 254
Then, when moral suasion had attained its highest
reach, and only then, Beecher argued:
[S]omething may be done by legislation to discourage the distillation
and importation of ardent spirits, and to discountenance improper
modes of vending them. Then, the suffrage of the community may be
expected to put in requisition men of talents and integrity, who
sustained by their constituents, will not hesitate to frame the
requisite laws, and to give to them their salutary power.
255
Beecher's synthesis of suasion and coercion had a
cautionary tone to it, insisting that any effort to use legislation
"before the public is prepared for an efficient cooperation, could
terminate only in defeat. Republics must be prepared by moral
sentiment for efficient legislation."256 Beecher stated this "rule"
three more times257 making the point that "efficacious
legislation" requires the "concurrent aid of an enlightened
public sentiment."258
Beecher's cheery reliance on moral suasion and
assimilation as the remedy for the "peril" of Catholicism259 in
the 1830s must be considered in light of his call for more
restrictive immigration laws. Perhaps he meant only that the
Catholics then in America could be assimilated, but the number
of Catholics had to be kept under control for assimilation to
work.260 Beecher's call for laws restricting immigration and
naturalization must have rested on his belief that "rectified
public opinion," that is to say the views of white Anglo-Saxon
evangelical Protestants, wanted to keep Catholics out. 261 He
253 SIX SERMONS, supra note 240, at 87-88. Beecher also called on those
committed to temperance to boycott merchants who dealt in ardent spirits. Id. at 91-92.
254 Id. at 93.
255 Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
256 Id.
257 Id. at 96, 98, 101.
2,1 SIX SERMONS, supra note 240, at 101.
259 See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
260 See BEECHER, supra note 148, at 175-76 (arguing for the use of legal
coercion to stem the flow of immigration and to slow down and restrict the
naturalization of those immigrants then in the United States).
261 See RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE, supra note 197, at 211 (noting that the "[a]nti-
2005]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
may have been right, up to a point. However, countervailing
forces-mainly the need for white immigrants to help in the
settlement of the vast North American continent262-kept
restrictive immigration and naturalization laws off the books
for a long time, until the perceived need had vanished, along
with the frontier.23 Nonetheless, Beecher was no starry-eyed
idealist. Moral suasion needed legal coercion in order to
effectuate the social reform goals of the Protestant Empire. The
demographics reveal much about the meaning of
"assimilation," of suasion as the dominant strategy to advance
the interests of the Protestant Empire. Evangelical
Protestants, as a collective group, far outnumbered other
religious groups in the America of the 1840s.264 A hegemony, a
dominance, then existed in fact, if not in law.265
Beecher was betting on something like critical mass, an
idea that explains much of his thinking. He believed that a
critical mass of evangelical Protestants was ready to close the
door on immigration and restrict naturalization in the 1830s.
On this point he was wrong. Evangelical Protestants were
conflicted between their dislike of Catholics and the need for
white colonizers. Protestant Europe simply did not produce
enough workers for the Protestant Empire. But his larger
theory held true: "rectified public opinion" on the immigration
question came around to his position eighty or ninety years
later, as did the law.266 With regard to temperance, Beecher
rightly understood that many evangelical Protestants had not
yet come to agree with him. The program of suasion that he
called for was not aimed at Catholics, but was aimed at
Catholicism [of the early Twentieth century] was an emphasis left over from the days
when Protestants had endeavored to build an empire which would keep the hated
papists out.").
262 See Protestant Empire, supra note 23, at 243-45.
263 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v.
Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, and "Federal Courts," 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927,
1994 (2003) (stating that Frederick Jackson Turner noted in 1893 that as of 1890, the
frontier line had disappeared and noting that for Turner "the passing of the frontier
meant that America was entering a new and potentially dangerous age").
264 In 1850, evangelical Protestants totaled 73.8% of those Americans having
religious affiliation. See FINKE & STARK, supra note 112, at 55.
265 The distinction between the situs or location of the Protestant Empire
became a matter of some discussion early on. See State v. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.)
553, 562-63, 572 (1837) (holding that Delaware was a Christian nation in fact, although
not in law, and that that fact could change, if the people changed their religion).
266 See Immigration Act of 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5 (repealed 1952) and
Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11(a), 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952), which
established national origins quotas that strongly preferred whites.
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Protestants, the vast bulk of the white American population at
the time.
Using Beecher's thought as a benchmark, it becomes
clear that the stubborn and persistent resistance of an ever
growing Catholic and immigrant American population to the
temperance-prohibition idea threw a monkey wrench into
Beecher's well-crafted strategy. Suasion could not produce the
"rectified public opinion" that Beecher rightly understood was
necessary for prohibition to work. And it is difficult to believe
that broad liberal notions of religious freedom easily come into
play under these circumstances for it was precisely that
"religious freedom," claimed by Catholics and others, no matter
what the Protestant Empire might have thought, wished for, or
wanted,267 that gummed up the works.
The larger currents of evangelical Protestant thought
and action also reflect the idea that suasion and coercion exist
in a dynamic relation. The Anglo-American Protestant Empire
has, for centuries, exhibited a characteristic penchant for
suasion, for attrition and restraint, even though legal coercion
remained in the background, available for use when
circumstances warranted.268 The relation between suasion and
coercion might take shape within the thinking and the work of
one writer, as was the case with Beecher. It might also
manifest itself in other contexts, such as the swirling currents
of history, society, and culture, operating as an unstated
premise in a welter of conflicting and dissonant ideas, policies
and strategies.
Thus it happened that the first temperance group,
established in New York in 1808, relied on self-help, surely a
form of moral or cultural or social suasion, as the way to get its
267 See R. LAURENCE MOORE, RELIGIOUS OUTSIDERS AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICANS xi (1986). Moore argues:
[O]utsiderhood is a characteristic way of inventing one's Americannness.
Despite what Frederick Jackson Turner wrote, most people who lived in this
country did not gain a sense of what it meant to be an American by going to
the frontier. Far more of them gained that sense by turning aspects of a
carefully nurtured sense of separate identity against a vaguely defined
concept of mainstream or dominant culture.
Id.; James H. Moorhead, "God's Right Arm'"? Minority Faiths and Protestant Visions of
America, in MINORITY FAITHS AND THE AMERICAN PROTESTANT MAINSTREAM 337
(Jonathan D. Sarna ed., 1998) (arguing that "the meaning of America remained subject
to continuous renegotiation, as together minority faiths and the Protestant mainstream
haggled over questions of national identity.").
268 See Common School Religion, supra note 6, at 222-23. For a detailed
discussion of this dynamic over time, as mirrored in the post-Reformation Anglo-
American religious settlements, see Protestant Empire, supra note 23, passim.
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members to abstain,269 and this faith in suasion dominated the
approach of many temperance groups and supporters in the
years leading up to the Civil War.270 Perhaps these groups had
read and mastered Beecher or some precursor to Beecher. In
any event, the strategy of the early self-help temperance
groups, at least until the critical mass of "rectified public
opinion" had taken shape, was consistent with Beecher's. But
even during that period, some temperance supporters favored
the use of coercion to impose temperance, 271 and in the 1850s
several states and territories enacted state-wide laws designed
to prohibit the manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquor,
although regulated sales for limited purposes were permitted
or authorized.272 These laws had limited impact, given the
269 See KOBLER, supra note 117, at 48-51.
270 See SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF
CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 98 (1963); ODEGARD, supra note 189, at 36 (arguing that "[a]
frontier population, just emerg[ing] from a seven year struggle for political
independence and educated by the propaganda of that period to regard with suspicion
all governmental interference, would have looked askance at a prohibitory policy.").
271 GUSFIELD, supra note 118, at 48 (noting that 'Temperance adherents [in
the West] were not content with moral suasion alone."); MEAD, supra note 270, at 99.
272 See An Act for the Suppression of Intemperance, ch. 57, §§ 1-2, 5, 1854
Conn. Pub. Acts 54-55 (repealed 1882) (prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor,
permitting the local manufacture and sale of cider and wine provided that they be sold
in quantities of not less than five gallons, and authorizing regulated sales of liquors for
"sacramental, medicinal, chemical, and mechanical uses only"); An Act for the
Suppression of Intemperance, ch. 245, §§ 1, 3, 5, 19, 11 Del. Laws 273-74, 279 (1855)
(repealed 1873) (prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors; prohibiting the possession
of intoxicating liquors with intent to sell; authorizing regulated sales of intoxicating
liquors for 'Mechanical, Chemical and Medicinal purposes only, and pure wine for
sacramental use"; and permitting the local manufacture and sale of cider and wine,
provided that sales be in quantities of not less than one gallon); An Act to Prohibit the
Retailing of Intoxicating Drinks, ch. 30, §§ 1, 4, 1851 Ill. Laws 389-90 (repealed 1853)
(prohibiting the sale of spiritous liquors in quantitites of less than one quart and
allowing the sale of liquors by druggists or physicians for "purely medical, mechanical,
or sacramental purposes"); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 1523-1524, 1544 (1880) (repealed 1934)
(prohibiting the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors, authorizing the regulated
sale of liquors "to be used for mechanical, medicinal, culinary, or sacramental
purposes[,]" and permitting the local manufacture and sale of beer, cider and wine); An
Act concerning the Manufacture and sale of Spirituous or Intoxicating Liquors, ch. 322,
§§ 1-2, 12, 1852 Mass. Acts 257-58, 262-64 (repealed) (prohibiting the manufacture or
sale of intoxicating liquors, permitting the regulated sale of liquor for medicinal,
chemical, and mechanical purposes, and exempting the sale and use of wine "for the
commemoration of the Lord's supper"); Act for Suppression of Drinking Houses and
Tippling Shops, ch. 211 §§ 1-2, 1851 Me. Laws 210-11 (repealed) (prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquor and authorizing regulated sales of alcohol "for
medicinal and mechanical purposes and no other"); An Act to Prevent the Manufacture
and Sale of Spiritous or Intoxicating Liquors as a Beverage, ch. 52, §§ 1, 14, MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 1, 14 (1857) (repealed 1933) (prohibiting the manufacture or sale of
intoxicating liquors, except "cider, beer, and wine of domestic manufacture; and
permitting the regulated sale of liquor for medicinal, scientific, mechanical and
manufacturing purposes, and wine for sacramental purposes); An Act for the
Restriction of the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors within the Territory of Minnesota, ch. 8,
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disorder of the Civil War, and were largely ignored, repealed,
or both. But they clearly represented an effort-successful or
otherwise-to advance the goals and agenda of the temperance-
prohibition movement.
The years following the Civil War, a low point in the
temperance-prohibition movement, saw the formation of the
Prohibition Party, the Women's Christian Temperance Union,
and the Anti-Saloon League.273 While their strategies and
approaches might have differed,274 each of these organized
§§ 1-2, 1852 Minn. Laws 12 (repealed 1933) (prohibiting the manufacture and sale of
intoxicating liquors and authorizing the regulated sale of liquor for "medicinal or
mechanical purposes and no other"). See infra Part III.A for further discussion of the
exemption in nineteenth century American law; An Act for the Suppression of
Intemperance, ch. 1658, §§ 1, 7, 1855 N.H. Laws 1527-28 (repealed 1858) (prohibiting
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor and authorizing the regulated sale of
liquor "for medicinal, mechanical and chemical purposes, and wine for the
commemoration of the Lord's Supper"); An Act for the prevention of Intemperance,
Pauperism, and Crime, ch. 231, § 1-2, 1855 N.Y. Laws 340-41 (prohibiting the sale or
distribution of intoxicating liquor, except for medical or sacramental purposes and
permitting the regulated sale of intoxicating liquor "for mechanical, chemical, or
medicinal purposes, and wine for sacramental use"); The Revised Statutes of the State
of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations §§ 1-2, 28 (1857) (repealed) (prohibiting
the manufacture and sale of liquor, authorizing the regulated sale of liquor for
"sacramental, medicinal, mechanical, chemical, and culinary purposes only[,]" and
permitting the local manufacture and sale of cider, wine and beer); VT. STAT. tit. 30, §§
1, 4 (1862) (repealed 1902) (prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor,
but totally exempting from the reach of the law the manufacture, sale and use of wine
"for the commemoration of the Lord's supper" and authorizing the regulated sale of
intoxicating liquors for "medicinal, chemical, and mechanical purposes only').
273 The Party was founded in 1869. See Randall C. Jimerson, The Temperance
and Prohibition Movement in America, 1830-1933, in GUIDE TO THE MICROFILM
EDITION OF TEMPERANCE AND PROHIBITION PAPERS 8 (Randall C. Jimerson et al. eds.,
1977). The Union was founded in 1874, see id. at 10, and the League in 1893, see
ASBURY, supra note 9, at 94; ASINOF, supra note 229, at 235-36; BADER, supra note 121,
at 191.
274 The Prohibition Party was the least effective of the three major
temperance-prohibition organizations. Its leaders "failed to understand the nature of
the modern political party." See West, supra note 27, at 111. Its rigidity "gained the
contempt of many political observers," id. at 112, and it 'lost itself amid fuzzy dreams
of state offices and immediate abolition of all liquor," failing to "realize that [it was] not
a party but an interest group which would have to organize, cooperate and take one
restrictive step at a time," id. at 136. See also PAUL E. ISAAC, PROHIBITION AND
POLITICS: TURBULENT DECADES IN TENNESSEE, 1885-1920, at 61 (1965) (noting that the
Prohibition Party "advocated the most radical kind of temperance reform," condemning
as "inadequate and compromises with evil" more modest proposals). The Women's
Christian Temperance Union was very much concerned with the family and home, and
worried about the living condition of workers. West, supra note 27, at 143-45. The
Union was also non-partisan. See Jimerson, supra note 273, at 14. Quite unlike the
Prohibition Party's singular focus on prohibition, the Union involved itself in a range of
social issues. The Anti-Saloon League adopted the non-partisanship of the Union and
the narrower focus on prohibition of the Party, although it never was as rigid as the
Party. The League was, first and foremost a pressure group, the most effective one in
American political history. See DELIVER, supra note 9, at 93. See also BADER, supra
note 121, at 191; Engelmann, 0, Whisky, supra note 27, at 151; West, supra note 27, at
266. The League "was formed as a political organization and was never anything else.
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expressions of the temperance-prohibition idea was committed
to the use of legal coercion to dry up America. Each had to
know that Catholics and immigrant groups, more generally,
opposed prohibition. At the same time, however, some Drys
stubbornly held on to a suasion strategy, even as the
nineteenth century drew to a close.275
But history clearly teaches that whatever the balance
between suasion and coercion might have been at the
beginning of the temperance-prohibition movement, the
balance had shifted towards legal coercion in the years leading
up to National Prohibition. "Circumstances" warranted
bringing coercion from the background into the foreground of
the effort to dry up America. The commentators on National
Prohibition have offered a variety of reasons to explain the
shift in emphasis.276 Surely, though, Catholic and immigrant
resistance to temperance-prohibition had to play an important
part in this shift.
Nonetheless, even during the regime of National
Prohibition, the Drys had not abandoned all hope in suasion.277
It is important to remember, therefore, that suasion and
coercion exist in a dynamic relationship, which is to say that
both can be present at any moment in time, although with
varying degrees of emphasis. Second, the American colonial
experience had established the importance of cultural or social
But it was not paritisan; it never tried to gain the support of any political party....
Two things were always emphasized by the Anti-Saloon League-its religious
character and the omnipartisan nature of its political activities." ASBURY, supra note 9,
at 100. See also GUSFIELD, supra note 118, at 108 (stating that the League "operated as
a 'pressure group,' with no formal attachment to any political or social system of ideas
other than evangelical Protestantism."). The League was by far and away the most
effective of the major temperance-prohibition organizations.
275 See Ruth, supra note 210, at 4 (noting that "[s]ome temperance
organizations in Georgia in the 1880s or thereabouts, apparently still taught individual
moral suasion.").
276 See Protestant Empire, supra note 23, at 253-54 (describing the reasons as
some or all of the following: impatience with the pace of suasion-dominated reform; a
search for order; "a major change in philosophy;" majority support for change; or no
apparent reason at all, although some believed that suasion and coercion could and did
coexist because one did not necessarily follow from the other or because of a stubborn
belief in cultural suasion).
277 Many Drys believed that the power or force of National Prohibition, once in
place, would, without more, lead to conversion. See ENGELMANN, supra note 237, at 123
(noting that Drys expected to see within a matter of weeks or months, a "dramatic and
massive urban conversion to the dry cause ...once city dwellers no longer saw as
through the bottom of a glass darkly" because "[tihe clear bright light of prohibition
would reveal in detail magnificent changes and transformations"); MCCARTY, supra
note 188, at 24 (quoting a Dry Journal to the effect that "given appropriate time, the
prohibition amendment would 'show its power"').
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suasion,278 thereby blurring any sharp distinction between
public and private action. Thus, it is most probable that Drys
responded in a pragmatic fashion to changes in demographic
and other facts. They "simply viewed coercion and suasion,
without any regard to institutional locus or situs, as options
and alternatives, but they all ultimately coalesced under the
banner of legal coercion'279 for whatever reason, even though
the legal forms of National Prohibition might, for Joseph
Gusfield,280 have marked a moral reform only.281
This Part has established two important traits of Drys
during the times leading up to National Prohibition, both of
which must be considered in providing an explanation for the
exemption in the Volstead Act for the religious use of wine.
First, the Drys had inherited a multi-dimensional culturally
and theologically embedded anti-Catholicism, fed and
nourished in no small part by theology, a world view, and the
stubborn resistance of Roman Catholics and other non-
evangelical Protestants to the efforts of the evangelical
Protestants to convert them to their evangelical religion.
Second, Drys clearly demonstrated considerable frustration,
anger, impatience, anxiety, and fear because their plans to
Protestantize non-Protestant Americans had not fared well.
Undoubtedly, the imperatives of anti-Catholicism and
Protestantization, not to mention a shift from suasion to
coercion, sorely test any conclusion that the exemption
necessarily reflects a deep and abiding commitment to a theory
of religious freedom and liberty that values religious pluralism
and diversity. However, the foregoing does not necessarily
justify the conclusion that the exemption does not reflect such a
commitment.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE EXEMPTION IN AMERICAN LAW
In the spirit of exploring the meaning of the exemption
in the Volstead Act, this Part will examine the history of
exemptions for the religious use of wine, explicit or implied, in
the temperance-prohibition laws of the states and the federal
government enacted prior to the adoption of the Volstead Act.
In the second decade of the twentieth century the question of
278 See Protestant Empire, supra note 23, at 244-45, 249-53.
279 Id. at 254.
280 See GUSFIELD, supra note 118 passim.
281 See Protestant Empire, supra note 23, at 254.
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the presence or the absence of an exemption, explicit or
implied, took on an urgency, and became, in some sense,
symbolic or emblematic of the larger religious struggle between
evangelical Protestants and non-evangelical Protestants. The
ultimate conclusion was that National Prohibition would not be
the means for the destruction of the Catholic Mass, or for that
matter, other Christian and Jewish religious rituals and
ceremonies, and that National Prohibition would not be the
occasion for reducing those who were not evangelical
Protestants to mendicants forced to beg judges and prosecutors
for the right to use wine for religious purposes.
A. The Exemption in Nineteenth Century American Law
As discussed above, the dawn of the nineteenth century
revealed a universal use of wine for religious purposes by
Protestants and Catholics alike.282 While evangelical
Protestants would shift to grape juice by the end of that
century, temperance-prohibition laws began to appear long
before the Civil War. Exemptions for the religious use of wine,
therefore, benefited evangelical Protestants by ensuring that
temperance-prohibition laws would not interfere with their
communion services. Others might also benefit from such
exemptions, but it might well suffice to say that they benefited
solely by reason of interest-convergence. 283
1. The Exemption Expressly Provided
A brief review of a sampling of the temperance-
prohibition laws enacted in the nineteenth century shows a
pattern or a tendency to provide an exemption for the
sacramental use of wine.284 Some statutes made it quite clear
282 See supra Part II.A.4.
283 See generally Bell, supra note 31.
284 See, e.g., Revised Statutes of the State of Illinois, ch. 24, art. V, pt. 62, § 1
(1885); An Act to prevent intemperance in Wayne township, the county of Henry, ch.
115, 1851 Ind. Acts 125 (repealed); An Act to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors in
the town of Plainfield and vicinity, in Hendricks county, ch. 154, 1850 Ind. Acts 123;
An Act to prohibit the sale of spirituous liquors in Jackson and Monroe townships, in
Madison county by a less quantity than thirty gallons, ch. 158, 1850 Ind. Acts 126; Act
of Feb. 19, 1908, ch. 113, § 4, 1908 Miss. Laws 112, 113 (repealed); An Act to prohibit
the sale of vinous, spirituous or malt liquors within two miles of the Ethel school house
and church in the county of Attala, ch. 107, 1890 Miss. Laws 123 (repealed); An Ac [sic]
to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors in the corporate limits of the town of
Harrison, of the county of Tallahatchie, of the State of Mississippi, or within three
miles of the corporate boundary of said town of Harrison, ch. 306, 1886 Miss. Laws 548
(repealed); An Act to prevent the sale of vinous and spirituous liquors in the town of
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that only the Christian use of wine was protected. For example,
several Mississippi statutes limited the exception to
unmistakably Christian usages, if not evangelical Protestant
usages. Thus, one law exempted liquors used "for the
administration of the Lord's supper."285 Another permitted the
sale of wine only "to church officers to be used for sacramental
purposes.286 And yet another created an exemption for the use
of wine in "the administration of the Christian sacrament."287
Mississippi was not alone in crafting a narrow
exemption that explicitly benefited Christian usages only.
During the wave of statewide prohibition laws enacted by
several states and territories during the 1850s and 1860s,
Vermont exempted the use of wine "for the commemoration of
the Lord's supper."288 Likewise, New Hampshire carved out an
exemption only for the use of wine "for the commemoration of
the Lord's Supper."289 And, completing a New England trifecta,
Massachusetts limited the exemption in identical terms,
restricting it to the use of wine in "the commemoration of the
Lord's supper."290 These three New England statutes may well
have accommodated only evangelical Protestant usages of
wine, considering that the Catholic Mass is not a
"commemoration of the Lord's supper," but rather a
propitiatory sacrifice and a commemoration of the bloody
sacrifice of Christ.291 Thus statutes exempting the use of wine
in connection with "the commemoration of the Lord's supper"
might or might not have applied to the Mass.
Meadville, Franklin county, in this State, or within two miles of the Court-house, ch.
72, 1875 Miss. Laws 104 (repealed); An Act to allow Druggists in the Town of
Hernando, DeSoto county, to sell vinous and spirituous liquors for sacramental or
medicinal purposes, ch. 158, 1860 Miss. Laws 218 (repealed). See also supra note 272.
285 An Act to prevent the sale or giving away intoxicating liquors within one
mile of Chapman Church, at Binnsville, Kemper county, Mississippi, ch. 193, 1886
Miss. Laws 311. See also An Act to incorporate Ebenezer High School, in the town of
Ebenezer, Holmes county, Mississippi, ch. 386, 1890 Miss. Laws 560.
286 An Act to amend an Act entitled "An Act to prohibit the sale or giving away
of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, in the town of Ripley, and within two miles
thereof, in the county of Tippah," approved March 8, 1884, ch. 342, 1886 Miss. Laws
645).
287 An Act to incorporate Goodman High School, in the town of Goodman,
Holmes county, Mississippi, ch. 385, 1890 Miss. Laws 558.
288 The General Statutes of the State of Vermont 1862, ch. 94, § 1.
289 An Act for the suppression of Intemperance, ch. 1658, § 7, 1855 N.H. Laws
1527, 1530.
290 An Act concerning the Manufacture and Sale of Spirituous or Intoxicating
Liquors, ch. 322, § 12, 1852 Mass. Acts 257, 264.
291 See CANONS AND DECREES, supra note 41, at 144-46 (footnote omitted).
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As we have already seen, 292 the limitation of the
exemption to Christian uses of wine found judicial acceptance.
Texas had adopted a local option law with an exemption for the
sacramental use of wine.293 The law was challenged on several
grounds, one of which was that it discriminated against Jews
in their mode of worship.294 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals
rejected the argument, stating that in essence the Jewish use
of wine was not "sacramental."295 Even though the court
recognized that the exemption only spoke to the sacramental
use of wine, it found no discrimination because the law did not
prohibit the use of wine in Jewish worship, but merely
prohibited the sale of wine for use in Jewish worship.296 The
court was terribly insensitive to Jewish religious practices,
paying no attention to the practical problems that Jews might
have in acquiring wine for religious uses. Regardless of
whether the Texas court sincerely felt bound by the
conventional understanding of the term "sacramental," it
clearly chose not to appeal to any theory of broad and liberal
religious freedom as a basis for extending the exemption to
include the Jewish uses of wine.
2. The Exemption Arising by Implication-or Explicit
Text not Needed
Some nineteenth century laws made no accommodation
for the religious use of wine and there appear to be no cases
from that century challenging the absence of any exemption.
However, the United States Attorney General did respond to
an inquiry from the Secretary of the Treasury regarding "an
application to ship to Alaska wines for sacramental use in the
various Greeco-Russian churches there.297 A federal
prohibition law applicable to the territory of Alaska had no
exemption for the religious use of wine. The Attorney General
concluded, however, that:
[S]uch provision does not apply to exclude wines intended for
sacramental uses. Such use of wines is a religious rite equally
solemn and venerable. Its 'free exercise' is therefore protected by the
first amendment to the Constitution. In the light of that guaranty, I
292 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
293 1895 Texas Rev. Civ. Stat. tit. 69, art. 3385.
294 Sweeney v. Webb, 76 S.W. 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
295 Id. at 770. See supra note 14.
296 Id.
297 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 139 (March 24, 1885).
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am satisfied that ... Congress had no more intention than it had
power to interfere with the shipment of the wines in question. 298
Professor Powell has observed that this opinion "gave a
more vigorous interpretation to [the free exercise] clause than
modern doctrine endorses.299 Although this may well be true,
it is unclear whether the Attorney General would have reached
the same conclusion had the question pertained to the
importation of wine into Alaska for Jewish religious purposes.
B. The Exemption in American Law during the First Two
Decades of the Twentieth Century, the Years Leading up
to National Prohibition
By 1900, circumstances had radically changed for
evangelical Protestants. Most importantly, as a general rule,
they no longer used wine for their communion services.300 Thus
the exemptions in the various temperance-prohibition laws,
even in their pinched form accommodating only the
"sacramental" use of wine, no longer served their original
majoritarian function of protecting the religious exercises of the
majority. The law could now prohibit the use of wine for any
purpose and not interfere with evangelical Protestant religious
services. The exemptions, therefore, could only benefit non-
evangelical Protestants, then and now, a minority of the
American population.01 Not surprisingly, exemptions for the
religious use of wine had, at this point, become a matter of
considerable controversy, particularly for Catholics. 302
1. The Exemption Expressly Provided-Or Not
As more and more states fell victim to the onslaughts of
the Drys, the question whether to exempt the religious use of
wine kept surfacing. In several states, notwithstanding the
objection of Catholics and others, Drys threatened to enact
prohibition legislation that would lack exemptions for the
"sacramental"-not to mention the religious-use of wine.3°3
The threat became a reality in Arizona and Oklahoma.
298 Id.
299 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
222 (1999).
300 See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
301 See LATOURETTE, supra note 29, at 1258.
302 See PILGRIMS, supra note 9, at 377; TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 32.
303 See George E. Hoadley, Some Tactics of Prohibitionists, 19 AMERICA 353-54
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a. Arizona and Oklahoma
Arizona became a state in 1912. Its "progressive"304
constitution permitted initiatives and referendums,305 but said
nothing on the subject of prohibition. In November, 1914, soon
after Arizona became a state, the Drys put the question of
prohibition to the Arizona electorate. The proposed amendment
to the Arizona constitution read in relevant part as follows:
Section 1. Ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquor ...
shall not be manufactured in or introduced into the State of Arizona.
... Every person who sells, exchanges, gives, barters, or disposes of
any ardent spirits, . . . wine, or intoxicating liquor.., to any person
in the State of Arizona, or who manufactures, or introduces into, or
attempts to introduce into the State of Arizona any ardent spirits...
wine, or intoxicating liquor.., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor... ;
providedo that nothing in this amendment contained shall apply to
the manufacture or sale of denatured alcohol.
Section 2. The legislature shall by appropriate legislation provide
for the carrying into effect of this amendment.306
It passed, narrowly. 3°7
When Oklahoma entered the Union in 1907, its
constitution contained a Prohibition provision that similarly
stated, in relevant part:
The manufacture, sale, . . . or otherwise furnishing . . . of
intoxicating liquors within this State . . .is prohibited .... Any
person.., who shall manufacture, sell ... or otherwise furnish any
intoxicating liquor ... contrary to the provisions of this section, ....
or who shall ship ... such liquors from one place within this State to
another place therein, except the conveyance of a lawful purchase as
herein authorized, shall be punished.., provided [that there may be
regulated sales of] such liquors for medicinal purposes; and . . .for
(1918) (discussing Florida); Henry Maurice, Temperance against Prohibition, 12
AMERICA 506 (1915) (discussing Pennsylvania); Bernard J. McNamara, Danger in
Prohibition, 58 THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW 495, 509-11 (1918) (discussing Iowa);
Note, The Minimum and a Menace, 12 AMERICA 566 (1915) (discussing Utah); Note,
Sacramental Wine and Prohibition Laws, 56 THE LIVING CHURCH 673 (1917)
(discussing Georgia).
304 See infra note 517 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Progressivism.
305 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1; art. XXI, § 1.
306 WILEY E. JONES, PROHIBITION LAWS, FEDERAL AND STATE, IN FORCE IN THE
STATE OF ARIZONA 3 (1917).
307 DAVID R. BERMAN, REFORMERS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE ELECTORATE: AN
ANALYSIS OF ARIZONA'S AGE OF REFORM 121 (1992); H.D. Ware, Alcohol, Temperance
and Prohibition in Arizona 261 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State
University) (on file with author).
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industrial purposes, of alcohol which shall have been denaturized...
of alcohol for scientific purposes . . . . 308
Pursuant to this provision, in 1917 the Oklahoma
legislature enacted a prohibition law, a Bone-Dry law because
it prohibited the possession of liquor, which contained no
exemption for any religious use of wine.3°9 It provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person in this State to receive directly or
indirectly any liquors, the sale of which are prohibited by the laws of
this State, from a common or other carrier.
It shall also be unlawful for any person in this state to possess any
[such] liquor[], received directly or indirectly from a common or other
carrier in this State. This section shall apply to such liquors
intended for personal use, as well as otherwise, and to interstate as
well as intrastate shipments or carriage .... Provided, however, that
scientific institutions, universities and colleges, and bonded
apothecaries, druggists, hospitals or pharmacists may receive and
possess pure grain alcohol, as provided by the laws of this State, to
be used only for such purposes as are prescribed by the laws of this
State. 310
The question in both Arizona and Oklahoma became
whether the law implied an exemption for the "sacramental," or
the "religious" use of wine, notwithstanding the silence of the
Arizona constitution and the Oklahoma statute. 311
b. The Other American States
In virtually every American state, however, whether
contemplated or not, an exemption or accommodation for the
religious use of wine, at least by Christians, found its way into
the prohibition laws enacted during the first two decades of the
twentieth century. The change in the circumstances of
evangelical Protestants of course changed the meaning of the
exemption. Nonetheless, the Nineteenth Century form still
dominated the statutes that emerged during these two decades,
308 OKLA. CONST. PROHIBITION ORDINANCE (repealed 1959).
309 A Bone-Dry law can still provide for the religious use of wine. See infra
notes 386-387 and accompanying text. In fact, the Volstead Act itself is a perfect
example of such a law.
310 Bone Dry Law, ch. 186, § 1, 1917 Okla. Sess. Laws 350, 350 (repealed).
311 A larger question presented is whether one could read the exemption in the
Volstead Act merely as the product or result of custom, a custom that dates back to
some of the earliest temperance-prohibition laws of exempting the religious use of wine
when the laws otherwise would prohibit or impede access to religious wine. The
experience of the first two decades of the twentieth century counsels against such a
conclusion. The contestability of the question was simply too wide, broad, and deep as
this Part will show.
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and, arguably, the religious freedom of Jews remained
precarious. 312
Whatever the influence of the Anti-Saloon League may
or may not have been on the drafting of the state prohibition
laws enacted in the run-up to National Prohibition, 313 and thus,
whether there may have been "model" laws that the states
adapted to meet their own individual purposes and
circumstances, the state laws demonstrate a remarkable
fidelity to the form limiting the exemption to the sacramental
use of wine. Wayne Wheeler, the legislative superintendent of
the Anti-Saloon League, prepared a comprehensive survey of
federal and state prohibition laws.314 That compilation provides
the basis for the following discussion.
As noted earlier, the Nineteenth Century form provided
for an exemption for the sacramental use of wine.315 Some of
the states, the "Group I States," enacted laws in the first two
decades of the twentieth century that essentially restated the
Nineteenth Century form.316 Some states, the "Group II
States," expanded on the Nineteenth Century form by
introducing the term "religious" when defining the nature and
the scope of the exemption. 317 The term "religion," which of
course gives content to the adjective, "religious," had a meaning
that clearly encompassed Judaism.318 The use of the word
312 See supra notes 281-93 and accompanying text.
313 It is clear, of course, that the Anti-Saloon League drafted what ultimately
became the Volstead Act. See TIMBERLAKE, supra note 10, at 181.
314 FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO INTOXICATING LIQUOR (Wayne B.
Wheeler, compiler, 2nd ed., 1918) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS].
315 See supra notes 281-288 and accompanying text.
316 FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note 314, at 131. The following states
exempted the "sacramental" use of wine, without elaboration: Connecticut, id.; Idaho,
id. at 184; Iowa, id. at 207; Kentucky, id. at 258; Louisiana, id. at 270; Minnesota, id.
at 321; Montana, id., at 392; New Mexico, id. at 450; New York, id. at 465; and North
Dakota, id. at 482.
317 See WEBSTER DICTIONARY (1913 ed.) (defining "religious" to mean "of or
pertaining to religion; concerned with religion; teaching, or setting forth, religion; set
apart to religion ...."), at http://machaut.uchicago.educgi-binfWEBSTER.sh?WORD=
religious (last visited May 1, 2004).
318 See People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 92 N.E. 251, 252 (Ill. 1910)
(stating that "[rieligion has reference to man's relation to divinity; to the moral
obligation of reverence and worship, obedience and submission" and "the recognition of
God as an object of worship, love, and obedience; right feeling toward God, as rightly
apprehended."); McMasters v. State, 207 P. 566, 568 (Okla. 1922) (stating that religion
"has reference to man's relation to Divinity; to reverence, worship, obedience, and
submission to the mandates and precepts of supernatural or superior beings" and "[iun
its broadest sense it includes all forms of belief in the existence of superior beings,
exercising power over human beings by volition, imposing rules of conduct with future
rewards and punishments."); Nikulnikoff v. Archbishop and Consistory of Russian
Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, 255 N.Y.S. 653, 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932) (stating
that "[rieligion as generally accepted may be defined as a bond uniting man to God and
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"religious" would suggest, therefore, an intention to
accommodate both Christian and Jewish religious uses of
wine. 319 A few of the Group II States also introduced the term
"church."320 It is not clear that "church" sweeps as broadly as
"religious" does. Indeed, the word merely sows confusion and
doubt.321 A small number of states, comprising the "Group III
States," expanded the Nineteenth Century form by utilizing the
term "church" rather than "religious."' 322 As with the Group II
a virtue whose purpose is to render God the worship due to him as the source of all
being and the principle of all government of things."). See also WEBSTER DICTIONARY
(1913 ed.), at http://machaut.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin[WEBSTER.sh?WORD=religion (last
visited May 1, 2004) (defining religion as "[t]he outward act or form by which men
indicate their recognition of the existence of a god or of gods . . .as, ethical religions;
monotheistic religions; natural religion; revealed religion; the religion of the Jews; the
religion of idol worshipers."). Ring got to the heart of the matter: "Christianity is a
religion." 92 N.E. at 254 (emphasis added). So is, for present purposes, Judaism.
319 The Group II States adding the term "religious" to the basic Nineteenth
Century form were Arkansas, FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note 314, at 105;
California, id. at 110; Florida, id. at 140; Michigan, id. at 300; South Dakota, id. at 584;
Texas, id. at 642, 658; Utah, id. at 678; Virginia, id. at 706-08; and West Virginia, id.
at 806-07.
320 The Group II States adding the two terms "religion" and "church" to the
basic Nineteenth Century form were Alabama, FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note
314, at 80-81; Colorado, id. at 121; Georgia, id. at 178; Indiana, id. at 196; Mississippi,
id. at 339; Nebraska, id. at 393, 396; North Carolina, id. at 477; Oregon, id. at 540; and
Tennesse, id. at 633, 637.
321 Several cases decided at or around the time of National Prohibition,
defined "church" as pertaining to Christians only. See Portage Township v. Full
Salvation Union, 29 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Mich. 1947); Church of the Holy Faith v. State
Tax Comm., 48 P.2d 777, 778 (N. Mex. 1935); McNeilly v. First Presbyterian Church,
137 N.E. 691, 694 (Mass. 1923); Scott County v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 163 P. 88,
91 (Or. 1917); In re Zimzow, 43 N.Y.S. 714, 719 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896) (relying on a
dictionary definition of "church" that equates the term to Christian religious bodies);
Wiggins v. Young, 57 S.E.2d 486, 487 (Ga. 1950); In re Douglass' Est., 143 N.W. 299,
300 (Neb. 1913). But other cases defined church with reference to "religion" generally,
and not to Christianity. See McAllister v. Burgess, 37 N.E. 173 (Mass. 1894); In re
Rupp, 106 N.Y.S. 483, 484 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1907); Riffe v. Proctor, 74 S.W. 409, 410 (Mo.
App. 1903); Josey v. Union Loan, 32 S.E. 628 (Ga. 1899). And at least one case
specifically defined "church" with reference to an Orthodox Jewish religious group.
Katz v. Goldman, 168 N.E. 763 (Ohio App. 1929). See also WEBSTER DICTIONARY (1913
ed.) (defining the word "church" primarily with reference to Christians and
Christianity, but also to "[a]ny body of worshipers; as, the Jewish church;"), at
http://machaut.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/WEBSTER.sh?WORD=church (last visited May 1,
2004). Modern cases continue to reflect the variable meanings of the term "church." See
Summum v. City of Ogden, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1295 n.11 (D. Utah 2001)
(distinguishing between churches and "the Jewish communion"); Jews For Jesus, Inc.,
v. Jewish Cmty. Relations Council of New York, Inc., 768 F.Supp. 467, 468 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (describing "church" as Gentile, and thus not Jewish); Grendel's Den,
Inc. v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88, 99 n.2 (1st Cir. 1981) (distinguishing between church and
synagogue). But see Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 768 (1973) (arguably using the word "church" to include Jews); Elbert v. Elbert,
579 N.E.2d 102, 109 n.3 (Ind. App. 1991) (using the word "church" to encompass all
religions); In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1024 (Ill. App. 1990) (Johnson,
J., dissenting) (using "church" to describe an Orthodox Jewish religious community).
322 The Group III States were Delaware, FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra
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States using the term "church," the Group III States merely
sowed confusion. One could argue, nonetheless, that the Group
II and the Group III States, or at least many of them, expanded
the reach of the exemption to cover the Jewish use of wine. But
several of the Group II and Group III States appear to have
had no such purpose in mind. Only a small handful of states,
the "Group IV States," directly and explicitly confronted the
matter of the religious use of wine by Jews.323 Finally, some
states appear to have had no statewide laws that implicated
the religious use of wine by Christians and Jews.324
Of course, the simplest and most straightforward
approach to accommodating both Christians and Jews would
simply have entailed the explicit mention of the religious use of
wine by Christians and Jews, or the expressed inclusion of
rabbis when describing the clergy eligible to receive and
purchase wine for religious purposes. That so few states did so
should give one pause. It may simply be that the Nineteenth
Century form continued to hold sway over the legislative
imagination in the two decades leading up to National
Prohibition. But because states employed language that
arguably broadened the reach and scope of the exemptions that
they crafted, it appears that many states meant to achieve
something more and different. Nonetheless, the texts adopted
by the Group II, the Group III, and the Group IV states
warrant some brief examination and review, considering new
language and new forms did not always mean a broader
exemption for the religious use of wine.325
i. Group II States
The religious freedom of Jews and Catholics was
certainly not secure in Group II States, where the exemption
only pertained to the sacramental use of wine. Given the
note 314, at 135; Kansas, id. at 251; New Hampshire, id. at 417, 420; and New Jersey,
id. at 448.
323 The Group IV States were South Carolina, FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS,
supra note 314, at 570-71; and Washington, id. at 793.
324 Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming did not appear, as of
the publication of FEDERAL AND STATE LAws, to have statewide laws that implicated
the religious use of wine. See FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note 314. Some or all of
these states might have adopted such laws subsequent to the publication of FEDERAL
AND STATE LAws. Id.
325 This discussion limits itself to the religious needs of Christians and Jews in
the face of National Prohibition. This is not to suggest that National Prohibition did
not adversely affect the religious needs of others. See supra note 20.
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holding in Sweeney v. Webb that "[t]he Jewish mode of worship
knows no sacraments,"326 the position of Jews in such
jurisdictions could be perilous, to the extent that the position in
Sweeney might be adopted elsewhere. Additionally, given the
language in some nineteenth century statutes limiting the
reach of an exemption for the use of wine "for the
commemoration of the Lord's Supper,"327 the position of
Catholics was also in jeopardy to the extent that legislatures
would use language to protect "the Lord's Supper" only.
The decision of the legislators in the Group II States to
add the term "religious328 or the two terms "religious" and
"church"329 to the basic Nineteenth Century form of the
exemption, did not necessarily settle the questions raised by
Sweeney and by the variations on the Nineteenth Century form
which limited the exemption to the Christian sacramental use
of wine, or, even worse, the use of wine in commemoration of
the Lord's Supper. As noted above,30 the term "religious"
should certainly include both Jews and Catholics, and the term
"church" should include Catholics, at least, if not Jews as
well. 331 But the drafting of the early twentieth century statutes
too often left much to be desired when it came to matters of
clarity and precision, not to mention the substantive protection
of the use of wine by Catholics and Jews in rituals, services and
ceremonies.
The nine Group II States adding the term "religious" to
the textual mix left the question of the scope of the exemption
unsettled. Thus Arkansas law accommodated the order,
shipment, or delivery of wine for sacramental purposes by or to
"any priest or minister of any religious denomination or
sect."332
326 76 S.W. 766, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
327 See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
328 See supra note 319.
329 See supra note 320.
330 See supra notes 317-318 and accompanying text
331 See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
332 FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note 314, at 105. Similarly, California
accommodated the sale by pharmacists of wine for sacramental purposes to "a
regularly ordained minister of some religious denomination, or upon the written order
of the local official board or governing body of a religious ordanization." Id. at 110.
Florida made it lawful for "any priest or minister of any religious denomination or sect
to receive and possess wines for sacramental purposes." Id. at 140. Michigan law
provided for the sale of wine "for sacramental purposes for use by religious bodies." Id.
at 300. Utah created an exemption for the "sacramental" use of wine by "religious
bodies." Id. at 678. Virginia law also created an exemption for the "sacramental" use of
wine "by religious bodies." Id. at 706-08. West Virginia law used the same form as the
Utah and Virginia statutes, exempting the sale of "wine for sacramental purposes by
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Texas law followed the same pattern as the other Group
II States adding the word "religious" to the formulation or
expression of the exemption. The Texas statute provided that a
"priest or minister of any religious denomination or sect" could
lawfully take delivery of wine, but only for "sacramental
purposes." 33 But the Texas statute must be read with
Sweeney's restrictive holding in mind. The continued use of the
word "sacramental" in statutes enacted after Sweeney strongly
suggests that the Texas legislature meant to embrace the
holding of Sweeney and that the addition of the word "religious"
did not broaden the scope or reach of the exemption. It would
appear, therefore, that in Texas, Jews were still left
unprotected.
The obvious question, then, is how one should read the
statutes enacted in Arkansas, California, Florida, Michigan,
South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia, the other
Group II States that added the term "religious" to the text of
the exemption. On the one hand, some or all of these states
could or would have rejected the restrictive and bigoted holding
in Sweeney. On the other hand, some or all of these states could
or would have accepted and adopted that holding. Nothing in
the statutory text of these laws, however, provides any clear
answer to the question whether Jewish religious uses of wine
were accommodated. Simply put, in light of Sweeney, the use of
the word "sacramental" in framing the exemption was at best
problematic.
For a variety of reasons, the answer of the nine Group II
states that added both "religious" and "church" to the text of
their statutory exemptions, fares no better than that of the
nine jurisdictions reviewed above, and may even be worse. The
exemption in Alabama, for example, fell victim to sloppy
drafting. The Alabama statute allowed wine to be used for
"sacramental or religious purposes only."334 It further provided
that "it shall be unlawful to sell wine for sacramental purposes,
except to a minister, pastor, priest or officer of a regularly
organized religious congregation or church. . . ."335 The problem
arises from the fact that the first clause uses the words
"sacramental or religious" whereas the second uses the words
"sacramental . . . religious. . . or church." This leaves one to
religious bodies." Id. at 806-07.
333 Id. at 642, 658.
334 FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note 314, at 80.
335 Id. at 81.
[Vol. 70:3
SOME KIND OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
wonder, in the classic tradition of flyspecking, whether the
words paired with "sacramental" had different meanings. It
might be senseless to conclude that the meaning or scope of the
exemption changes from one clause to the other, and thus one
might suppose that "religious" and "religious or church" mean
the same thing. But this conclusion is far from obvious.336 So it
remains possible that the two clauses have different meanings!
At that point, the statute becomes incoherent.
Georgia law presented a somewhat similar interpretive
problem. It provided for the shipment of wine "used for
sacramental purposes or used in the observance of the Lord's
Supper only."337  One might reasonably conclude that
"sacramental purposes" would exclude Jewish religious uses,
and perhaps Catholic ones as well, because of the specific
reference to "the Lord's Supper only." However, the Georgia
statute also provided that "the ordained minister, priest, in
actual charge of a church or religious order, or head of the
official board of any church or religious order338 were entitled
to receive wine. Thus there was some room to argue that the
broader term "religious" and the somewhat less broad term
"church" trumped the specific reference to "the Lord's Supper
only," particularly if a Georgia court were moved to invoke a
broad and liberal theory of religious freedom. On the other
hand, a court interpreting this statute could just as easily
conclude that the specific reference to "the Lord's Supper only"
controlled the analysis and that the phrase "church or religious
order" would have to be read narrowly in order to comport with
that specific reference or limitation, and thus, would only apply
to a "Christian church or religious order" if not an "evangelical
Protestant church or religious order."
Mississippi law exempted the sale of wine "for
sacramental purposes ... to a minister, pastor, priest or officer
of a regularly organized church or religious congregation." 339
But true to its well-established traditions, 34° a later Mississippi
law provided that wine "shall remain in the possession of such
minister or priest save when the wine is being administered in
the sacramental service or in the the service in commemoration
of the Lord's supper."341 As may have been the case in Georgia,
336 See supra notes 317-318, 321 and accompanying text.
337 FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note 314at 339.
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 See supra notes 284-286 and accompanying text.
34, FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note 314, at 371.
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the term "minister . . of a . . . church or religious
congregation," would have to be read narrowly to encompass
only a "Christian minister . . . of a . . . church or religious
congregation" if the more limiting reference to "sacramental
service or . . . the service in commemoration of the Lord's
supper" were to be held to trump the broader reference to "a
regularly organized church or religious congregation."
Catholics in Mississippi were spared from the draconian reach
of prohibition, but it is far from clear that Jews were. The
limiting language of the Mississippi statute-like the limiting
language in the Georgia statute-performed precisely the same
function as the narrow holding in Sweeney did in construing
the Texas statutes. Jews were left out and ignored.342
Nebraska law accommodated the use of wine for
sacramental purposes, and the shipment of such wine to
"churches and religious societies," 343  but limited the
"sacramental" use of wine to "sacramental services." 344 The
term "sacramental" is difficult enough, given Sweeney, but the
phrase "sacramental services" 345 may trump the broader phrase
"churches and religious societies" requiring the latter phrase to
be read to apply only to "Christian churches and religious
societies."
Yet another Group II State created a problem for Jewish
religious uses of wine. Colorado law permitted sales by licensed
druggists of wine for sacramental purposes "to any person duly
designated by any regularly organized or incorporated church
or religious society, which according to the accepted doctrines
of such church or religious society uses intoxicating liquors in
any of their services. ... 346 This provision may have had
broader scope than the comparable Nebraska provision, but the
question remained whether the exemption covered the Jewish
use of wine at religious meals. Everything would have turned,
of course, on the meaning of "service."
342 In Georgia, Catholics may also have been left out and ignored.
343 FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note 314, at 393, 396.
344 Id. at 401.
345 The term "services" is not necessarily limited to Christian religious
services. See Nikulnikoff v. Archbishop and Consistory of Russian Orthodox Greek
Catholic Church, 255 N.Y.S. 653, 662 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932) (defining "service" as "public
worship"). See also WEBSTER DICTIONARY (1913 ed.), at
http://machaut.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/WEBSTER.sh?WORD=service (last visited May 1,
2004) (defining "service" as "office of devotion; official religious duty performed;
religious rites appropriate to any event or ceremonial; as a burial service"). However,
when linked to "sacramental," "services" may be limited to Christian religious services,
rites or ceremonies.
346 FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note 314, at 121.
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Finally, four Group II States used the terms "religious"
and "church" in a more or less straightforward way and
eschewed the use of qualifying or limiting language such as
"the Lord's Supper only," "sacramental service or ... service in
commemoration of the Lord's supper," "sacramental services,"
or "services." But, again, thanks to Sweeney, it is far from clear
that the textual interplay of "sacramental," "church," and
"religious," standing by themselves accommodates Jewish uses
of wine. 341
The legislatures in at least some of the Group II States
may have intended to accommodate Catholics and Jews. It is
not clear, however, that they necessarily did so. That depends
on whether the courts in the various states would have adopted
the reasoning of Sweeney. The problem arises, of course, from
the use of the word "sacramental" without additional language
specifically rejecting that reasoning. The use of the term
"religious" and the more problematic terms "religious and
church" do not, without more, solve the problem posed by
Sweeney when the statutes also use the term "sacramental" in
crafting an accommodation for the use of wine. Thus, the
reasoning of Sweeney could have reared its ugly head in the
interpretation of all the Group II states.
ii. Group III States
In framing their exemptions for at least some religious
uses of wine, the Group III states eschewed the use of the word
"religious," or the words "religious" and "church" together,
preferring to use "church" instead. While both terms can
comprehend or cover Judaism, the latter term is more
troublesome if only because many probably understood
"church" to refer to a Christian body even though the term does
cover Jews as a body of worshipers. 348 The exemptions enacted
in the Group III States, therefore, should have been at least as
347 Indiana accommodated the sale of wine "for sacramental purposes to the
authorized officer or clergyman of any regular church or religious organization." Id. at
196. North Carolina law accommodated the sale of "wine to any minister of religion or
other officer of a church when said wine is bought for religious or sacramental
purposes." Id. at 477. Oregon, in a fashion similar to the North Carolina approach,
carved out an exemption for the receipt of wine by "any priest or minister of any church
or religious congregation . . . for sacramental purposes only." Id. at 540. Tennessee law
permitted "any priest or minister of any religious denomination or sect to receive and
possess wines for sacramental purposes," and also provided that retail druggists could
sell wine "to ordained ministers, or to elders of a church ... for sacramental purposes."
Id. at 633, 637.
348 See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
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problematic as the exemptions adopted in the Group II States,
and they were.
For example, Delaware limited sales of wine "to
churches or the proper officers thereof . . for sacramental
purposes."349 New Hampshire also limited the "sacramental"
use of wine to "churches.' ' 35° New Jersey nominally fell into
Group III, but, just as Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, and
Texas used express language (or arguably relied on judicial
precedent) to narrow the reach of the exemption to the
religious use of wine by Christians, notwithstanding the use of
a broader term, New Jersey did likewise. The New Jersey
statute permitted sales of wine by pharmacists to "the proper
officer of any duly organized church."351 But the law limited the
use of such wine "for communion purposes." 352 The Kansas
statute produced a similar result. The law created an
exemption for the "regularly ordained minister or regular
priest of any church," permitting them to receive and possess
"wine for communion purposes." 353 The law also referred to the
eligible clergy as "pastor[s] or priest[s]." 354 Rabbis need not
have bothered to apply for permission to receive and possess
wine in Kansas, even though at one point the statute referred
to "any duly organized church."
iii. Group IV States
Only two states specifically addressed the question of
the religious use of wine by Jews. In so doing, they largely put
Sweeney to rest. A South Carolina law provided that "a
minister, pastor, priest, rabbi, or regularly constituted officer of
a regularly organized religious congregation or church" could
lawfully take delivery of not more than one gallon of wine upon
the filing of the necessary affidavit and payment of a small
fee.355 The statute also provided that "the head of a family of
the Hebrew faith" could take delivery of not more than one
gallon of wine "for use during Passover" upon the filing of the
necessary affidavit and payment of the small fee.356 Clergymen
could seek permits once a month. A Jewish head of household
349 FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note 314, at 135.
350 Id. at 417, 420.
351 Id. at 448.
352 Id.
353 Id. at 251.
354 FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note 314, at 251.
355 Id. at 570.
356 Id. at 570-71.
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could apply only in March of every year, obviously looking
towards the celebration of Passover. There is much that is
wrong with this law, not least of which are the application fees
and the gallonage restrictions. This law suffers from an
excessively pinched view of the need of wine by liturgical
Christians and Jews. But at least little to no doubt remains as




Washington State also improved upon the Group II
States with a law that exempted sales of wine to "an ordained
clergyman, priest or rabbi actually engaged in ministering to a
religious congregation in this State . . . for sacramental
purposes only."358 The Washington State law had no gallonage
restrictions. 359 However, it did not address the problem of the
religious needs of Jewish heads of household for wine.360
While the Group IV statutes clearly represent
substantial improvements in the form of the exemption, they
do not appear adequately to address the full range of Jewish
religious practices requiring the use of wine. The early
twentieth century statutes reflect, therefore, some kind of
religious freedom. But one cannot describe it as broad and
liberal. These statutes clearly presented problems for Catholics
and Jews in some instances and arguably did so in others. As a
consequence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make a
plausible argument that these statutes, as a group, reflect a
broad and liberal theory of religious freedom. And yet, to the
extent that these statutes influenced the drafting of the
Volstead Act, it may prove difficult to demonstrate that the
Volstead Act somehow rose above the pinched view of religious
liberty contained in the generality of these statutes.
357 An earlier South Carolina statute clearly fell in the Group II classification.
Id. at 563, 565.
358 Id. at 793. As with South Carolina, an earlier Washington State statute
clearly fell in the Group II classification. Id. at 784-85.
359 FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS, supra note 314, at 796-97.
360 A 1933 Minnesota law probably addressed the question best, although the
exemption is tied to the tenets, practices and clergymen of religious organizations. See
1933 Minn. Laws 306 § 11 (exempting the importation of wine by "any regularly
appointed and ordained rabbi, priest, minister or pastor of any church or established
religious organization," and providing that such clergymen "may supply the wine so
purchased to individual worshippers of religious organizations and congregations who
practice religious rites and ceremonies in their homes in which wine is used by virtue




Congress enacted a raft of prohibition laws beginning in
1917. The Alaska Prohibition Law exempted "shipments of
wine for sacramental purposes" to "a duly authorized and
officiating priest or minister of [a] church."361 The Porto [sic]
Rico Prohibition Law empowered the Commonwealth
legislature to "authorize and regulate importation,
manufacture and sale of [intoxicating] liquors . . for . . .
sacramental . . . uses only."362 The Reed "Bone-Dry"
Amendment carved out an exemption for the use of intoxicating
liquors for "sacramental . . . purposes."363 The District of
Columbia Prohibition Law carved out an exemption for the use
of wine for "sacramental" purposes. 364 However, only a
"minister, pastor, or priest of a religious congregation or
church" may apply for a permit to take delivery of such wine.365
And the Hawaii Prohibition Law created an exemption for the
use of wine for "sacramental" purposes. 366
The Porto [sic] Rico law, the Reed Amendment, and the
Hawaii law would fall in Group I. The District of Columbia law
would fall in Group II. The Alaska law would fall in Group III.
No clear pattern emerges in five statutes passed within a year
of each other, except that none of these laws explicitly
addresses the religious needs of Jews.
2. The Exemption Arising by Implication - or not
Neither the 1914 Amendment to the Arizona
constitution nor the 1907 Oklahoma constitution provided an
exemption for the religious use of wine. The stage was thus set
for a series of dramatic confrontations in both states as to
whether there was such an exemption arising by implication,
or whether such an exemption needed to be expressly crafted.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that there was such an
exemption by implication. The people of the State of Arizona
amended the amendment to provide expressly for an exemption
for the religious use of wine. It remains to be seen whether one
361 Alaska Prohibition Act, ch. 53, Pub. L. No. 64-308, 39 Stat. 905 (1917).
362 Jones Act, ch. 145, Pub. L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat. 952 (1917).
363 Reed Amendment, ch. 162, Pub. L. No. 64-380, 39 Stat. 1069 (1917).
364 Sheppard Bone-Dry Law in District of Columbia, ch. 165, Pub. L. No. 64-
383, 39 Stat. 1123 (1917).
365 Id. at 1125.
366 Hawaii Prohibition Act, ch. 84, Pub. L. No. 65-157, 40 Stat. 560 (1918).
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approach was better than the other from the perspective of
religious freedom.
The campaign to adopt the 1914 amendment to the
Arizona constitution specifically gave rise to the question
whether an exemption for the religious use of wine in Arizona
could be implied notwithstanding the silence of the text. Wets
argued that the proposed amendment "interfered with religious
freedom.367 Nonetheless, the amendment was adopted. Shortly
thereafter, four lawsuits challenging the law were filed in
federal court. These cases were then consolidated for trial.
Father Thomas Connolly, a Roman Catholic priest in
Arizona, filed one of them,368 seeking, inter alia, to have the
amendment declared unconstitutional as violative of Article I, §
8 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and to have Arizona officials enjoined from
enforcing the amendment "preventing the introduction of wines
into Arizona for sacramental or sacrificial purposes" or from
instituting any other action on the purported authority of the
amendment.369 At a hearing held on December 21 and 22, 1914,
the State "blandly asserted that since the state constitution
forbade interference with religious freedom, use of wine in
liturgy could not be denied."370 On December 24, 1914, in an
unpublished opinion, the court ruled in favor of the State of
Arizona. 371
The State of Arizona's concession regarding the non-
prosecution of the religious use of wine did not ultimately settle
the matter. In a case unrelated to the four suits brought to
overturn the 1914 prohibition amendment to the Arizona
constitution, one W. J. Sturgeon was convicted of bringing
liquor into the state in violation of the 1914 prohibition
amendment, one quart of California wine, to be precise. 372 The
Supreme Court of Arizona reversed his conviction and ordered
a new trial.373 At trial, Sturgeon had demurred to the
367 BERMAN, supra note 307, at 120.
368 The other three were filed by a hotel company, a wholesale liquor company,
and a drug and candy company. See Ware, supra note 307, at 270.
369 Complaint of Father Thomas Connolly, Connolly v. Jones, (D. Ariz) (Dec. 7,
1914) (unpublished opinion) (copy on file with the author).
370 Ware, supra note 307, at 271. See also, Nancy K. Tisdale, The Prohibition
Crusade in Arizona 170 (1965) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Arizona) (on file
with author). This "stipulation" or "concession" by the Drys would resurface in
Oklahoma. See infra notes 401-04 and accompanying text.
371 Ware, supra note 307, at 271. See also Tisdale, supra note 370, at 170.
372 Ware, supra note 307, at 293-94.
373 Sturgeon v. State, 154 P. 1050, 1056 (Ariz. 1916).
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information on the grounds that the liquor had been
transported for his personal use. The demurrer was overruled,
and his later offer of proof of personal use was denied.374 The
Arizona high court declared that "[s]earch the prohibition
amendment as you will, there is no suggestion or intimation in
any form contained therein prohibiting the possession or
individual consumption of intoxicating liquors in Arizona."375 It
continued: "[w]e think it is the concensus [sic] of opinion, not
only of the legal profession, but of the general public, that it is
not a crime to possess or drink intoxicating liquors in this
state."376 Thus the trial court "committed error in refusing
appellant's offer of evidence to show that he had brought the
liquor into the state for his personal use,"377 although the
demurrer to the information "was properly overruled" because
the question of personal use was a question of fact for the jury
to decide.378
The decision in Sturgeon left a gaping hole in the
Arizona prohibition scheme, notwithstanding the court's
cautionary warning that:
[T]he privilege of possessing and using intoxicating liquors for [one's]
individual consumption . .. may not be used as a license to violate
the law by invoking that privilege as a subterfuge for an illicit
introduction or use, nor should [one] consider it an invitation to pass
the danger line lest [one] find [oneself] wrecked, for the way of the
transgressor is hard. 379
The Drys had their work cut out for them. And so they
offered up a new constitutional amendment in 1916 which
would eliminate the personal use exception,50 thus proposing a
Bone-Dry constitutional regime. The new proposed amendment
also contained an exemption for the religious use of wine by
Christians-and perhaps Jews as well: "provided, that it shall
be lawful for any regularly ordained priest or clergyman of an
374 Id. at 1051.
375 Id. at 1053.
376 Id.
377 Id. at 1055.
378 Sturgeon, 154 P. at 1056.
379 Id.
380 The proposed amendment provided, in relevant part: "it shall be unlawful
for any person in the State of Arizona to have in his possession, for any purpose, any
ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, which he has
introduced or caused to be introduced into the State of Arizona." See JONES, supra note
306, at 4.
[Vol. 70:3
SOME KIND OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
established church to receive, transport and possess wine to be
used only for sacramental purposes." 381
In their official argument for the 1916 proposed
amendment, the Drys stated:
The Courts would make exceptions for sacramental wine, as it is a
mode of religious worship, if it were not made here. A law without
this exception would be inoperative in this particular. What the
United States Constitution and Court decisions guarantee we cannot
take away. This amendment must stand the test before the
Courts. 382
The 1914 litigation, of course, did not establish the legal
proposition contended for in the official argument. Nor is it
clear that any other litigation, anywhere, had done so, and
there remains the possibility that the Arizona courts might
have supported a narrow construction of the word "church" so
as to prejudice the religious use of wine (or other types of
intoxicating liquor) by non-Christians in general and by Jews
in particular. 383 While the predicate for the claim made by the
Arizona Drys may be debatable to one degree or another, it was
a legal claim, a claim about what the law required, not what
the Drys believed in on the merits of the question.
In any event, this amendment passed handily. 384 Now it
no longer mattered what promises the State officials-judges
and prosecutors-would or would not make to those Christian
clergy who wanted to use wine for religious purposes in
Arizona, and hopefully, to non-Christians as well.
The scene now shifted to Oklahoma. The 1917 law, as
noted above, made no exception for the religious use of wine. 3s5
But notwithstanding the Arizona experience, the Oklahoma
Attorney General, S. Prince Freeling, made it clear that in his
opinion the new 1917 Bone-Dry law did not imply an
exemption for the sacramental use of wine.386 As in Arizona, a
Roman Catholic priest challenged the law. Urban De Hasque,
381 Id.
382 STATE OF ARIZONA, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PUBLICITY PAMPHLET 10
(1916).
383 See supra note 316 and accompanying text. Were the Arizona courts to
follow the "reasoning" of Sweeney, it is altogether possible that the religious use of wine
by Jews would fall within the ban of the prohibition because such use, while "religious,"
was not "sacramental."
384 See Ware, supra note 307, at 303.
385 See supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
386 See THOMAS ELTON BROWN, BIBLE BELT CATHOLICISM: A HISTORY OF THE
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN OKLAHOMA, 1905-1945, at 72 (1977); FRANKLIN, supra
note 124, at 67-68.
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chancellor to the Catholic diocese of Oklahoma, and secretary
to the Catholic bishop of Oklahoma, tried to send a quantity of
altar wine by rail to another Roman Catholic priest in Guthrie,
Oklahoma. The railroad company, Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe, refused to deliver the altar wine on the grounds that
shipment and delivery would be in violation of the 1917 Bone-
Dry law. 38 DeHasque thereupon brought suit in state court for
mandamus to compel the railroad to accept a shipment of wine
to the priest in Guthrie, and to compel it in the future to accept
like shipments and deliver them.388 The trial court ruled in
favor of the railroad. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
reversed and remanded "with directions to grant the relief
prayed for."389
The case squarely presented the question of the
religious and sacramental use of wine by Christians. It did not
present the larger question of the religious use of wine by Jews
or the religious use of wine or other alcoholic beverages by
members of other religions. Nevertheless, a commitment to and
a concern for a broad and liberal theory of religious freedom
might have persuaded a court to take on the larger question.
Whether or not the Oklahoma court had such a commitment or
concern, it did not take on the larger question.
Instead, the Oklahoma high court framed the question
narrowly as "whether the laws of [Oklahoma] prohibiting the
sale of intoxicating liquors include . . . altar wine."390 An
interesting feature of this case is that while the immediate
cause of the problem was the 1917 Oklahoma Bone-Dry law,
the parties, the trial court and the state high court focused
their attention on the Oklahoma constitution. The court's
framing of the issue, therefore, was not altogether correct. The
best argument for the shift in emphasis is that the Oklahoma
legislature was bound to follow the strictures of the Oklahoma
constitution. If the state constitution protected the religious
use of wine, then the legislature had to do likewise, regardless
of what it said or did not say in the 1917 Bone-Dry law. The
proper question was, therefore, whether the Oklahoma
387 The relevant portion of the 1917 Bone-Dry law provides that "It shall [] be
unlawful for any person . . . to posses any [unlawfull liquor . . . received directly or
indirectly from a common or other carrier in this State." 1917 Okla. Sess. Laws 186, §1.
388 De Hasque v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 173 P. 73, 74 (Okla. 1918).
389 Id. at 78.
390 Id. at 74.
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constitution's prohibition against intoxicating liquors included
altar wine. 391
The railroad made the rather straightforward argument
that the general terms of the Oklahoma constitution392 clearly
covered altar wine, and since exemptions for medicinal,
industrial and scientific purposes were provided for, the
absence of an exemption for the sacramental use of wine meant
that such wine should be comprehended or covered by the
general prohibitory rule of the Oklahoma constitution. 393
The court, however, insisted that the question
concerned not the language of the text, but "the intention of the
legislative body." 394 The court conceded, as the railroad had
argued, "that any fermented and intoxicating wines fall within
the general terms of the [Oklahoma] constitution. 395 However,
"it has been held a thing may be within the letter of the law
and yet not within the law, because not within its spirit, nor
within the intention of its makers."396 The evil that the
constitution was meant to remedy was, in part at least, the
casually racist conclusion that "the use of intoxicating liquors
among the Indians was the fruitful source of much crime." 397
Put in somewhat broader terms, the purpose of the prohibition
amendment in the Oklahoma constitution was "to conserve the
morals and guarantee the safety of the public by suppressing
the use and traffic in intoxicating liquors and prevention of
kindred and resulting evils." 398 The court stated that it did not
believe that "the members of... the [Oklahoma] Constitutional
Convention, in framing [the prohibition] section, had in mind
the sacred use of wine in the sacramental service in connection
with the suppression of this evil."399 Thus, the court concluded,
an exemption for the sacramental use of wine had to be
implied: "the term 'intoxicating liquors,' as commonly used in
prohibition statutes, [does not] include such wine when used in
divine worship."400
391 We shall see that there were also pragmatic reasons for this shift in focus
from "laws" to the Oklahoma constitution itself. See infra Part IV.B.
392 See supra note 305 and accompanying text.










The court also referred to another section of the
Oklahoma constitution which provided for toleration of
religious sentiment,401 and noted that religion and the public
worship of God served useful social purposes. It further stated
that it "should not impute to the framers of our Constitution..
the intention to prevent or interfere with public worship
under the general terms to suppress the liquor traffic.402 The
court then put the matter in exceedingly sharp focus:
Suppose in our Constitutional Convention some member had offered
a section which in express terms declared against the use of wine in
sacramental services by any church within this state, and that the
transportation and use of such wine, solely for such purpose, would
subject the members of that church to prosecution and punishment;
can it be believed it would have received a minute of approving
thought or a single vote?
40 3
It did not matter, therefore, what might have or might
not have motivated the Oklahoma legislature when it passed
the Bone-Dry law. What mattered was what the framers of the
Oklahoma constitution would or would not have done, and the
court was satisfied that it knew the answer to the
constitutional question.404
But the court had not finished. It pointed out that
various prohibition laws enacted after statehood and before the
enactment of the 1917 Bone-Dry law expressly provided for the
sacramental use of wine.405 To the extent that the one-section
Bone-Dry law built upon these other Oklahoma prohibition
laws, it might make sense to suppose that it should be read as
doing likewise, and the court so held. 4o6 Finally, the court
considered the fact that those charged with enforcing the
various prohibition laws enacted by Congress applicable to the
Indian Territory, now the eastern part of the state of
Oklahoma, and which, like the 1917 Bone-Dry law, contained
no express exemption for the religious use of wine, had not
sought to apply or enforce the applicable federal laws.407
401 OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
402 De Hasque, 173 P. at 77.
403 Id.
404 The court surely exaggerated, perhaps to good effect, but exaggerated
nonetheless. See infra notes 410-12 and accompanying text.
405 De Hasque, 173 P. at 78.
406 Id. This argument, of course, does not depend on what the 1907 Oklahoma
Constitution does or does not mean.
407 Id. This argument, likewise, does not depend on what the 1907 Oklahoma
Constitution does or does not mean.
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In essence, the court (1) embedded an exemption for the
sacramental use of wine in the Oklahoma constitution, and
made the laws enacted pursuant thereto subject to that
exemption, regardless of the text of those laws, (2) embedded
the Bone-Dry law in the fabric of the other Oklahoma
prohibition laws many of which did make provision for the
sacramental use of wine, (3) embedded the Bone-Dry law in the
larger texture of federal law and law enforcement relative to
the Indian Territory, now a part of Oklahoma, or (4) some or all
of the above. The 1917 law had little to no independent legal or
constitutional significance in the view of the Oklahoma court.
Arizona ended up aligned with the Group III States.
The text of the 1916 prohibition amendment conjoined the
terms "sacramental" and "church," producing an uncertain
result as to the scope or coverage of the exemption. The means
by which Arizona did so were dramatic, however, because of a
clear reversal of course by the Drys utilizing the initiative and
referendum process. The legislature itself played little to no
role in the events. The courts might have functioned as an
impetus for the change in direction, but they certainly did not
compel it. Father Connolly lost his lawsuit, after all.
In Oklahoma, the final outcome, if such it were, aligned
that state with the Group I States. Left to its own devices, the
Oklahoma legislature would have provided no exemption for
any religious use of wine or other intoxicating liquor. The
courts forced a change of direction. But working within the
logic and structure of case-by-case adjudication, the court
decided only the question before it which concerned the
religious use of wine by the Roman Catholic plaintiff. Reference
by the Oklahoma high court to the Oklahoma Constitution's
declaration of religious tolerance4°s invites the supposition that
the court would have extended the scope of the judicially
crafted exemption to any religious use of wine or other
intoxicating liquor. But the holding in DeHasque40 9 extends
protection only to Roman Catholics, and probably any other
Christians needing "altar wine," even as the "spirit" of the case
might extend the accommodation even further.
408 See supra notes 401-02 and accompanying text.
409 De Hasque, 173 P. at 78.
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C. The Social, Religious and Cultural Context
Perhaps, given the results in Arizona and Oklahoma,
the conflict and the dispute amounted to sound and fury
signifying nothing,410 at least as far as the sacramental use of
wine was concerned. Perhaps not. There was real conflict, and
it is clear that an anti-Catholic bias, revived and enlivened for
the reasons discussed earlier, fueled the conflict.411 A review of
the social, religious and cultural context of the troubles in
Arizona and Oklahoma, and also of the commentary of the
period demonstrates the intensity and ferocity that the Arizona
and Oklahoma situations and their "reasonable" resolutions
belie. Feelings about the question of an exemption for the
religious use of wine remained strong and testy as late as
1940.412
Nor should one forget the precarious position in which
Jews found themselves. While anti-Catholicism lies at the
heart of the meaning and purpose of the Protestant Empire,
anti-Semitism also reared its ugly head, making Jews the
targets of oppression, abuse, indifference and neglect.413 The
drama, the conflict, and the tension, however, seemed largely
to revolve around problems between Christians. A broad and
liberal idea of religious freedom and liberty, however, would
not leave non-Christians to the tender mercies of neglect,
benign or otherwise. In other words, the very nature of the
predominant drama or discourse may have shaped the
predominant ideologies of religious freedom and liberty. But
the predominant drama and discourse also provided the
context for assessing the meanings of religious freedom that
one might fairly ascribe to the Volstead Act's exemption for the
religious use of wine.
410 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 5, sc. 5 (Barbara A. Mowat &
Paul Werstine eds. 1992) ("It is a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.").
411 See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
412 See generally DOBYNS, supra note 17.
413 See JOHN HIGHAM, SEND THESE TO ME: IMMIGRANTS IN URBAN AMERICA
164 (1984) (stating that "[iln the early twentieth century the generalized prejudice that
had fascinated modern social psychologists chrystallized" and that "Jews now found
themselves part of a motley array of outsiders, confronting an ever more fearful [white
Protestant] majority"); NATHAN C. BELTH, A PROMISE TO KEEP: A NARRATIVE OF THE
AMERICAN ENCOUNTER WITH ANTI-SEMITISM 58 (1979) (noting that the 1915-1925
decade was the most violent decade experienced by American Jews); ARTHUR GILBERT,
A JEW IN CHRISTIAN AMERICA 41-47 (1966) (discussing anti-semitism during the period
of 1840-1924); LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, UNEASY AT HOME: ANTISEMITISM AND THE
AMERICAN JEWISH EXPERIENCE 103-32 (1987) (discussing the lynching of Leo Frank in
Atlanta, Georgia in 1913).
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1. The Evangelical Protestants
Early twentieth century evangelical Protestants
displayed a welter of emotions and feelings about the question
whether to exempt the religious use of wine from the reach of
prohibition laws ranging from arrogance to indifference to
denial. A sampling of Protestant religious journals from the
period illustrates the complexity of the evangelical stance on
the question. It is fair to say that evangelical Protestants
pressed the point.
The culturally embedded anti-Catholicism of Anglo-
American evangelical Protestants often took the form of sheer
arrogance. Having themselves abandoned wine for grape
juice,414 they found it difficult to understand why Catholics in
particular, but also Episcopalians and Lutherans, would
continue to insist on the use of wine in their Eucharistic
liturgies. 415 Thus when asked whether prohibition laws ought
to protect the religious use of wine, they responded that priests
were better off with grape juice,416 that "intelligent people in all
churches had long ago given up the superstition that
intoxicating wine is necessary to the proper observance of the
sacramental duty,"'417 that there was no reason to "make an
exception to much needed prohibition for the sake of . . . a
church custom,"'41 and that grape juice "serves every purpose
in the celebration of the Lord's Supper."'419 The use of wine by
Catholics and others, therefore, amounted to nothing more
than an unintelligent, superstitious custom that did nothing to
further the purposes of the sacrament and harmed the clergy to
414 See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
415 Of course any reasonable assessment of the Eucharistic theologies of
Catholics and some liturgical Protestants would have shown they did not switch to
grape juice. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
416 Note, Roman Catholics and Prohibition, 5 THE WATCHMAN- EXAMINER 166-
67 (1917). Since communion in one kind only was available to the Catholic laity, only
priests drank from the cup. See CANONS AND DECREES, supra note 41, at 159 (noting
that "the holy Catholic Church [had decided] that lay people ... are to communicate
under the one species of bread" but declaring that the Pope "in accordance with his
singular prudence" had authority to act on petitions "for the use of the chalice" by the
laity).
417 See Bernard J. McNamara, Prohibition and the Mass, 59 THE
ECCLESIASTICAL REV. 184, 190 (1918) (quoting, in a letter to the editor, a document
issued on June 8, 1918, by the Board of Temperance, Prohibition, and Public Morals of
the Methodist Episcopal Church, Washington, D.C. office).
418 Lydia Vose Johnson, Letter, Fermented Wine Should Go, 102 THE
CONGREGATIONALIST 130 (1917).




boot! Evangelical Protestants-or at least some of them-had
clearly set themselves up as the ultimate authority on the
religious practices of others.
In Oklahoma, this perspective found ample expression
in the difficult and tense times that followed the enactment in
1917 of a tough Bone-Dry prohibition law that did not exempt
the religious use of wine. A small newspaper opined that it did
not think that "the good Lord would seriously object to the
substitution of grape juice for wine."420 Members of an
Oklahoma City Baptist Church "thought [that the prohibition
law] should apply impartially to all citizens; and they went
further to assert that the use of altar wine by Protestant
churches in particular 'is wholly unnecessary and ... is deemed
detrimental to the best interests of such churches,421 leaving
unstated what the benefits or detriments of altar wine might
be for non-Protestants.
The superintendent of the Oklahoma Anti-Saloon
League, H.T. Laughbaum, provided the best look into the
conceit of evangelical Protestants towards other religious
groups, at least in cases where they had the political power to
do whatever they wanted to. Laughbaum was reported to have
said:
In every fight we fellows had for Prohibition, Anglicans and
Catholics refused to lend their aid. We would gladly have
incorporated into the law the permission to import wine into the
state for sacramental purposes, but at the time they sent no
delegates and ignored us completely, and therefore we let the law go
on record as it stood.422
Evangelical Protestant views on the religious use of
wine had both theological and political dimensions, a perfectly
foreseeable development in a Protestant Empire. The court in
DeHasque had good reason, quite apart from the law, to shift
the focus away from the 1917 Bone-Dry law, and the highly
charged rhetoric of Laughbaum and other ultraist Drys in
Oklahoma, to a presumably more peaceful or civil point in time
420 FRANKLIN, supra note 124, at 67-68 (quoting an editorial in the Waukomis,
Oklahoma, Hornet).
421 Id.
422 McNamara, Danger, supra note 303, at 505 (quoting Laughbaum's remarks
on the Oklahoma prohibition law). But see BROWN, supra note 386, at 69 (arguing that
Catholic "inactivity" rather than Protestant "bigotry" explains the failure of the 1917
Oklahoma Bone-Dry law to make provision for the religious use of wine). Brown's
argument, however, makes no sense unless one expects Roman Catholics continually to
ask evangelical Protestant politicians-legislators, prosecutors and judges-to take
pity on Catholics and protect their use of wine in the Mass.
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ten years earlier, or at least a time where anti-Catholicism had
not so thoroughly deformed Oklahoma politics.423
Sometimes the evangelical Protestant response was
muddled, or perhaps reflective of a greater sensitivity by some
evangelical Protestants to the rights of minority religions. A
Baptist journal took the "standard" position, as it had done
before,424 postulating that it would have been better if the
Arkansas legislature had not exempted the sacramental use of
wine and admonished "[1]et not the churches lend their
influence to the liquor traffic by demanding wine for use in the
Lord's supper."425 Nevertheless, just a year later the same
journal was indifferent on the question,426 and more to the
point, denied that the Baptists and other evangelical
Protestants wanted to abolish the use of wine for the Mass,
claiming that the argument of a Roman Catholic priest to that
effect was "false, utterly false, absurdly false.427 Protestants in
Arizona reflected this varied approach to the religious use of
wine, or at least they did in 1916.428
It is certainly the case that some evangelical
Protestants were utterly indifferent to the question of an
exemption for the religious use of wine and, on other
occasions,429 denied any intention to interfere with the religious
use of wine. In particular the Anti-Saloon League took great
pains to make such a denial. 430 But the religious press betrayed
423 Nonetheless anti-Catholicism was present in Oklahoma in 1907 and
persisted at least up to World War I. See BROWN, supra note 386, at 45-46.
424 See supra note 416 and accompanying text.
425 Men and Things, 5 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 228 (1917).
426 See Men and Things, 6 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 454 (1918).
427 See id. at 1134.
428 See supra notes 303-04, 380-82 and accompanying text.
429 See, e.g., Editorial, Prohibition Victories, 102 THE CONGREGATIONALIST 206
(1917) (reporting without opinion or comment on a prohibition law that [supposedly]
did not exempt the religious use of wine and a prohibition law that did); Note, A
Comprehensive Bill, 22 THE ASSEMBLY HERALD 292 (1916) (expressing support for a bill
pending in Congress that might have had the effect, were it to become law, of not
exempting the religious use of wine from its reach); BADER, supra note 121, at 186
(noting that the Women's Christian Temperance Union "took no stand on the
controversial proposal that communion wine be exempted" from a pending Kansas
prohibition law).
430 Purley A. Baker, The Sacramental Use of Wine, 22 THE AMERICAN ISSUE 8
(1915) (claiming that the Anti-Saloon League "will not advocate the passage of any
federal or state law that interferes with the . . . religious use of alcohol"); Note,
Oklahoma Prohibition, 58 THE LIVING CHURCH 861 (1918) (referring to remarks from
the Anti-Saloon League on the Oklahoma situation to the effect that the league "has
avoided, in drafting laws .... any infringement whatever upon the polity and practice
of any denomination in the use of fermented wines at the sacramental altar," and "has
advised against such infringement"); Wayne Wheeler, The Great Prohibition Victory, 80
THE METHODIST RECORDER 19 (1919) (insisting that the Prohibition Amendment "does
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a school of evangelical thought bent on destroying the Mass by
denying or discouraging the use of wine in the Mass, 431 as did
the reaction of many evangelical Protestants in Oklahoma. 432
That those holding this view did not succeed 433 does not tell us
what position (or positions) did. Identifying that position (or
those positions) is, of course, the central concern of this paper.
Nothing captures better the fundamental interpretive or
hermeneutical dilemma than the essentially political response
of an evangelical Protestant journal to the decision in
DeHasque:434 "This ruling will dissipate much opposition to
prohibition."435
Perhaps Fletcher Dobyns, a Dry frustrated by the repeal
of National Prohibition, writing in 1940, put the matter into
proper perspective. 436  Dobyns opposed the Volstead Act
exemption for the religious use of wine, viewing it as an
"absurdity,"437 because the exemption "furnished an opening
through which large amounts of intoxicating liquor [i.e. wine]
poured into illegal channels."438 Dobyns' solution is of
considerable interest here:
If [the Volstead Act] had simply prohibited the manufacture and use
of alcoholic liquors for beverage purposes, it would have been
complete and adequate and free from invitations to evasion. If any
church desired in good faith to make or have made, purchase, and
use intoxicating beverages for strictly sacramental purposes, there
would not have been a district attorney who would have suggested, or
not interfere with the manufacture and distribution of [intoxicating] liquors for ...
sacramental purposes, which will doubtless be provided for in careful rules and
regulations which Congress will authorize"). Apparently Oklahoma's doughty H.T.
Laughbaum was a loose cannon on a rolling deck. Presumably he was "advised" by the
national office not to push for a law not containing an exemption for the religious use of
wine, if one believes Purley A. Baker, a high ranking official in the Anti-Saloon League.
431 See Note, Roman Catholics and Prohibition, 5 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER
166-67 (1917) (declaring that Roman Catholic priests would be better off not using wine
in the Mass).
432 See JIMMIE LEWIS FRANKLIN, BORN SOBER: PROHIBITION IN OKLAHOMA,
1907-1959 at 67-69 (1971) (noting that one newspaper editorialist and many church
members and leaders in Oklahoma saw no reason to exempt the religious use of wine
from the reach of prohibition).
433 Some Roman Catholics entertained little doubt that evangelical
Protestants meant to destroy the Mass, plain and simple. See, e.g., Lucian Johnson, An
Aspect of Prohibition, 53 THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW 373, 380 (1915) (stating that "I
make this prediction, namely, that at no very distant date Protestant bigotry will
recognize in Prohibition just such a means of prohibitiong the Mass").
434 De Hasque, 173 P. 73 (Okla. 1918).
435 See McNamara, Prohibition, supra note 417, at 190 (quoting remarks made
by the Methodist Episcopal Church).
436 See generally DOBYNS, supra note 17.
437 Id. at 295.
438 Id. at 297.
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a judge who would have held, that such action constituted a violation
of the law. The churches could have used fermented or unfermented
wine in connection with their religious rites without interference by
governmental officials, and there would have been no loopholes
through which bootleggers might escape.4
39
Dobyn's approach suffers from two serious defects. The
first is that as a matter of fact the Oklahoma Attorney General
took the position that the sacramental use of wine was a
violation of the Oklahoma prohibition law. It took a court
decision to overturn that view. One cannot say that other
attorneys general or other state and local prosecutors might
not have reached the same conclusion. 440 Second, as suggested
earlier,441 Dobyn's solution would have turned those who were
not evangelical Protestants into perpetual mendicants
regularly having to beg judges and prosecutors for relief from
the draconian sweep of National Prohibition. As bigoted as he
was, the Oklahoma Anti-Saloon League superintendent,
Laughbaum, would have required them only to beg once.
439 Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
440 In 1959, Oklahoma voters adopted an amendment to the state constitution
directing the legislature to "enact laws providing for the strict regulation, control,
licensing, and taxation of the manufacture, sale, distribution, possession, and
transportation of alcoholic beverage." OKLA. CONST. art. 27, § 3. This provision gave
rise to a lawsuit, Salatka v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 607 P.2d 1355
(Okla. 1980). In a remarkable display of obtuseness, the then Oklahoma Attorney
General opined that the "import, sale and purchase by churches" "of sacramental wine"
were subject to the regulatory r6gime adopted in 1959. Id. at 1355. As a consequence,
the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board sought to require the Roman Catholic
Church "to purchase their sacramental wine from licensed Oklahoma retail liquor
stores rather than from their own approved sources of supply." Id. The Catholic
Bishops of the Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the Diocese of Tulsa brought the suit
in the Oklahoma Supreme Court for a Writ of Prohibition to restrain the Board and the
Oklahoma Tax Commission from acting pursuant to the opinions issued by the
Attorney General. The court granted the writ.
The Attorney General sought to distinguish DeHasque on the grounds that
sacramental wine "is within the purview of the constitutional use of the term 'alcoholic
beverage' for the purpose of regulation and taxation but was outside its purview when
shipping of wine was sought to be prohibited in DeHasque." Id. at 1357. The court was
having none of it. As in DeHasque, the court stated that it was "extremely doubtful that
the people of Oklahoma who adopted Section 3, Art. 27 by popular vote . . . intended
that the regulation and taxation of traffic in 'alcoholic beverages' was meant to curtail
or interfere with public worship in the slightest degree." Id. Also, as in DeHasque, the
court noted that "there is nothing in the record to show but that for the first time in 20
years, officers in charge of enforcement of Section 3 and the Oklahoma Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act have undertaken to apply it to the use of wine for sacramental
purposes." Id. DeHasque obviously settled the matter for the court.
Dobyn's casual assurance that prosecutors would have done "the right
thing" is belied by the facts in Salatka. Anti-Catholicism continued to have a real bite.
The bishops had to bring their action in the Oklahoma high court because their
supplies of altar wine were running low and they needed immediate relief from the
silly opinion of the Attorney General. Id. at 1355-56.




As we have already seen, Catholics resisted evangelical
Protestant attempts to protestantize Catholics.442 Not
surprisingly, Catholics demonstrated a different set of
emotional responses when the question whether to exempt the
religious use of wine arose. Reported Catholic opinion
essentially consisted of an admixture of fear, bravado,
desperation, and contempt. It was, by and large, far more
focused and uniform than evangelical Protestant opinion was,
although one can find gradations and variations in Catholic
thought about the question of an exemption for the religious
use of wine.
In Arizona, Catholics led the fight against the 1914
proposed prohibition amendment to the state constitution, and
the Roman Catholic Church "was the most vocal in opposition
to the amendment. 443 Drys had responded by arguing, in the
opinion of a former judge, "that although the amendment did
by inference prohibit wine for sacramental purposes, this
provision could not be enforced because such was not the
intention of the framers of the amendment. 444 This argument
did not satisfy the Catholics. "In October of 1914 the Church
issued a formal statement denouncing the prohibition
amendment. Father Thomas Connolly... declared that though
many lawyers contended that the amendment would in no way
restrict free exercise of religious liberties, the church still felt
that it must stand in opposition to the prohibition
amendment. ' 44 Arizona Episcopalians, however, supported the
amendment,446 even though they, like Catholics, used wine in
their celebration of the Eucharist.
The predominant Catholic response to the unwillingness
of the Drys to include exemptions for the religious use of wine
in the prohibition laws enacted in the decades leading up to
National Prohibition was fear, perhaps with a touch of distrust.
Over and over again the Catholic religious journals of that era
insisted that the Drys aimed to destroy the Mass by prohibiting
the religious use of wine. 447 Catholic opinion also revealed a
442 See supra Part I.D.3.
443 Tisdale, supra note 370, at 159.
441 Id. at 160.
445 Id.
446 Id. at 161-62.
447 Johnston, supra note 433, at 380 (arguing that the exemptions for the
religious use of wine are a matter of courtesy, even political trickery, but are not a
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related contempt that responded to the conceit of the
evangelical Protestants: Protestantism had decayed and its
back was to the wall, and was "emotionalism unregulated by
reason" incapable of harmonizing "all the elements of human
nature;448 Drys had a "fanatical and blasphemous attitude
toward the Mass; 449 and Bernard J. McNamara distinguished
between "the Christ-given apostolically-carried tradition" of
Roman Catholicism and "the new-fangled, unscriptural,
untheological, unphilosophical, characterless, sentimental,
unchristian, unchristlike, unity-destroying, unpatriotic, and
trouble-making doctrine of modern American Protestantism."' 450
We have seen that Catholics took the lead in
challenging the 1914 Arizona constitutional amendment both
as a matter of politics and of law, and that they also challenged
the Oklahoma Bone-Dry law, at least in the bringing of a
lawsuit,451 thereby revealing some bravado, if not outright
courage. When commenting on the Arizona and Oklahoma
situations, fear and anger were joined by bravado and
desperation as well. One correspondent noted that "in one
Western State [presumably Arizona] priests even now must
evade the law to get wine for Mass.452 The Bishop of Arizona
said, among other things:
I took care to warn the promoters of Prohibition of the stand of the
Church . .. and of our determination to fight all and every form of
Prohibition that failed to provide an exemption . .. The
Prohibitionists were intent on framing a drastic law that would leave
no loophole of any sort or shape for infringement and they simply
waived aside our representations by alleging that priests could use
grape juice. 453
recognition of any right, as a matter of principle, to use wine in the Mass); Maurice,
supra note 303, at 507 (claiming that the Drys are extremists, pursuing "an impossible
program which would prevent [Catholics] from saying Mass"); Note, Prohibition and
the Mass, 16 AMERICA 355 (1916) (urging Catholics "not to take part in public
campaigns for legal prohibition, unless an unequivocal clause, authorizing the use of
wine for sacramental purposes, is inserted in the prohibition law."); Hoadley, supra
note 303, at 353-54 (stating that prohibitionists meant to destroy the Mass by
prohibiting the religious use of wine); Michael Kenny, Prohibition and Alcoholism, 19
AMERICA 301 (1918) (declaring that prohibitionists meant to destroy the Mass);
McNamara, Prohibition, supra note 417, at 190 (stating that Drys meant to do in the
Mass).
448 Johnston, supra note 433, at 376.
449 Note, Bone Dry Prohibition, Patriotism or Blasphemy?, 19 AMERICA 314
(1918).
"'0 McNamara, Prohibition, supra note 417, at 189.
4.5 See supra Part II.B.2.
452 Johnston, supra note 433, at 380.
453 McNamara, Danger, supra note 303, at 498 (reporting Bishop Granjon's
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Another commentator observed that dealers and
railroad companies which formerly supplied wine to Catholic
priests in Arizona were now refusing to do so, citing the 1914
amendment to the Arizona Constitution. The writer concluded
that "[t]he manufacture or introduction of wine for purely
sacramental purposes has become a penal offence. 454
Another correspondent labeled the Catholic Church as
"the chief victim" of the Oklahoma prohibition statute.4s5 He
concluded with a declaration that all of those using wine for
religious purposes in Oklahoma:
[O]ught to be in prison because they are openly violating the law of
the State and committing a crime every day in the week, even
though it is done in the performance of the sacred functions of their
office .... The Catholic Church and the others must give up the
practice of their religion because the Legislature of Oklahoma says
that the use of wine is a crime.456
Yet another correspondent, Michael Kenny, put it best,
albeit sarcastically, in his response to the question of what
Catholics should do in those states that did not exempt the
religious use of wine: "Nothing but incur felony and helotry,
take to the woods or jails, or dig catacombs; or else, become
Baptists, Methodists, or other pure species of prohibitionist. 457
Kenny did believe-mistakenly-that the courts would grant
relief on constitutional principles. 458 But in his sarcasm, Kenny
remarks).
454 Note, Prohibition at Work, 12 AMERICA 368, 369 (1915). See also Note,
Arizona, 13 AMERICA 544 (1915) (noting that "railroads will not transport wine
destined for religious purposes, until the courts pronounce on the meaning of the [1914
Arizona] prohibition law .... ).
4 McNamara, Danger, supra note 303, at 504. Whether the Catholic Church
was the chief victim remains to be seen. See infra Part III.C.3 for a discussion of
Episcopalian concern regarding the accommodation of the religious use of wine.
4 McNamara, Danger, supra note 303, at 506.
457 Michael Kenny, Prohibition, the Constitution and the Mass, 19 AMERICA 5,
5 (1918). Occasionally a Catholic correspondent would suggest that the Catholic
Church make do with grape juice. See John R. Hagan, Reply to Dr. McNamara's Article
on Prohibition, 59 THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW 48, 52-53 (1918) (arguing that if
"matters were to come to a real crisis, unfermented juice of the grape could be used
until such time as Catholics could appeal to the sense of justice of their fellow
citizens.'). But see McNamara, Prohibition, supra note 417, at 192-93 (rejecting
Hagan's suggestion outright).
458 Kenny, Prohibition, the Constitution and the Mass, supra note 457, at 5-7.
Incorporation of the religion clauses was still a generation or more away. See Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7, 15-17 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment
Clause). DeHasque was decided, after all, on textual (i.e. constitutional) construction
grounds. See supra notes 385-407 and accompanying text.
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managed to capture the fear, bravado, desperation and
contempt that characterized Catholic opinion of the time.
3. The Episcopalians
Many Episcopalians, the quintessential liturgical
Protestants, found themselves on the horns of a dilemma when
it came to temperance-prohibition. One important journal, The
Living Church, joined with evangelical Protestants in
supporting Prohibition, but at the same time joined with
Catholics and other non-evangelical Protestants in insisting on
express exemptions for the religious use of wine. 459
One commentator laid out the basic position: some
Episcopalian priests were having difficulty in obtaining proper
wine for use in the Holy Communion.460 He noted that
Episcopalians, like Catholics, cannot hold that the use of wine
is sinful or necessarily evil, and Episcopalians were not
prepared to take a position that calls into question "the
legitimacy of a use that has been made an integral necessity in
the sacrament of the Holy Communion.461 Nonetheless, he
continued, Churchmen could stand for prohibition as a
measure justified by the widespread abuse of liquor, and by the
behavior of the liquor industry.
The liquor traffic is beyond reclaiming now, and those who have
promoted it must assume the blame. But notwithstanding all this,
the Church cannot take the ground that the production or the proper
use of liquor is necessarily sinful, and she is bound to see that pure
wine is made available for sacramental use in every county, town,
and village in the country, no matter how ironclad may be the
regulations against its sale or use as a beverage. Certainly our
bishops, our clergy, and our people must take it upon themselves to
see that the prohibition laws now being enacted or proposed so
generally do not infringe upon this requirement.462
The Oklahoma statute forced The Living Church to take
another look at its position on prohibition. Another
commentator noted that enforcement of the Oklahoma law
459 Lutherans expressed a similar, but somewhat more accommodating,
position. See Note, The Prohibition of Sacramental Wines, 2 LUTHERAN HERALD 242
(1918) (arguing that either an exemption in the Oklahoma prohibition law for the
religious use of wine should be implied by the courts, or, if such an interpretation were
not possible, then the Oklahoma constitution should be amended so as to permit such
an exemption).






created difficulty for churches using wine for religious
purposes.46 3 He restated the basic position that the first
commentator had taken earlier. However, he concluded that
"[ilf we must choose between the absolute Prohibition of the
Oklahoma law and no Prohibition at all, our religion compels
us to choose the latter."464 Religion, then, trumped the
depredations of the liquor traffic. Indeed, some Episcopalians-
however many or few-seriously considered the possibility of
civil disobedience. An editorial writer declared that if clergy are
caught using wine for religious purposes,
[L]et them suffer the penalty of the law and go to jail. A couple of
bishops and a goodly number of priests suffering prison terms for the
crime of preparing to administer Holy Communion to their people
would impress the virility of modern [Episcopal] Churchmanship and
of the clergy upon the men of Oklahoma as, perhaps, nothing else
can do. 465
The argument that Episcopalians should use grape juice
and not engage in civil disobedience466 fell on deaf ears. The
Living Church, and those Episcopalians who agreed with that
journal, took the matter seriously, and saw themselves as
having to resist the Drys. Their style and their tactics, and
indeed even their basic approach to National Prohibition may
have differed from that of the Roman Catholics.47 However,
the two religious groups did, at some level, resist the Drys and
their depredations. It is not clear, unfortunately, that either
group has adequately credited the other for its role in
protecting the religious use of wine, a rather uncharitable, not
to say unchristian, position for both Catholics and
Episcopalians.
IV. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND LIBERTY
The § 6 form of the exemption in the Volstead Act most
nearly resembles the form employed in the two Group IV
States.468 It explicitly settles the question as to the protection
or accommodation of Jewish religious practices, and it leaves
463 Note, Prohibition and Sacramental Wine, 58 THE LING CHURCH 524
(1918).
464 Id.
465 Editorial, The Oklahoma Inhibition of Sacramental Wine, 58 THE LIVING
CHURCH 759 (1918).
466 See J. Louis Gibbs, Letter, Sacramental Wine and the Oklahoma Law, 58
THE LIVING CHURCH 839, 839-40 (1918).
467 See infra Part IV.A.2. discussing Anglican medianism.
468 See supra notes 355-60 and accompanying text.
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no doubt that it covers the use of wine by all Christians. As
such, the Volstead Act indisputably marks an important
advance or progression in the quest for religious freedom and
liberty.
It remains a fair question, however, as to what kind of
religious freedom and liberty might underlie the § 6 form. Two
approaches to the question present themselves. The first
involves an attempt to reason from the text of the § 6 form
itself. Textualism, like formalism more generally, tends to
bracket factors that may aid in understanding the text itself.
Accordingly, a contextualist approach also commends itself,
and it is to that approach that this Part IV is largely dedicated.
Nonetheless, textualism provides a useful starting point
in understanding the exemption for the religious use of wine by
Christians and Jews. As a matter of textual analysis, the Drys
decided two important questions when they exempted the
religious use of wine from the reach of the Volstead Act. First,
they decided that the Volstead Act would not become the
occasion for destroying the Catholic Mass, or the Eucharistic
liturgies of non-evangelical Christians, nor the religious
practices of Judaism that required the use of wine. Second, by
expressly exempting the religious use of wine, they clearly
demonstrated that there was no need for those who were not
evangelical Protestants to have to routinely beg judges and
prosecutors for administrative grace. For whatever the reason,
any begging, if any at all was required, was limited to the
legislative process that produced the Volstead Act. The Act
could, in theory, be amended at some future date, striking out,
modifying, or narrowing the scope of the exemption. Those who
were not evangelical Protestants would have to beg then too.
But it is hard to imagine that repeal of the exemption-or the
threat thereof-would become part of the legislative routine of
Congress.
The text-driven meanings of the exemption found in the
Volstead Act reveal a theory of religious freedom and liberty
that ultimately rests on the idea or concept of non-interference,
a legally protected zone of autonomy. 469 Thus, the Volstead Act
exemption placed the religious use of wine by Christians and
Jews in such a zone, and also offered some assurance that the
zone would remain intact because it would take, literally, an
act of Congress for it to be eliminated, modified, or narrowed.
469 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 746 (1917).
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But the question remains why Congress was moved to create
such a zone of autonomy and non-interference for Catholics,
liturgical Protestants, Jews, and Eastern Orthodox Christians.
It is at this point that one must turn to context.
The most plausible explanation for the creation of this
particular zone of autonomy, for the religious freedom and
liberty implicit in the exemption found in the Volstead Act, was
the need for the Drys to propitiate Episcopalians. A second
possible reading of the exemption, closely related to the first, is
that pragmatic considerations of demography, political stability
and "appearances" led even the most ultraist Drys to accede to
the exemption, notwithstanding their belief that wine was
unnecessary for religious purposes. A third plausible
explanation is that some Drys believed that the fact of National
Prohibition, in and of itself, would aid greatly in the program of
evangelical Protestant moral reform. Those who were not
evangelical Protestants would give up the use of wine in their
religious services and ceremonies and, perhaps, even convert to
evangelical Protestantism out of gratitude for the great gifts
that National Prohibition would, in the estimation of the Drys,
undoubtedly bestow on the American people. A fourth reading,
that the exemption reflected a genuine belief in a broad and
liberal theory of religious freedom, that is, that religious
diversity and pluralism are pro bono publico, simply cannot
withstand scrutiny.
A. Propitiation of Episcopalians
1. Setting the Context: The Act of Toleration
My first Protestant Empire article 470 set the stage for a
reading of the Volstead Act exemption as an expression of
propitiation of Episcopalians. A brief review of portions of that
article is in order.
Anglo-American Protestantism essentially consists of
two rather distinct groupings. Henry VIII presided over two
religious parties that traced their origins back over 500 years,
Anglo-Protestants and Anglo-Catholics.471 But Henry's church
"was at war with itself. From 1534 until the decisive lurch
leftward in 1549, Henrician religion embraced two distinct
factions, the avowed goal of which was the elimination of the
470 See Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 23.
471 Id. at 200.
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other."472 They continued to battle each other even as each
changed, moving to the theological left. By the time of the reign
of Elizabeth I, many Anglo-Catholics, Protestants nonetheless
because they "protested" the claims of the papacy, had become
Anglicans 473 and many Anglo-Protestants had become
Puritans. 47 4 In turn, many Puritans developed Separatist
tendencies or inclinations. 475 As a result, England ended up
with its established church, the Church of England, and with
some number of separatist evangelical Protestants. The two
parties, transformed in the crucible of the sixteenth century,
had not yet found a modus vivendi.476
The great travails of the seventeenth century did
nothing to improve the situation. Anglicanism was restored
after the Civil War, but the Restoration Stuart kings muddied
the waters with their allegiance to Roman Catholicism. 477
Finally, Anglicans, feeling threatened by the religion of Charles
II and James II, decided to forge a pan-Protestant unity,
something which had theretofore largely eluded the grasp of
the post-Reformation English State. The shape of the 1688
Settlement, the Act of Toleration,478 concerns us here. During
the preceding century and a half, the English government had
adopted a number of laws that burdened non-Anglican
evangelical Protestants in various ways. The 1688 settlement
left those laws on the books, but declared that they would not
"extend" to evangelical Protestants who made certain oaths
and declarations regarding religion, theology, and anti-
Catholicism. 479
472 Id. (quotation marks and footnote omitted).
473 Radical swings between the extreme Protestantism of Edward VI and the
Roman Catholicism of Mary convinced Anglo-Catholics that their future lay with the
Roman Church. They thus refused to work with the Protestant Queen, Elizabeth I, id.
at 219-20, thereby robbing the Anglo-Catholic party of much of its base and support.
"What was left of the Anglo-Catholic leadership essentially became the junior partners
of moderate Anglo-Protestants in an alliance against the more militant Anglo-
Protestants." Id. at 221.
474 More radical Anglo-Protestants objected to the relative conservatism of the
Church of England, wishing to "purify" it. Id. at 221-22.
475 Id.
476 Indeed, British North America owed much to the penchant of evangelical
Protestants who left England to settle in the New World, especially New England, free
from king and bishops as they pursued their goal of "purity."
477 Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 23, at 227-35.
478 An Act for Exempting their Majestyes Protestant Subjects, Dissenting from
the Church of England, from the Penalties of Certaine Lawes. Act of Toleration, 1688, 1
W. & M. ch. 18 (Eng.) [hereinafter Act of Toleration].
479 Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 23, at 235-36.
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Pan-Protestantism in 1688 took the form of Anglican
toleration (with the threat of the penal law lurking in the
background) of evangelical Protestants. As such, it constituted
just one more example of the dynamic relation between suasion
and coercion that had come to typify the Protestant Empire,
this time leaning decisively in favor of suasion over coercion, of
attrition over open combat. But in the American context, the
1688 Settlement took on an entirely different form.
Episcopalians found themselves outnumbered by evangelical
Protestants. In a democratic polity, Episcopalians were in no
position to hold legal hegemonic sway over evangelical
Protestants. But, in a remarkable tribute to embedded cultural
patterns and norms, Episcopalians nevertheless came to hold
cultural hegemonic sway over evangelical Protestants. The Act
of Toleration had become, in short, a cultural artifact.480
2. Anglican Eucharistic Theology and Cultural
Hegemony
Anglican-or Episcopalian-Eucharistic theology runs
the gamut from Zwinglianism to Transubstantiation (or
something very much like it) and Consubstantiation (or
something very much like it).481 This wide range of Anglican
views about the Eucharist largely stems from the medianist
impulse that typifies and even defines Anglicanism.482 While
480 The founding of the American nation witnessed the social power of cultural
institutions, particularly at the level of suasion. Id. at 249-56
481 See id. at 196-97 n.65 for a discussion of various Eucharistic theologies.
More specifically, the theologies and examples of their Anglican "authority" are as
follows: Zwinglianism-BENJAMIN HOADLY, A PLAIN ACCOUNT OF THE NATURE AND END
OF THE SACRAMENT OF THE LORD'S SUPPER (1735); Dynamic Receptionism-THOMAS
CRANMER, A DEFENCE OF THE TRUE AND CATHOLIC DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENT OF THE
BODY AND BLOOD OF OUR SAVIOUR CHRIST (Focus Christian Ministries Trust & Harrison
Trust ed. 1987) (1550); Receptionism-DANIEL WATERLAND, A REVIEW OF THE DOCTRINE
OF THE EUCHARIST (Clarendon Press 1880) (1737); Virtualism-JOHN JOHNSON, THE
UNBLOODY SACRIFICE AND ALTAR, UNVEILED AND SUPPORTED (John Henry Parker 1847)
(1713); Transubstantiation (or something very much like it)-ROBERT ISAAC
WILBERFORCE, THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY EUCHARIST (John Mozley et al. eds., Oxford &
London 1853); Consubstantiation (or something very much like it)-JOHN KEBLE, ON
EUCHARISTIC ADORATION (James Parker & Co., Oxford & London, 1857).
482 One of the most striking features of the Protestant Reformation is the
disarray among Protestants over the meaning of the Eucharist. See Newsom,
Protestant Empire, supra note 23, at 196-97 n.65. It is simply impossible to harmonize
the teachings of Luther, a sacramental realist, and Zwingli, a Bare Memorialist. Calvin
tried, see John Calvin, Short Treatise on the Supper of Our Lord, in 2 TRACTS AND
TREATISES ON THE DOCTRINE AND WORSHIP OF THE CHURCH 195-98 (Henry Beveridge,
trans., Win. B. Publ'g Co. 1958) (1849), but failed for a number of reasons, not least of
which is that his "medianist" theologies of the Eucharist failed to take hold with his
followers, as the vast majority of them became Zwinglians. See NEVIN, supra note 104,
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various Anglican parties or groups might find themselves at
odds over critical theological doctrines, like the theology of the
passim. The medianist impulse, however, reflected an attempt to challenge Roman
Catholic teaching, not on the basis of a series of propositions about what the "correct"
Eucharistic theology was, but rather on a series of propositions as to what the "correct"
Eucharistic theology was not. Medianism and triangulation have much in common. By
adopting Zwinglianism as its normative Eucharistic theology, Evangelical
Protestantism has, of course, abandoned any medianist position in favor of a clear cut
theology that challenges the very heart and soul of Catholic sacramental realism.
Anglicanism, however, adopted and has maintained a medianist posture
for several reasons. Given the practical realities of a messy, long drawn-out English
Reformation, see Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 23 passim, it became
impossible for Anglicans to embrace one normative Eucharistic theology. Their perhaps
remote origins as Henrician Anglo-Catholics meant that they had to maintain some
sort of openness to Catholic ideas, even though few if any Anglicans could be described
as holding a Catholic understanding of the Eucharist during the period between the
end of the reign of Elizabeth I at the beginning of the seventeenth century and the full
flowering of the Oxford movement in the mid-nineteenth century.
Unlike Calvin, therefore, Anglican medianism covered a wider terrain-
Transubstantiation (or at least something functionally similar, if not identical to it) to
Zwinglianism-than Calvin's did, and Anglicans did not all fall into Zwinglian
subjectivism largely because the Book of Common Prayer, in all of its post-1552 forms,
and the Anglican commitment to the historic episcopate kept open the possibility that
the Eucharist meant more than Zwingli thought that it did. See infra notes 488-500
and accompanying text.
In a very real sense, much of what constitutes Anglican medianism can be
summed up in the words of the Eucharist's administration as they appear in the post-
1552 Books of Common Prayer. On the one hand those words include the words of the
1549 Book of Common Prayer-"The body of our Lorde Jesus Christe which was geuen
for thee, preserue thy bodye and soule unto euerlasting lyfe" and "The bloud of our
Lorde Jesus Christe which was shed for thee, preserue thy bodye and soule unto
euerlasting lyfe," see EDWARD P. ECHLIN, THE ANGLICAN EUCHARIST IN ECUMENICAL
PERSPECTIVE: DOCTRINE AND RITE FROM CRANMER TO SEABURY 39 (1968)-words that
easily admit of a realist or Catholic interpretation, and the words of the 1552 Book of
Common Prayer-'Take and eate this, in remembrauce that Christ dyed for thee, and
feede on him in thy hearte by faythe, with thankes geuinge" and "Drinke this in
rembraunce that Christes bloude was shed for thee, and be thankefull," id. at 80-81-
words that cannot support a Catholic understanding of the Eucharist. The Anglican
communicant is largely left to her own devises to choose whichever Eucharistic
theology she might like since the words that she hears every time that she receives the
sacrament point in quite different theological directions.
Virtually alone among Protestants, Anglicans have insisted on maintaining
the historic episcopate. To the extent that the Catholic understanding of the Eucharist
requires sacramental bishops, bishops in the Apostolic Succession, then Anglican
sacramental bishops make it possible for Anglicans to understand the Eucharist in
Catholic ways, should they wish to do so. Anglicans pressed hard on the matter of
Apostolic Succession in the 1880s. In 1886, the House of Bishops of the Episcopal
Church adopted a statement addressed to other Christian bodies, setting out the terms
or the basis for "the restoration of unity among the divided branches of Christendom."
The Chicago Quadilateral, in THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 877 (1979). One such
term was: "[t]he Historic Episcopate, locally adapted in the methods of its
administration to the varying needs of the nations and peoples called of God into the
unity of His Church." Id. at 876-77. Two years later, at the 1888 Lambeth Conference,
the worldwide Anglican Communion adopted and reaffirmed the Chicago
Quadrilateral. Id. at 877-88. Roman Catholics pressed back hard, denying that




Eucharist,483 Anglicans nonetheless by and large stayed put in
a Church that allowed them some room to work out their own
understandings of the faith. Medianism's avoidance of rigid
doctrinal propositions, at least affirmative ones, made such
cohesion possible.484 Some have described the consequence of
medianism as Anglican "comprehensivism.485 At least one
party in the Church of England, the Latitudinarians, saw
themselves as a medianist party, encompassing within their
views of doctrine and mission, the substantive content of
medianism.4s6 Others, however, closer to the High and Low
Church positions also appealed to the via media, although from
quite different premises or presuppositions.487
This general pattern or hanging together,
notwithstanding serious disagreement on theological or other
related matters, played itself out in the nineteenth century
American branch of the Anglican Communion. The year 1811
saw the emergence of two rather distinct parties in the
483 See DIX, supra note 37, at 613-14 (remarking on the intensity of intra-
Anglican disagreement over the theology of the Eucharist).
484 Some Anglicans did secede, both to evangelical Protestantism, see
GRAYSON CARTER, ANGLICAN EVANGELICALS: PROTESTANT SECESSIONS FROM THE VIA
MEDIA, C.1800-1850 passim (2001), and to Rome, see GERTRUDE DONALD, MEN WHO
LEFT THE MOVEMENT, at vi (1933) (noting that "it is reckoned that several hundreds [of
lay people] accompanied the one hundred and thirty Tractarian clergy who left the
[Oxford] Movement for Rome" in the period of 1845-1855). The number of secessions
was relatively small. The experience in the United States was similar, see CHORLEY,
supra note 48, passim. "Going to Rome" has caused a great deal of disquiet in Anglican
and other circles. See PATRICK ALLITT, CATHOLIC CONVERTS: BRITISH AND AMERICAN
INTELLECTUALS TURN TO ROME 5-6 (1997); Dwight Longenecker, Intoduction to THE
PATH TO ROME: MODERN JOURNEYS TO THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1, 1-3 (Dwight
Longenecker ed., 1999); ARNOLD LUNN, ROMAN CONVERTS (1924); D. G. PAZ, THE
PRIESTHOODS AND APOSTASIES OF PIERCE CONNELLY: A STUDY OF VICTORIAN
CONVERSION AND ANTICATHOLICISM, at xiv (1986). Whatever the numbers or the
consequences might be of "going to Rome," I did so, becoming a Roman Catholic on
Pentecost, 1992.
485 PROTESTANTISM, supra note 35, at 172.
486 Latitudinarianism was a late seventeenth century expression of moderate
Anglican churchmanship, born of the strife and discord of that century. It placed
relatively little importance on doctrine as it sought to advance pan-Protestant unity in
the face of "the threat of [Roman] Catholic insurgency." W.M. SPELLMAN, THE
LATITUDINARIANS AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, 1660-1700, at 9 (1993).
487 See GEORGE FREDERICK POLLARD, ECCLESIA ANGLICANA 274-75 (1930)
(arguing from a High Church stance that the Anglican Church, like the Church of the
East, takes the Via Media, unlike "the Church of Rome [which] has added to the Faith
once for all delivered, while the Protestant bodies have taken away from that Faith");
ALFRED FAWKES, THE GENIUS OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH 24, 105, 110 (1917) (arguing
from a non-High Church position that the Church of England reflected the English
national instinct to "distrust extreme solutions, and to avoid decisive action," and
instead to "temporize, and take a middle course," finding fault with both the
Evangelical and the Tractarian movements, and stating that the English Church's
"characteristic 'Via Media' is not, and is not likely to become, a middle term between
Rome and Protestantism.").
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Episcopalian Church,488 and serious conflicts and
disagreements ensued.489 Nonetheless the warring factions,
good Anglicans all, largely succeeded in keeping their struggles
in house. By the time of National Prohibition, a peace of sorts
had settled on the Episcopal Church, a peace that legitimized a
"catholic" understanding of the Christian faith and liturgical
practice. 490
Throughout the history of the Episcopal Church, the
vast majority of Episcopalians, medianist or not, could rightly
claim to be Protestants when it came to the doctrine of the
Eucharist. Some of them even shared the Zwinglianism of the
evangelical Protestants. Those Episcopalians who held
Dynamic Receptionist, Receptionist, or Virtualist doctrines of
the Eucharist could at least trace their beliefs back to John
Calvin and Thomas Cranmer, Protestants in good standing.
Perhaps even the Consubstantiationists could argue that at
least they rejected the Roman Catholic doctrine of
Transubstantiation. Only those Episcopalians who believed in
Transubstantiation (or something very much akin to it) could-
and often did-have their Anglican credentials challenged. 491
In varying degrees, from less so to more so, Dynamic
Receptionism, Receptionism, Virtualism, Consubstantiation
and Transubstantiation are all "higher" Eucharistic theologies
than Zwinglianism. Anglican Low Churchmen tended to
Zwinglianism, Dynamic Receptionism, and Receptionism,492
488 See CHORLEY, supra note 48, at 133 (stating that "[t]wo movements sprang
from the revival of the American Church in 1811-the Evangelical and the high
Church Movement.").
489 Id. at passim.
490 Id. at 390-91 (noting that the fight between High and Low Church factions
had largely reduced itself to a question of proper ritualistic practices, resulting in a
"pro-Low Church" canon in 1874 outlawing certain "catholic" practices, but also noting
that in 1904 "this canon was dropped"). Notwithstanding the canon, the growing
insinuation of Anglo-Catholicism in the nineteenth century American church led
several Low Churchmen to depart and establish a splinter church, The Reformed
Episcopal Church, which specifically rejects and denies "high church" or "Anglo-
Catholic" Eucharistic doctrine. See JAMES THAYER ADDISON, THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1931, at 212-13 (1951).
491 ADDISON, supra note 490, at 158-63 (discussing, inter alia, objections in
1843 to the ordination of a seminarian who did not "deny" the teachings of the Council
of Trent); WILLIAM WILSON MANROSS, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN EPISCOPAL
CHURCH 301-02 (1950) (remarking on the refusal in the mid-1870s to confirm the
election of two Anglo-Catholics nominated as Episcopal Bishop of Illinois).
492 See GEORGE HODGES, THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH
IN AMERICA 139 (1906) (stating that "[a]s regards the Holy Communion.... [tihe high
Churchman held a doctrine . . . akin to that which was held in the Middle Ages ...
[whereas tihe low Churchman held a doctrine of the Lord's Supper akin to that which
was held by the Swiss reformers.").
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Anglican High Churchman typically held to a Virtualist
understanding of the Eucharist, 493 and Anglo-Catholics, heirs of
the Tractarians of the nineteenth century and of the Henrician
Anglo-Catholics, held views that were functionally quite
similar to consubstantiationist and transubstantiationist
doctrine although formalistically different because of a need to
attempt some reconciliation with the rejection of
Transubstantiation in the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of
England. 494 Not surprisingly, Low Churchmen tended to enjoy
better relations with evangelical Protestants than High
Churchmen and Anglo-Catholics did.495 Low Churchmen,
therefore, served as a valuable theological and cultural bridge
between Episcopalians and evangelical Protestants.
The "higher" Eucharistic theologies of virtually all the
Episcopalian parties mapped or followed the contours of the
fundamental structural logic of the Act of Toleration. The Act
accorded Anglicans a higher legal status. The Eucharistic
theologies of Anglicans-and Episcopalians-also conferred a
higher theological status. 496 In some sense, even if resented by
evangelical Protestants, Episcopalians enjoyed a privileged
cultural position due to their higher Eucharistic theologies.
It is possible that the higher status of Episcopalians
came, in whole or in part, from the refined and elegant beauty
of the Book of Common Prayer and its liturgies, 491 quite
without regard to the Eucharistic theology of either the Book or
those who worshipped in accordance with it. Evangelical
493 See ECHLIN, supra note 482, at 213-16 (showing that the Eucharistic
theology of the High Churchman, Samuel Seabury, the first American Episcopal
Bishop, was Virtualist).
494 See HARDELIN, supra note 168, at 123-219 (engaging in a careful and
meticulous examination and analysis of the thought, as it changed over time, of various
important figures in the Tractarian or Oxford Movement, as they came ever and ever
closer to a Catholic Eucharistic Realism); MANROSS, supra note 491, at 273 (noting that
the Anglo-Catholics, heirs of the Tractarians "tended to express a strong belief in the
Real Presence, sometimes even approaching the Roman Catholic theory of
Transubstantiation.").
495 See CHORLEY, supra note 48, at 273-81; Charles Newton Brickley, The
Episcopal Church in Protestant America, 1800-1860, at 156-57 (1946) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation in History and International Relations, Clark University) (on file
with author).
496 However much some evangelical Protestants might despise "high church,"
one cannot gainsay the reality of "high church" theologies that go back to the beginning
of Christianity. See ADOLF VON HARNACK, HISTORY OF DOGMA (Neil Buchanan trans.,
1976) (1893) (making a liberal Protestant critique of "high church" or Catholic tradition
and dogma). For a discussion of von Harnack's liberal evangelical Protestantism, see
WILHELM PAUCK, HARNACK AND TROELTSCH: TWO HISTORICAL THEOLOGIANS 5, 22-23
(1968).
411 See CHORLEY, supra note 48, at 103-04, 192, 270.
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Protestants, with their aversion to liturgy,498 might disparage
the Book of Common Prayer at least as much as they disliked
non-Zwinglian Eucharistic doctrine. Furthermore, the Book of
Common Prayer is not theologically neutral. 499 There are,
undoubtedly, functional, liturgiological links and connections
between its "high" prose and "high"-or at least "higher"-
Eucharistic theologies. The Book has to accommodate the
theologies of those who use it. At a minimum, throughout most
of its history, it has had to accommodate Zwinglianism,
Dynamic Receptionism, Receptionism and Virtualism, and
from the mid-nineteenth century on, Consubstantiation and
Transubstantiation as well. It may take some doing to get the
Book of Common Prayer to do all of this.500 However, the
evident devotion of Anglicans of all theological persuasions to
the Book of Common Prayer would suggest that the Book
"works" for Anglicans. Finally, "high" prose, like "high" art, has
cultural relevance. The Book may function, for present
purposes, therefore, as a cultural proxy.501
It may be no accident, therefore, that a religion that
came to be seen as the special preserve of the wealthy, the
"high and mighty," as is shown below,502 would in strictly
theological or liturgical terms also be or become "high and
mighty." If the Gilded Age did anything for America, it
established that it was possible to have extraordinary gulfs
between the rich and the rest-whether or not the gulf did the
country any good. Being "high and mighty," therefore, took on a
more extreme and palpable form as an expression, a status, a
cultural norm that stood at a considerable distance from the
values of the non-rich. As noted above, the resolution of the
strife between High and Low Churchmen had, by the time of
National Prohibition, largely come out on the High side, not the
498 See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
499 See ECHLIN, supra note 482, passim (arguing that the Book of Common
Prayer has increasingly, over time, come to express a theology that is essentially
Virtualist); BYRON D. STUHLMAN, EUCHARISTIC CELEBRATION 1789-1979, at 162-63
(1988) (stating that the 1979 Book of Common Prayer reflects a "virtualist" theology of
the Eucharist).
500 See Dix, supra note 37, at 716 (stating that the Book of Common Prayer "is
patient, however awkwardly, of a different interpretation from its author's [i.e. Thomas
Cranmer].").
501 See WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, THE CHURCH IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE
PRESENT CONDITION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM 83 (1922)
(remarking that "[miore than any other American church the Episcopal lays stress
upon beauty and dignity of worship, and side by side with its parish churches it is
building stately cathedrals in the great centres of population which accommodate large
numbers of worshippers and minister to the community as a whole.").
502 See infra note 508-13 and accompanying text.
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Low side, the Low Churchmen being, at least for the moment,
in retreat.503
3. Social Dynamics and Cultural Hegemony: The Case
for Propitiation in the Face of Evangelical Protestant
Envy and Resentment
The social status of Episcopalians matched their
theological and liturgical status. Admittedly, at the beginning
of our national history, the future of Anglicanism in America
was far from bright. Many Episcopalian clergy and laity,
especially in New England, had been Tories, favoring England
in the Revolutionary War.504 Thus the post-Revolutionary
church was "small and feeble, and still suspect by reason of its
English origin."55 But shortly thereafter, the Episcopalian
Church had become a bastion for the urban privileged,506 a
church for the refined.507 The power and social clout of
Episcopalians emerged in full force in the decades following the
Civil War,508 which is to say, during the push for National
Prohibition. Neverthless, the Episcopal Church "could not
effectively reach the rank and file."509
Episcopalians enjoyed high status and prestige, not to
mention power and social clout, even if they constituted only a
minority of the American population. As such, their situation
paralleled that of the Anglicans responsible for the Act of
Toleration, sufficient to cause the shift from legal hegemony to
cultural hegemony and to retain that dominance over time.
s03 See CHORLEY, supra note 48, at 424 (stating that "the remnant of the
Evangelicals remained to tread softly and speak low for more than half a century [after
1873], when they were born again.").
504 ROBERT W. PRICHARD, A HISTORY OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH 118-19
(1991).
505 CHORLEY, supra note 48, at 27.
506 Id. at 28-29.
507 ADDISON, supra note 490, at 272, 379.
608 See KIT KONOLIGE & FREDERICA KONOLIGE, THE POWER OF THEIR GLORY,
AMERICA'S RULING CLASS: THE EPISCOPALIANS 29, 65-66 (1978). The high position of
Episcopalians continues to the present day. See, e.g., THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, THE
SPIRITUAL HEALTH OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH (1989) (noting that the household
income of Episcopalians appears to be considerably above the national average).
09 See LATOURETTE, supra note 29, at 1234.
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a. Evangelical Protestant Crisis: Josiah Strong's Critique of
Socialism, Wealth, and the City
The unprecedented growth and development of
industrial capitalism in the years following the American Civil
War left many evangelical Protestants at a loss as they sought
to accommodate new economic realities to the Protestant
Empire. American Protestantism divided on the question. The
Gospel of Wealth taught that the growing concentration of
great, wealth in the hands of the capitalist classes and the
growing gulf between the rich and the laboring poor
represented a natural and rational development which should
be allowed to take its course because it was, perhaps, even
divinely inspired.lo But other Protestants believed that some
aspects of these developments warranted not only pause but
also corrective action in order to attenuate the economic
extremes generated by American post-Civil War economic
growth and development. These social reformers, not
altogether comfortable with all of the implications of a theology
rooted in alienation and rejectionism, tended to group
themselves under the banner of the Social Gospel. 511
510 See PAUL H. BOASE, THE RHETORIC OF CHRISTIAN SOCIALISM 12-13 (1969)
(quoting Russell Herman Conwell who "assured his listeners that 'there is not a poor
person in the United States who was not made poor by his own shortcomings, or the
shortcomings of someone else"' and who "exhorted his audiences 'to get rich ... because
to make money honestly is to preach the gospel ... Ninety-eight out of one hundred of
the rich men of America are honest [and t]hat is why they are rich."). Henry Ward
Beecher, one of Lyman Beecher's children, put it even more directly: "God has intended
the great to be great and the little to be little." Id. at 17. Sydney Mead describes a
Gilded Age preacher who suggested that begging "is prompted by a low, indolent spirit
which seeks to gratify its selfish lusts, at the expense of the virtuous and good... [and]
four-fifths, if not nine-tenths, of all our street beggars and paupers are of one
nationality and of one form of religion." MEAD, supra note 270, at 159. Mead described
the tendency of the age to view poverty as the result of sin. Id. at 160-61.
511 The Social Gospel was a "Protestant crusade for the kingdom of God and
against social evil." THE SOCIAL GOSPEL IN AMERICA, 1870-1920, at 3 (Robert T. Handy
ed., 1966) [hereinafter SOCIAL GOSPEL]. Its origins lie in "the patterns of thought and
action that had long been characteristic of American Protestantism." Id. at 4. It was
thus an expression of the Protestant Empire.
The Social Gospel had, however, no coherent political point of view,
embracing within its fold Protestant ministers with a wide range of attitudes "from
right wing to radical." See BOASE, supra note 510, at 21-24. Yet, there may be a certain
overarching coherence in the Social Gospel movement, as a matter of theology, due
largely to the fact that it was based on "a conviction that the social principles of the
historical Jesus could serve as reliable guides for both individual and social life in any
age." See SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra, at 10. But see MEAD, supra note 270, at 178 (stating
that 'the social gospel movement cannot be defined theologically or institutionally. It
was never incorporated in any independent new organizations, it did not result in any
new denominations .... It was in reality a movement in the denominations looking for
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The division between the two ideologies512 was real but
also lopsided. In the waning years of the nineteenth century,
the predominant opinion held by the loyalists of the Protestant
Empire favored the Gospel of Wealth.513 Herbert Spencer
became an icon for the rich, the comfortable, the smug, and the
complacent of the Gilded Age. 514 And Andrew Carnegie, the
industrialist-or robber baron,515 if one prefers-produced the
"bible" of the Gospel of Wealth.516 Perhaps the Progressive
Movement 517 of the first two decades of the twentieth century
theological roots.").
512 The struggle between the Social Gospel and the Gospel of Wealth largely
concerned the locus of salvation-the individual or society. The Gospel of Wealth can be
described as "Private" Protestantism, whereas the Social Gospel can be described as
"Public" Protestantism. See RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE, supra note 197, at 178-79.
513 See HENNESEY, supra note 197, at 173. See also BOASE, supra note 510, at
11.
514 Spencer's doctrine of Social Darwinism provided ample grist for the Gospel
of Wealth's mill. BOASE, supra note 510, at 13-18. See also RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 31-50 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1959) (1944)
(discussing Spencer's views). Spencer's sociology generated a 'language [that] has
become a standard feature of the folklore of individualism." Id. at 50. Spencer's great
sociological disciple in America was William Graham Sumner.
He provided his age with a synthesis which, though not so grand as Spencer's
was broader in its stark and candid pessimism. Sumner's synthesis brought
together three great traditions in western capitalist culture: the Protestant
ethic, the doctrines of classical economics, and Darwinian natural selection.
Correspondingly, in the development of American thought Sumner played
three roles; he was a great Puritan preacher, an exponent of the classical
pessimism of Ricardo and Malthus, and an assimilator and popularizer of
evolution. His sociology bridged the gap between the economic ethic set in
motion by the Reformation and the thought of the nineteenth century, for it
assumed that the industrious, temperate, and frugal man of the Protestant
ideal was the equivalent of the "strong" or the "fittest" in the struggle for
existence; and it supported the Ricardian principles of inevitability and
laissez faire with a hard-bitten determinism that seemed to be at once
Calvinistic and scientific.
Id. at 51. See also AHLSTROM, supra note 26, at 789 (describing "the American's basic
contempt for poverty, the 'hard shell of sanctified realism' fostered by the Puritan ethic
in both its pious and secularized forms .... The Puritan doctrine of vocation avoided a
static interpretation of the dominical words, 'You have the poor always with you' (Matt.
26:10). Because God called nobody unto mendicancy and inactivity, [and thus] those
who begged and did not work either were being or ought to be punished for their
sins.").
5'5 See SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE: FROM THE
DEATH OF LINCOLN TO THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 30-31 (3d ed. 1993) (defining
the term robber baron to include rogue financiers, businessmen who "aimed for
monopoly control ... but not simply to control prices .. . [who] determined to replace
fierce industrial competition with sound commercial order," and "rapacious men
capable of criminal acts for commercial gain, but who nevertheless worked within the
letter (if not the spirit) of the law").
516 See ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH, AND OTHER TIMELY
ESSAYS (Edward C. Kirkland ed., 1962).
517 Herbert Croly wrote the definitive work on progressivism. His major thesis
was: "[i]f the responsible managers of large industries of the country and their political
allies lost public confidence, it was because of their own flagrant misdeeds .... The ill-
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will of public opinion could be stirred up against them, because they had
unscrupulously violated the laws, and abused their opportunities." HERBERT CROLY,
PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 5 (1914). Croly, of course, laid the blame at the feet of robber
barons. See CASHMAN, supra note 515. The loss of public confidence opened the door to
a more searching, if not radical, inquiry into our political institutions. CROLY, supra, at
28. It has been suggested that there is no agreement on the meaning of
"Progressivism." JOHN D. BUENKER, URBAN LIBERALISM AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM, at
vii (1978). But see DAVID M. KENNEDY, INTRODUCTION TO PROGRESSIVISM: THE
CRITICAL ISSUES, at vii (David M. Kennedy ed., 1971) (arguing that the heart of
Progressivism was, quoting William Allen White, the use of "the government as an
agency of human welfare," having "reject[ed] the laissez-faire determinism that had
rendered government so unable to control the economic expansion that followed the
Civil War").
One can find parallels between Progressivism and the Social Gospel. Both
represent impulses having their origins in the Protestant Empire. "Catholics were not
prominent in Progressive Era reform movements." HENNESEY, supra note 197, at 210.
Indeed, it was only in 1919, when the Progressive movement had largely spent its
force, that the American Catholic Church spoke in a meaningful way to Progressive
reform, showing that it could be reconciled with Leonine Social Catholicism, see Leo
XIII, Rerum Novarum, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 14-39 (David J. O'Brien et al.
eds., 1992). See also JOSEPH M. MCSHANE, "SUFFICIENTLY RADICAL": CATHOLICISM,
PROGRESSIVISM AND THE BISHOPS' PROGRAM OF 1919 (1986). One writer has sought
carefully to distinguish between the Progressive movement, a Protestant phenomenon,
and "urban liberalism," a political expression dominated by Catholics and Jews.
BUENKER, supra, viii. ('"urban liberalism' is a reasonably precise description of the
complex of social, economic, and political positions taken by urban new stock
lawmakers in [New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts,
Ohio, and Illinois] .... ").
And both the Social Gospel and Progressivism were silent--or worse-on
matters of race and religion. Croly in his masterful piece of political science, only
referred to slavery and the Civil War in passing, and said nothing at all about the
problem of racism during his time, or at any other time in American history, as if the
various political conceptions of democracy that he so carefully treats have absolutely
nothing to do with race. A more perceptive commentator has observed:
The many terrorized and disgruntled southern Negroes who sought refuge in
northern cities during the Progressive era found no relief from violence and
omnipresent discrimination. They also found that northern progressives
offered no plan of social redemption for their oppressed numbers. An aspiring
white middle class condemned the malefactors of great wealth, but they
failed to condemn the great malefactors of race who sought eternal
degradation of the Negro. The trenchant fact was that the overwhelming
majority of northern progressives had acquired a racial philosophy akin to
that of the Negro-baiting politicians of the South. The only difference was
that the racism of the northern progressives was often more circumspect,
more subtle. It was no subtlety, however, that the end of the Progressive era
saw the Negro at the very nadir of his harried existence.
DAVID W. SOUTHERN, THE MALIGNANT HERITAGE: YANKEE PROGRESSIVES AND THE
NEGRO QUESTION: 1901-1914, at 2 (1968).
The blind spot, the malignancy, extended even beyond the minions and the
reaches of the Protestant Empire. The 1919 Catholic program of industrial democracy
referred to above was completely silent on the matter of racial and religious justice,
contenting itself to deal with matters of industrial democracy. See MCSHANE, supra.
And Southern relates that even socialists were, by and large, racists. SOUTHERN,
supra, at 72-73. This blind spot, this obtuseness on the race question, continues to play
itself out in otherwise "respectable" scholarship. See, e.g., TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at
120 (writing that liquor interests could corrupt the black vote, yet failing to display the
curiosity or the interest in determining whether this was in fact the case. For a more
honest treatment of Progressivism, southern style, see Ruth, supra note 210. But
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was a victory of sorts for the apostles of the Social Gospel. 51 But
during the nineteenth century, the Social Gospel was distinctly a
minority voice.
Nonetheless, in the waning years of the nineteenth
century, Josiah Strong, a Social Gospeler, rather than a
disciple of the Gospel of Wealth,519 seemed to capture the spirit
and feeling of evangelical Protestant America. He "had gauged
correctly the mind and mood of Protestant America and, in the
Quaker phrase, spoke 'to his readers' condition.'520 Strong did
so by the publication of Our Country, "a historical document of
major importance."' 521
Strong identified several "perils" confronting the
America of the Gilded Age: (1) immigration,522 (2) Romanism,523
(3) religion and the public schools,524 (4) Mormonism,525 (5)
intemperance, 526 (6) Socialism,527 (7) wealth,528 and (8) the
Timberlake nevertheless provides critical insights into both Progressivism and
Prohibition. Racism was so deeply ingrained in both social movements that bracketing,
if not condoning, racism may in and of itself yield insight.
And yet, as with the Social Gospel, see CALVIN S. MORRIS, REVERDY C.
RANSOM: BLACK ADVOCATE OF THE SOCIAL GOSPEL (1990), people who were neither
white, nor male, nor both, did address issues of segregation, family relations, labor,
lynchings, and suffrage, seeking to have-and perhaps succeeding in having-a
positive impact on this large and broad reformist impulse in the Protestant Empire and
having it address the concerns of the excluded and the marginalized "others." See
generally GENDER, CLASS, RACE AND REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (Noralee
Frankel et al. eds., 1991). The contribution of these "outsiders," of course, has been
largely ignored.
518 The Social Gospel achieved its greatest measure of success during the
Progressive era. See, e.g., MEAD, supra note 270, at 182; SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note
511, at 3; RONALD C. WHITE, JR. & C. HOWARD HOPKINS, THE SOCIAL GOSPEL: RELIGION
AND REFORM IN CHANGING AMERICA, at xi (1976). See also TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9.
This makes perfect sense because of the profound similarities between these two broad
impulses of the Protestant Empire, see supra notes 312, 317, although some tension
existed between the two. WHITE & HOPKINS, supra, at xix. But the Social Gospel never
attained the backing of a majority of Protestants. See, e.g., RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE, supra
note 197, at 183. Fundamentalism, as we use that term today, can be explained as a
reaction to the Social Gospel. MEAD, supra note 270, at 183. Its political equivalent
would be an Americanist conservatism.
519 See generally LUKER, supra note 158. Strong may not have been a major
figure in the Social Gospel movement, for that distinction appears to belong to Walter
Rauschenbusch and Washington Gladden, see SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 511, but he
was nonetheless a man of no little consequence in the Protestant America of his time.
See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 303 (2001); T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and
LaFcitg, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 449 (2004).
520 Jurgen Herbst, Introduction to STRONG, supra note 27, at ix.
521 Id.
522 STRONG, supra note 27, at 41-58.
,23 Id. at 59-88.
524 Id. at 89-106.
525 Id. at 107-16.
526 Id. at 117-32.
527 STRONG, supra note 27, at 133-55.
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city.529 As discussed above, Strong was strongly anti-
Catholic.53o But, of interest here are Strong's views on
Socialism, wealth and the city. In his analysis and treatment of
these three "perils" something of the nature of the relations
between predominantly middle class evangelical Protestants
and disproportionately upper class Episcopalians on the
question of temperance-prohibition becomes clear.
Strong's criticism of Socialism focused on various
strands of European or German Socialism because of their
anarchistic and nihilistic tendencies. 531 However, Strong did
not content himself merely to flagellate "German" Socialism.
He conceded that "the great German [i.e. Protestant]
Reformation of the sixteenth century" was a part of "an
irresistible drift toward individualism"532 which, if left
unchecked, would become "favorable to the spread of socialism,
as advocated by the [anarchists]." 533 Thus, Protestantism was
itself part of the problem.
Second, Strong tarred the radical socialism that he
disliked with the brush of materialism. 534 But it is difficult to
see how one could avoid tarring the plutocrats of his age with
the same brush. Strong was obliged, therefore, to lay much of
the blame at the feet of the very tribunes of the Empire who
made the rules. It is a fair assumption, of course, that a good
number of these tribunes were or were becoming
Episcopalians. 535
Strong saw that "mechanical invention" tended to widen
the gulf between the social classes, even making them
hereditary, thereby enhancing the appeal of socialism's dream
of equality.536 But the problem of "mechanical invention" and
the widening gulf between the social classes was not the fault
of immigrants and their alleged alien and strange ways, beliefs
and practices. Rather this problem derived from the heart and
soul of the Protestant Empire. 537
528 Id. at 156-70.
529 Id. at 171-86.
530 See supra notes 161-69 and accompanying text.
531 See STRONG, supra note 27, at 134-39.
532 Id. at 139.
533 Id. at 139-40.
534 Id. at 140.
535 See supra notes 501-06 and accompanying text.
536 STRONG, supra note 27, at 140-41.
537 Strong also pressed the point that the wages paid to the average working
man were not enough to support him and his family. Id. at 142-43. Consequently, wives
and children were forced to work. Strong insisted that "[t]hese children ought to be in
the school instead of in the mill or the mine." Id. at 143.
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Strong similarly understood that the monotony of the
assembly line would give rise to discontent,538 and that
technological change and development would lead to the
unemployment of middle-aged men too old to be retrained and
who would, "unless anchored by a family, probably turn[]
tramp. '' 39 Strong also feared "a strong tendency toward
combination and monopoly, which is one of the darkest clouds
on our industrial and social horizon:"540
This is modern and republican feudalism. These American barons
and lords of labor have probably more power and less responsibility
than many an olden feudal lord. They close the factory or the mine,
and thousands of workmen are forced into unwilling idleness. The
capitalist can arbitrarily raise the price of necessaries, can prevent
men's working, but has no responsibility, meanwhile, as to their
starving. Here is "taxation without representation" with a
vengeance. We have developed a despotism vastly more oppressive
and more exasperating than that against which the thirteen colonies
rebelled.541
In analyzing the "peril" of wealth, Strong elaborated on
the themes and the analysis that he had developed in
connection with his critique of Socialism. He granted that the
germ of the evil lay in "the very blood of Anglo-Saxons."542 This
time the seminal danger was mammonism, the love and
worship of money. 543 And there were peculiar features of his
beloved Protestant Empire that made matters even worse,
especially its aristocracy of wealth.544 The love of money had led
to the corruption of popular morals 545 as well as the ballot-
box. 546 Mammonism threatened Americans with a "gross
materialism, 547 and the perils of "luxuriousness."' 548 Even
worse, it had led to a "congestion of wealth." 49
538 Id. at 144-46
539 Id. at 146.
540 STRONG, supra note 27, at 149.
541 Id. at 150.
542 Id. at 160.
543 Id.
544 Id. Strong failed to note that to the extent that the American class
structure was becoming hereditary, see STRONG, supra note 27, at 140-41, the
American aristocracy might conceivably come to rest on birth as much as on wealth
and that such a development could have a considerable impact on the strength,
character, and shape of American mammonism.
545 Id. at 162.
546 Id. at 163.
547 Id.
548 Id. at 165.
549 STRONG, supra note 27, at 167.
[Vol. 70:3
SOME KIND OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Strong declared that "[t]he classes from which we have
most to fear are the two extremes of society-the dangerously
rich and the dangerously poor; and the former are much more
to be feared than the latter."550 His objection to the
"dangerously poor" rested to a significant degree on religious
grounds: these people, particularly in large cities, tended to be
Catholics. 551 Strong has reinforced his bias against Catholics by
associating Catholics with the "worst" of the urban poor. It is
no small wonder, therefore, that his views found widespread
support among the white evangelical Protestants of his day.
But his objection to the "dangerously rich" had a religious
component to it as well. Strong thundered that this latter class
needed to "discover that they are not proprietors, apportioning
their own, but simply trustees or managers of God's
property."552 There was a Protestant duty to treat great wealth
as a divine trust. To the extent that the "dangerously rich" did
not, then they had violated a religious duty in much the same
way that the "dangerously poor" had violated their duty to
become card-carrying evangelical Protestants.
Nonetheless, the tone of the criticism of the two classes
was different. Fear of the poor may be aggravated by the sense
of differentness or alienation. Envy, or aspiration, or optimism,
or hopefulness may, ironically, temper fear of the rich, 553
particularly if the rich were the soteriological elite. 554 The fact
that Strong appealed to the rich to fund his missionary efforts
to turn the immigrant poor into Protestants 555 certainly helped
to temper the criticism, no doubt, and indeed, may simply be an
acknowledgement that the rich are that elite.
The normative Eucharistic theology of the Protestant
Empire rests in alienation and the doctrine of unbridgeable
distances.56 Gulfs between social classes should not offend that
550 Id. at 167-68.
551 Strong's argument focused on "dangerous elements" in cities. See id. at
171-86. He concluded that "the dangerous elements of our civilization are each
multiplied and all concentrated in the city." Id. at 177. He declared that Romanism
found its chief strength in cities, id. at 173, and that the Catholic urban vote was
subject to the control of the pope. STRONG, supra note 27, at 185. Strong also stated
that the poor in large cities were worse off than the poor in smaller communities, id. at
174. The city was the situs, therefore, of the "dangerously poor" who were, in large
numbers, Catholics.
552 Id. at 221.
553 Strong himself appealed to the rich to fund his missionary work, surely an
expression of optimism and hopefulness, whether or not also an expression of envy. See
infra notes 546-551 and accompanying text.
554 See supra notes 509-10 and accompanying text.
555 See STRONG, supra note 27, at 226.
56 See supra Part II.A.2.a.
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theology, although some, like Strong, were surely troubled by
these social chasms. Perhaps, however, the problem was not
the social gulfs, but rather that if the gulfs grew too wide, the
have-nots would rise up against the rich thereby causing the
divinely ordained gulfs to disappear. The incoherence of the
Social Gospel 557 and of Progressivism 558 may now be explained.
The task at hand was the maintenance of the soteriological
elite, even if the excesses of that elite needed to be controlled
for its own good.
But the elite, the rich and powerful, needed more than
criticism of their ways by the likes of Josiah Strong. In a way
that is so typically American, Strong, the Congregationalist
missionary, declared money to be the solvent in which the
moral and the providential would dissolve the dross and the
impurities and the perils would be overcome. He called for the
rich and the powerful, perhaps to atone for their sins of greed,
mammonism, and appalling lack of social responsibility for
their economic decisions, to donate large sums of money to fund
the voluntary efforts of men like, well, Josiah Strong. He
declared "[flor Christians to apprehend their true relations to
money, and the relations of money to the kingdom of Christ
and its progress in the world, is to find the key to many of the
great problems now pressing for solution. ' 59
In other words, "money power" had to be
"Christianized."'560 Strong bemoaned the fact that far too many
Christians "give only a trifle or nothing at all for the work of
missions,"561 claiming that "the world would have been
evangelized62 long ago, if Christians had perceived the
relations of money to the Kingdom, and had accepted their
stewardship."' 563 Strong wanted to use the money that
stewardship would produce so as to increase urban and
western missions, work which, given Strong's notion of "peril,"
was of the utmost importance and necessity.564 For Strong,
57 See supra notes 509-18 and accompanying text.
558 See supra note 516 and accompanying text.
559 STRONG, supra note 27, at 219.
560 Id. at 220.
561 Id. at 238.
562 Strong appears to have moved a considerable distance from his earlier
insistence that the Anglo-Saxon race would dominate the other races of the world,
instead using the much milder language of "evangelization." See supra notes 198-203
and accompanying text. One does not have to be a cynic to understand that
"evangelization," for Strong, is merely racial domination by another name.
563 STRONG, supra note 27, at 242.
564 Id. at 251-56.
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propitiation of the wealthy was an indispensable element of the
work of the Protestant Empire.
Strong fully appreciated the importance of the city. For
him it was "the nerve center of our civilization. It is also the
storm center."565 For "[tihe city has become a serious menace to
our civilization, because in it, excepting Mormonism, each of
the dangers we have discussed is enhanced, and all are
focalized. It has a peculiar attraction for the immigrant."566 For
this reason, Romanism and the saloon find their home in the
city.567 And yet, wealth also found its home in America's
metropolitan centers: "[h]ere the sway of Mammon is wildest,
and his worship the most constant and eager .... Here, also, is
the congestion of wealth in the severest . . . . The rich are
richer, and the poor are poorer, in the city."568
The mission goal of Protestantization simply ran up
against a brick wall in American cities. Strong lamented the
relatively small number of Protestant churches in large urban
centers like Boston, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Buffalo, and
Chicago:569 too few evangelical Protestant churches to do the
"manifestly destined" work of Protestantization. He declared
that "we may say that the city, where the forces of evil are
massed, and where the need of Christian57 influence is
peculiarly great, is from one-half to one-quarter as well
supplied with churches as the nation at large. And [evangelical
Protestant] church accommodations in the city are growing
more inadequate every year."571
After lambasting cities and their inhabitants for not
being evangelical Protestants and evangelical Protestants for
not building enough evangelical Protestant churches in
American cities, Strong then took up the cudgels against the
government of large cities, calling it "a failure,"572 and
"degenerating into government by a 'boss.' '' 7 Under Strong's
theory, cities would soon be controlled by immigrant non-
evangelical Protestants, people "who themselves most need to
565 Id. at 171.
566 Id. at 172.
567 Id. at 173.
568 STRONG, supra note 27, at 174.
569 STRONG, supra note 27, at 177-78.
570 Here Strong displays the annoying tendency to equate evangelical
Protestantism with Christianity, as if Catholics, Eastern Orthodoxs and Oriental
Orthodoxs are somehow beyond the pale.
571 Id. at 178.
572 Id. at 180.
573 Id. at 181.
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be controlled."' 574 In his peroration, Strong tied the upper and
lower classes together, both being the source of threat and
danger. Strong feared "centralized [political] power," the power
of the "boss," the capitalist and the corporation, the liquor
interests, the Mormon Church, and most severely, the pope. 575
Strong lumped together the upper-class capitalist with all of
the socialists, liquor traffickers and non-Protestant religious
leaders who, in one way or another, served or represented the
lower classes. He wrote: "These several dangerous elements are
singularly netted together, and serve to strengthen each other.
It is not necessary to prove that any one of them is likely to
destroy our national life, in order to show that it is
imperiled."576 The disaster to befall America would be "an open
struggle between the destructive (i.e. upper and largely
Protestant and lower largely non-evangelical Protestant
classes) and the conservative (i.e. evangelical Protestant
middle class) elements of society. 577
Josiah Strong's critique of socialism, wealth and the city
would suggest that the middle class, imbued with rural or
small town values, if not rural or small town mailing
addresses, embodied the heart and soul of the Protestant
Empire.578 But the upper class, overwhelmingly Protestant, to
be sure, but troublesome for the Protestant middle class largely
precisely because of its wealth and urban orientation,
nevertheless had a Christian duty to fund the works of the
Protestant Empire, works largely aimed at the working class, a
class dominated by immigrant, non-evangelical Protestants. On
this view, then, temperance-prohibition, an idea and an ethos
springing forth from the evangelical Protestant middle class,
would be imposed on the non-Protestant working class thanks
to the financial support of the Protestant upper class. In
reality, something like this actually happened.
574 Id.
575 STRONG, supra note 27, at 184-85.
576 Id. at 185.
577 Id. at 186.
578 See TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 2, 152-54 (defining the "middle class"
essentially as "old-stock," which is to say, evangelical Protestant); HANDY, supra note
26, at 77 (stating that "evangelicals usually thought of themselves as falling into that
vague but vast grouping styled 'the middle class"'); Jimerson, supra note 273, at 19
(referring to "middle-class Protestant values"); CHERYL CRASNICK WARSH, DRINK IN
CANADA: HISTORIcAL ESSAYS 13-14 (1993) (noting a similar pattern in Canada where
"temperance ideology has invariably been associated with the emerging middle classes
and evangelical religion.").
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In Josiah Strong's perfervid nomos, propitiation of
disproportionately Episcopalian, wealthy, Protestant urbanites,
became a theological imperative, even though Strong found
much about these urbanites to dislike, as his critique of
socialism, wealth and the city plainly demonstrates.
b. Social Class and National Prohibition
Many commentators have argued that National
Prohibition emerged from an evangelical Protestant middle
class that felt squeezed both by the upper and the working
classes, 519 a position that was presaged by Josiah Strong.580
Somewhat more problematically, others have claimed that
Prohibition was part of the broad Progressive Movement of the
first two decades of the twentieth century.581 We have already
seen that some progressives (sometimes referred to as "urban
liberals") were neither white nor Protestant and opposed
579 See AsINOF, supra note 229, at 240 (stating that the "middle class,
squeezed by its struggle for identity between its envy of the wealthy owners and its
distrust of hardworking labors found [temperance] an agreeable cause around which to
rally"); BLOCKER, supra note 223, at 241 (stating that the "middle class supported
prohibition primarily because of a social outlook which stemmed not from slipping
status but rather from the inescapable growth of the corporation and the resulting
militancy of labor. This outlook rested on the well-founded belief, dating from the
Gilded Age, that the middle class was in imminent danger of being crushed between
two millstones: capital above and labor below."); CAREY, supra note 123, at 65 (stating
that the "progressive movement represented in part a middle-class mentality that
feared the concentration of power in Gilded Age trusts on the one hand and radical
labor and populist agitations on the other" whereas Catholics exhibited a variety of
responses, Protestant moralism, resistance to that moralism, and noninvolvement in
the question, "being primarily concerned with the religious needs of immigrant parish
communities"); GUSFIELD, supra note 118, at 106 (arguing that the Dry middle class
opposed the Wet upper and lower classes); HANDY, supra note 26, at 77 (stating that
"[middle-class and Protestant complacency was threatened by both the unrest of the
laboring and poor, by the vast increase of wealth, especially when displayed
conspicuously . ... pos[ing] disturbing challenges to the reigning philosophy of
individualism [for] the road to a Christian America was seemingly becoming more
difficult because of developments such as these"); Ruth, supra note 210, at 28-29
(stating that "Protestant institutions seemed threatened from above and from below");
TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 1 (describing the Progressive Movement as
"endeavor[ing] to come to grips with the two great problems threatening American
democracy: the growing power of big business on the one hand, and, on the other, the
mounting discontent of the lower classes, especially among urban-industrial workers").
580 See supra notes 538-39 and accompanying text.
581 See TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 2 (stating that "prohibition was actually
written into the Constitution as a progressive reform," that it was "an integral part of
the Progressive Movement" and "drew on the same moral idealism and sought to deal
with the same basic problems"); THE DRY YEARS, supra note 226, at 122 (stating that
the "dimension of class tension in the prohibition movement in Washington helps one
see it as part of that widespread agitation for reform in American society after 1900
called the progressive movement .. . [t]his is to say, almost, that the progressive
movement and the prohibition movement were, in fact, the same").
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Prohibition. 582 Thus, a more accurate statement would be that
Prohibition was part of the evangelical Protestant Progressive
Movement and not part of the liberal-urban-immigrant and
African-American Progressive Movements. Even granting this
point, more careful observers have noted that the relation
between Prohibition and Progressivism was yet more
complex-and more contingent, characterized by separateness
and distance.83 Prohibition, unlike other items on the
Progressive agenda, had direct ties, links and connections to
the normative Eucharistic theology of American evangelical
Protestants.54 This accounts for its distinctive character, and
thus, its distinctive political and strategic coloration. The Anti-
Saloon League referred to itself as "the church in action against
the saloon.585 No other group or organization associated in any
manner or fashion with the Progressive Movement could earn,
warrant, or deserve such a characterization. Furthermore,
there were other exogenous factors, most importantly World
War I, which played a role in advancing the temperance-
prohibition cause. 586  However, Progressivism and
582 See supra note 517 and accompanying text. Timberlake concedes the point.
See TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 2 (granting that non-Protestant progressives
"especially those identified with the urban-labor-immigrant elements, disliked
[prohibition] and fought it" but their opposition was overcome by the "old-stock middle
class [which] constituted the backbone of the Progressive Movement").
583 See, e.g., FRANKLIN, supra note 123, at xii-xiii (arguing that Oklahoma
Drys did not "flirt with other reform issues which would dissipate their strength, tax
their finance, or divide their ranks"); LEWIS L. GOULD, PROGRESSIVES AND
PROHIBITIONISTS 42-43 (1973) (essentially arguing that progressives and
prohibitionists worked together in Texas because of the state's "basic rural orientation"
meaning that there were few to no liberal-urban-immigrant progressives in Texas);
GUSFIELD, supra note 118, at 100 (noting that after 1906, "the rural nature of
Temperance was enhanced and it became a dominant political issue, separated from
the wider net of movements current at the same time"); HANDY, supra note 26, at 189
(stating that "[t]hough ... the [prohibition] amendment . .. was part of the general
program of the progressive movement, the evangelical churches felt it was a victory for
them especially"); ISAAC, supra note 274, at 264-65 (stating that "Prohibition was
stimulated by and flourished in conjunction with other waves of reformism, but it
always retained its identity as a distinct movement" even though "there was a close
relationship between the anti-saloon crusade and progressivism in Tennessee"); West,
supra note 27, at 332 (pointing out that Colorado Drys rejected a Dry Progressive
candidate for governor in favor of a law-and-order Republican in the 1914 elections).
584 See supra Part II.A.3.
585 See ASBURY, supra note 9, at 98. See also ISAAC, supra note 274, at 19;
Engelmann, 0, Whisky, supra note 27, at 149.
586 See, e.g., KOBLER, supra note 117, at 206-08 (arguing that but for World
War I, prohibition might have eluded the Anti-Saloon League, but the war provided the
League the opportunity to attack "the beer industry as pro-German and treasonable,"
and "to forge ahead with the Eighteenth Amendment, advocating it primarily as a war-
time measure"); MCCARTY, supra note 188, at 8. McCarty notes:
[T]he movement toward prohibition gained strength during World War I from
a mobilization which stressed home-front austerity ...and [n]or was it a
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Prohibitionism shared marked affinities, as many Drys were
also Progressives as a consequence of their status as middle
class American evangelical Protestants.
Some challenged this canon, insisting that American
capitalists, not the "old-stock" middle class, put National
Prohibition on the map because the rich and powerful had come
to the conclusion that National Prohibition served their
economic interests vis-A-vis the working classes.57 John
Rumbarger declared:
For while it is probably true that industrialization exacerbated the
evils of excessive drinking and that genuinely human efforts were
made to alleviate them, it is equally true that the liquor question
itself was the ideological creation of America's dominant social class
seeking to expand its hegemony over the lives of the country's
propertyless masses. Without capital's need for profit there would
have been no liquor question or temperance movement as they came
to be in America. 588
Rumbarger argued that wealthy capitalists bankrolled
the Anti-Saloon League S89 and largely set its agenda. 590 He
insisted that the rich used the League, not the other way
around.591 Jack Blocker, challenging Rumbarger, suggested
that the question was a narrowly focused one: whether the
League or wealthy businessmen persuaded Congress to
approve the Eighteenth Amendment. Blocker concluded that
the evidence to date did not support the conclusion that the
rich, and not the League, persuaded Congress to propose
National Prohibition. Instead, Blocker insisted that the data
suggested that it was the League that in fact persuaded
happy circumstance for imbibers that many of the largest distilleries in
America were controlled by persons of German descent; in the minds of many
patriots, shackling the liquor interests was but another way of striking the
"enemy."
Id.; ODEGARD, supra note 189, at 67 (noting that "[t]he war gave the League a rare
opportunity to deal the liquor traffic a mortal blow'). But see ASBURY, supra note 9, at 136-
37 (insisting that the 1916 elections guaranteed the success of the fight for National
Prohibition, and that "[a]t most the war may have hastened ratification by a few years; it is
extremely doubtful if anything could have stopped it").
587 See RUMBARGER, supra note 27, at xxiv; Harry Gene Levine, The Birth of
American Alcohol Control: Prohibition, the Power Elite, and the Problem of
Lawlessness, CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS., Spring 1985, at 63.
588 RUMBARGER, supra note 27, at 187-88.
5s9 Id. at 183.
590 Id. at 156 ("the [Anti-Saloon] League is better understood as the political
voice of business than as that of nativist and reactionary American Protestants-
middle class, progressive, or otherwise").
591 Id. at 182-83.
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Congress.592 Blocker's argument failed to consider the
possibility, implicit in Rumbarger's challenge to the Prohibition
canon, that wealthy capitalists controlled the League and left it
to the League to get Congress to adopt the Eighteenth
Amendment. One might think, however, that it would have
been easy for wealthy capitalists to settle the matter with
congressmen and senators directly, with no need for
intermediaries, or a "front" or "puppet" organization, to do their
work for them.
But there is another possibility, steeped in the historical
and cultural norms and artifacts of the Protestant Empire: the
interests of middle class evangelical Protestant Drys and
wealthy capitalists converged and they used each other to
advance their perceived self-interest5 93 Of course, there is
every reason to believe that the League received crucial
support from the upper class, and that it deferred to the views
of representatives of that class, even while furthering its own
agenda. This view accordsentirely with Josiah Strong's critique
of the peril of wealth,594 and is very much in the tradition of the
Act of Toleration: evangelical Protestant acceptance-albeit
resentful and full of envy--of the dominant position of
Anglicans in exchange for Anglican "toleration" of evangelical
Protestantism. At the very least, propitiation of the wealthy
appears to have been a central feature of the relationship
between the Anti-Saloon League-and evangelical Protestant
middle class Drys generally-and the rich. Taking care of the
religious needs of a social class disproportionately
Episcopalian, therefore, makes perfect sense. Put in the
simplest of terms, most Drys, including those associated with
the Anti-Saloon League, surely caviled at the thought of biting
the hand that fed them.
c. Episcopalians as Evangelical Protestants and Roman
Catholics Saw Them
Evangelical Protestants and Roman Catholics alike
found much to dislike about Episcopalians. Anglican
medianism 595 presented a tempting target. 596 They also found
592 BLOCKER, supra note 223, at 235-36.
593 See generally Bell, supra note 31.
594 See supra notes 530-42 and accompanying text.
595 See supra Part IV.A.2.
596 For Catholic criticism of Anglican medianism, see, for example, Samuel F.
Darwin Fox, The Episcopal Church and Catholic Claims, 102 THE CATHOLIC WORLD
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American Anglicans to be haughty, arrogant, and somewhat
silly and pretentious, probably the inevitable consequences of a
medianist church with a disproportionately upper class
membership and with the resulting cultural hegemony. 597 The
inter-religious discourse would seem to offer, therefore, scant
reason to suppose that the evangelical Protestant Drys would
have any particular interest in propitiating Episcopalians by
accommodating their religious need for wine. But hints, large
and small, surface in the popular religious literature of the
time revealing an acceptance, willing or not, of the cultural
hegemony of Episcopalians, and thus the need to propitiate,
whether or not such need was understood in terms of Josiah
Strong's Christian duty.
Evangelical Protestants routinely sniped at
Episcopalians. The Baptists found fault with the Anglican
insistence that Protestant church union required recognition of
the historic episcopate, something that evangelicals would
never easily accept, and with the failure of Episcopalians to
cooperate with an umbrella evangelical Protestant organization
and with the Dry agenda.59s They criticized the High Church
party, noting that they "make no charges against the Episcopal
Church, but . ..predict that the time will come when that
Church will have to rid itself of the High Church party, or
609 (1916); Note, What is an Episcopalian?, 15 AMERICA 451 (1916). For evangelical
Protestant criticism of Anglican medianism, see, for example, Note, Episcopalians and
Church Union, 3 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 1631 (1915).
597 For Catholic criticism, see, for example, Note, 12 AMERICA 452 (1915)
(taking indignant exception to a characterization of English Roman Catholics as
English "Dissent"); Henry Woods, More Anglican Misrepresentations, 13 AMERICA 172
(1915) (ridiculing a claim made by an Anglican journal that Rome had followed
Anglican precedents regarding fasting before receiving communion). For evangelical
Protestant criticism, see, for example, Note, Men and Things, 4 THE WATCHMAN-
EXAMINER 130 (1916) (mocking a claim made by an Episcopalian bishop that the
Episcopal Church was "the authoritative teacher of religious faith"); Note, Men and
Things, 4 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 1186 (1916) (noting, with envy perhaps, the fact
that the Epicsopal Church had raised "the magnificent sum of $3,000,000" for its
pension fund for priests); Note, Church Union?, 84 THE METHODIST PROTESTANT 6
(1914) (referring to the "impudence" of Anglican claims regarding the "historic
episcopate").
59s Editorial Comments on Current Events, 3 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 719
(1915). See also Note, Men and Things, 3 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 1058 (1915)
(commenting favorably on an article in an Episcopalian journal that sharply criticized
the lack of significant Episcopalian participation in the prohibition movement, finding
his fellow Episcopalians guilty of "inactivity and ... persistent disinclination to face
the issue fairly and squarely"); Robert Stuart MacArthur, This and That, 3 THE
WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 1481 (1915) (rejecting the claim of apostolic succession [and
thus the claim for an episcopate] as "essentially absurd and self-contradictory," and
ridiculing the Anglican position stating that "[tihe Anglican prelatist smiles at
Protestants outside the Anglican Church, and the Romanist regards with contempt the
Anglican mimicry of the Roman Church").
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awake to the fact that the High Church party is leading the
whole Church to Rome. 599 They mocked an Episcopal bishop's
claim that the Episcopal Church was "the authoritative teacher
of religious faith" and found it "equally laughable to note how
well 'Billy' [Sunday] gets on without the Episcopalians."600 One
editorial, proving that old wounds can fester for a very long
time, reached back into the sixteenth century and pointed out
that Anglo-Protestant reformers, Cranmer, Ridley, and
Latimer were willing to burn Baptists at the stake.601 "Does it
not look like poetical justice for these three persecutors to have
been bound to the stake themselves?"602
The Methodists made many of the same points that the
Baptists had. On the question of church unity, the Methodists
objected to the demand of the Episcopal Church that
evangelical Protestants "surrender . .. everything to the soap
bubble of an 'historic episcopate."'603 One commentator
continued with the categorical claim that:
[I]t is impossible to show that an apostolic episcopate succession was
in existence the first three hundred years, or that the Roman
Catholic hierarchy with its importation of heathen rites and church
officials represents Bible Christianity at all. The impudence of the
Anglican proposition is on a parallel with the oft-repeated but
utterly untenable assertion that there is a historic episcopate. 60 4
The Methodists, like the Baptists, objected to the refusal
of the Episcopal Church to take "a strong stand against the
liquor traffic" and found particularly objectionable the attacks
leveled against Drys by some Episcopalian priests.605 They
599 Note, Episcopalians and Church Union, 3 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 1631
(1915). See also Note, Baptist or Roman Catholic, 4 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 326-27
(1916) (inter alia accusing Anglicans of aping Catholics on the question of baptismal
regeneration, that is whether baptism has objective sacramental force or power, which
Catholics and Anglicans believe, or is only the occasion for the one baptized to confess
Jesus before men, which Baptists believe); Note, 5 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 388
(1917) (claiming that "the Catholic party in the Church of England is ... busy sowing
seeds of discord by striving to Romanize the Established Church," and "[w]hy is it that
the Catholic parties in the Church of England and the American Episcopal Church do
not go over, bag and baggage, to the Roman Catholic Church?").
600 Note, Men and Things, 4 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 130 (1916).
601 Mayor has suggested that English dissent was influenced by the
Anabaptists. See MAYOR, supra note 100, at ix, xvi-xvii. Perhaps the "Baptists" referred
to may have been Anabaptists. But see Joseph D. Ban, Were the Earliest English
Baptists Anabaptists?, in IN THE GREAT TRADITION, supra note 113, at 91-104 (arguing
that Baptists "are rooted in the Reformed Tradition").
602 Editorial Notes and Comments, The Injustice of History, 5 THE
WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 920 (1917).
603 Note, Church Union?, 84 THE METHODIST PROTESTANT 6 (1914).
604 Id.
605 Note, Prohibition in an Episcopal Convention, 85 THE METHODIST
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examined Tractarianism, the Oxford Movement, and found it
essentially Catholic, not Protestant. 606 Congregationalists
sounded a similar, if somewhat more restrained tone:
On the one side of the natural line of cleavage which runs across
[the] life [of the Episcopal Church] it [via the High Church party]
seeks to relate itself to the Latin Church, which totally and
scornfully denies the validity of its ordinations and its sacraments.
On the other side [i.e. the Low Church party], where its whole hope
of present fellowship remains, it is kept back by its own scruples and
exclusions, to which it is held by the voice and vote of its reactionary
elements. 607
The editorial writer, of course, had aimed his fire at
Anglican medianism. Roman Catholic critics of the
Episcopalian Church attacked it from the other side,
completing a picture or portrait of medianism as a theological
stance that would please neither those standing to one side of
that Anglican self-proclaimed via media nor those standing to
the other side.
Episcopalians hit back from a medianist perspective.
The High Church party, the one most heavily invested in
medianism because Anglican medianism had an opening,
however slight, to Catholic ideas, criticized Billy Sunday,608
contrasted the "positive" Christianity of the Catholic Church
and the "negative" Christianity of evangelical Protestants,609
fatuously claimed that the Episcopal Church "officially"
sustained closer relations to the Roman Catholic Church than
to the Protestant Churches,610 contended that Pan-
Protestantism had no consequence for Episcopalians,
contrasted the "incompleteness" of Protestantism with the
wholeness of Catholicism,611 contrasted Catholic objectivity and
Protestant subjectivity,612 and criticized much then recent
Protestant writing as "too frequently ... a combination of bad
PROTESTANT 4 (1915).
606 William W. Brewton, Inevitable Result of Tractarianism, 65 METHODIST
QUARTERLY REVIEW 695 (1916).
607 Editorial, The House of Bishops and Christian Co-operation, 103 THE
CONGREGATIONALIST AND ADVANCE 584, 585 (1918).
608 Note, The Psychology of "Billy" Sunday, 52 THE LIVING CHURCH 428
(1915).
609 Editorial and Comment, Peace Among Christian Churches, 52 THE LIVING
CHURCH 607 (1915).
610 Note, Should the Church Participate?, 52 THE LIVING CHURCH 645 (1915).
611 Editorial and Comment, Church and Pan-Protestantism, 52 THE LIVING
CHURCH 515, 516 (1915).




scholarship and bad temper in fairly equal parts."613 And, as we
have seen, Episcopalians resisted the attempts in Oklahoma to
prohibit the religious use of wine.614
Catholics attacked Anglicans with particular relish. In
1896, Pope Leo III had declared Anglican orders utterly null
and void.615 If Anglican orders were bad, then Anglican bishops
could not be a part of this "historic episcopate" on which
Anglicans doted, and the Anglican sacraments, including the
Eucharist, would be invalid, even if the theology of the
sacraments of some Anglicans was transubstantiationist. One
reason for this ukase may well have been the need to challenge
the proposition that there could be two "catholic" churches in
England, thereby undermining the "catholic" claims of the
heirs of the Oxford Movement, the Anglo-Catholics.616 The
defection of John Henry Newman from Canterbury to Rome 617
was, of course, a sensation and the Catholic Church sought to
capitalize on that dramatic event. One could not say that
relations between Anglicans and Roman Catholics had ever
been good,618 but these events added some sharpness or edge to
Catholic criticism of Anglicans. However, Catholic attacks, in
an ironic way, may have strengthened the position of
Episcopalians vis-A-vis evangelical Protestants. Much of the
evangelical Protestant criticism of Anglo-Catholics, of the High
Church party, sought to distinguish between that party and the
Episcopalian Church more generally. Put differently, whatever
ill feelings they may have had towards the Catholic-minded
High Churchmen, evangelical Protestants still felt some
kindred loyalty or attachment to Anglican evangelicals or Low
Churchmen with whom they shared, after all, similar views of
613 Editorial and Comment, Protestant Churchmanship Defined, 54 THE
LIVING CHURCH 595 (1916).
614 See supra Part III.C.3.
615 See Leo XIII, Apostolicce Curce (1896).
616 See GEORGE H. TAVARD, A REVIEW OF ANGLICAN ORDERS: THE PROBLEM
AND THE SOLUTION 95-97, 134 (1990).
617 See VINCENT FERRER BLEHL, S.J., PILGRIM JOURNEY: JOHN HENRY
NEWMAN 1801-1845, at 317-403 (2001) (describing in great detail the spiritual journey
that led Newman to Rome); DONALD, supra note 484, at 1-73 (discussing Newman's
conversion to Roman Catholicism). Newman had, however, an enormous impact on
Anglicanism as well, because of his role in the Tractarian Movement before his
conversion to Roman Catholicism. See DONALD, supra note 484, at 1-2 (quoting The
Guardian on the death of Newman in 1890 as saying that Newman "was the founder
we may almost say of the Church of England as we see it" because "Newman was the
living soul and inspiring genius [of the Tractarian Movement]," and that "[wihatever
solid success the high Church party have obtained since Cardinal Newman's departure
has been due to their fidelity to his method and spirit").
618 See Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 23 passim.
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the Eucharist.619 Evangelical Protestants, therefore, could not
completely abandon and disown the Episcopal Church as could
a non-Protestant denomination.
Roman Catholic criticism went to the heart of the
matter, rejecting Anglican medianism, and flaying its lack of
doctrinal unity, characterizing it instead as a "House of
Babel.620 Several writers flatly denied Anglican catholicity.
The Episcopal Church was Protestant because "it is a protest
against the Catholic Church .... [It] practically teaches the
right of every individual to his own private judgment;621 "it
was effectually isolated from the rest of Christendom,"' 622 and
"is no part of the one, holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church of
Christ. 623 James Thomas Coffey summarized much of the
Roman Catholic critique of Anglicanism:
It is hard, indeed, for any educated, sensible person to keep track of
the ecclesiastical gymnastics of this hybrid religious body; Protestant
in name and origin and profession, it wishes to be Catholic; anti-
Roman from its inception, it purports to be a branch of the great
Church of the Apostles; without a priesthood and a sacrifice, it
brazenly claims sacerdotal rites and functions, and maintains barren
altars. 624 . .. It adopts prayers and hymns recognizing the Real
Presence of Jesus Christ in the Sacrament of Holy Communion, and
refuses to have the Sacrament conserved on its altars for the
consolation of its communicants and the comfort of the sick and
dying. 625
He concluded that "[i]f common sense and reason are to
prevail, there must be a radical split in the Protestant
Episcopal Church of America, or else the imitators of Rome
must continue to come over to the true Fold."626 Consistent with
the arguable reasons for the Roman Catholic denunciation of
Anglican orders, many Catholic critics, in addition to Coffey,
619 See supra notes 489-92 and accompanying text.
620 What is an Episcopalian?, 15 AMERICA 451 (1916).
621 With Our Readers, 97 CATHOLIC WORLD 280 (1913).
622 Samuel F. Darwin Fox, The Episcopal Church and Catholic Claims, 102
THE CATHOLIC WORLD 289, 292 (1915).
623 Id. at 306.
624 By this, the writer meant that he believed that the Body and Blood of
Christ were not Really Present on Anglican altars.
625 James Thomas Coffey, The Protestant Episcopal General Convention in St.
Louis, 104 THE CATHOLIC WORLD 385, 386 (1916). See also, Michael Andrew Chapman,
Resemblance of the Anglican Communion Service to the Catholic Mass, 109 THE
CATHOLIC WORLD 774, 782 (1919) (challenging the claimed resemblance of the Anglican
Communion Service to the Catholic Mass, noting that "the specious resemblance ... as
amended and elaborated by High Churchmen, to the Catholic Mass .... is the chief
obstacle to conversions from among these separated brethren").
626 Coffey, supra note 625, at 387.
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sought to encourage Anglican High Churchmen to come over to
Rome, although they used rather different rhetorical
approaches.627
Two rather remarkable colloquies capture the heart and
soul of the criticisms leveled against Episcopalians by both
evangelical Protestants and Roman Catholics. One involves a
nasty dust-up between Episcopalians and Congregationalists
over the idea of "union" chaplaincies. The exigencies of the
Great War led the Congregationalists to propose to the
Episcopal Church's House of Bishops that Episcopalian
chaplains receive a joint consecration and authorization from
both the Episcopal Church and evangelical Protestant churches
to administer the Eucharist to Protestant soldiers on the
battlefield without regard to denomination affiliation. Non-
Episcopalian chaplains, by virtue of such a joint consecration
and authorization, could similarly administer the Eucharist to
Episcopalian soldiers.628 The Episcopal Bishops flatly rejected
the proposal. The Congregationalists' first response to the
denial was to offer to have their battlefield chaplains receive "a
special Episcopal ordination for this particular ministry to
members of the Protestant Episcopal Church."629 A month
627 See, e.g., John F. Fenlon, The General Convention of the Episcopal Church,
92 THE CATHOLIC WORLD 645, 647-48, 657-58 (1911). Fellon expresses some sympathy
for the founders of the Oxford Movement, noting how they had "wonderfully aided the
Catholic revival in England" and for their heirs, noting:
None of us with Christian charity in our hearts can help a deep feeling of
sympathy in this crisis [over the possible deletion of the word 'Protestant'
from the name of the Episcopal Church] for loyal High Church clergymen,
despite their too frequent expression of harshness towards us [as tiheir
situation is certainly a hard one [because t]hey cherish most dearly the belief
that they belong to a branch of the Catholic Church; yet the Catholic Church
pronounces their orders invalid and themselves heretical, a judgment with
which the Orthodox Church expresses no dissent.
Id.; see also Philip Graty, Modernism in England, 13 AMERICA 366, 367 (1915) (noting
that some think that the High Church party is the only hope for the Church of
England, but concluding that that party cannot save the Church because it "lacks a
living authority and has no lasting principle of unity and cohesion; it may divide at any
moment, and even now there are not wanting signs that the insidious spirit of
Modernism is not altogether idle in its ranks'); Woods, More Anglican
Misrepresentations, supra note 597, at 173-74 (harshly criticizing Anglicans for
claiming that Roman Catholics "followed" Anglican precedents regarding the handling
of the Eucharist on the battlefield, and concluding that if Anglican journals make such
statements "in good faith, one must conclude that the Anglican mind is singularly
dense; if in bad faith, it is clear that High Church Anglicanism must be on its
deathbed, since such means are used to keep a spark of life in it").
628 Newman Smith & Williston Walker, Letter, Reply to the Answer of the
House of Bishops, 59 THE LIVING CHURCH 52 (1918).
629 Editorial, Will Our Episcopalian Brethren Respond?, 103 THE
CONGREGATIONALIST AND ADVANCE 456, 457 (1918).
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later, they revisited the question, accusing the Episcopal
Bishops of being
afraid of adventure in this hour of need. Their precedents have
become inhibitions. Their own idea of witness is incompatible with
any acknowledgement whatever of the right of the living Church to
choose and empower its ministers to offer the ministry of the
Sacrament of the Lord's Supper to those who are in need. 630
Yet again, another editorial appeared shortly thereafter,
revealing more insight into the problem: the difficulty was, at
least for The Living Church, a High Church Episcopalian
journal, that Congregationalists ordained by Episcopalian
bishops could not work together with Episcopalian priests
because the former understood the ordination differently than
the latter did. However, as the editorialist correctly pointed
out, not all Episcopalians agree on the effect and meaning of
ordination to the priesthood. 631
The Congregationalists addressed the matter one more
time. They expressed their regret and appealed to "wider
minded brethren.632 The editorial writer noted that the
Episcopalian rejection of the union chaplaincy proposal would
only serve to:
[C]onfirm the present opinion of many American Christians, natural,
though prejudiced, that the Protestant Episcopal Church is perhaps
the most self-centered, and therefore sectarian of all our American
Christian communions. The effect of its attempt to hold the middle
ground apparently is to cut off relations with Christians seeking the
reunion of the whole Catholic body of believers on the right hand and
on the left. 633
In fairness to Episcopalians, the original proposal was
too clever by half. It asked Episcopalians to adopt an
ecclesiology which would undermine their medianist stance.
Those bishops who thought that being a bishop meant more
than just being some sort of bureaucrat or administrator, the
630 Editorial, supra note 607, at 584.
631 Editorial, The House of Bishops and Protestant Episcopal Opinion, 103 THE
CONGREGATIONALIST AND ADVANCE 680, 681 (1918). For a discussion of the difference
between High Church and Low Church views of priestly ordination, see CHORLEY,
supra note 48, at 73-75 (noting that Evangelicals denied "the 'doctrine of a sacrificing,
mediating, vicarious priesthood for the remission of sins' with its grievous perversion
[in the view of Evangelicals] of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, and its more
grievous denial of the free access of every penitent soul, directly, to the sacrifice and
intercession of Christ").
632 Editorial, The Episcopal Refusal, THE CONGREGATIONALIST AND ADVANCE
135, 135-36 (1918).
633 Id. at 136.
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High Churchmen, persuaded their brother bishops who did not,
the evangelicals, liberals, and Low Churchmen generally, 634
that World War I and the needs of the soldiers on the
battlefields were not the occasion to risk a rupture of the
Episcopalian Church. The proposal, then, has to be fairly
understood as an attack on medianism, whether intended as
such or not. The fact that some Episcopalians had little to no
use for medianism did not matter. Episcopalian unity did.635
But apart from the merits of the proposal, it illuminated the
fundamental tension between Episcopalians and evangelical
Protestants.
The other revealing colloquy involved a debate between
an Anglo-Catholic, Jared S. Moore, and various Roman
Catholic interlocutors over Moore's claim that he shared, with
Roman Catholics, for want of a better phrase, a "common
Catholicism."636 The essence of the debate for present purposes
was whether a "catholic" could be a medianist. Obviously
Moore thought so, and his interlocutors thought not. Moore
insisted that he could be "catholic" in a church which had some
members who were distinctly Protestant in outlook and
orientation, because the Episcopal Church possessed a "true
Catholic character" nonetheless.637 The Roman Catholic
response was pointed and direct: the "catholic" church can only
teach truth, and it must expel error. 638 While commending
Anglo-Catholics for holding certain Catholic doctrines and thus
making them "nearer to Christ than are the members of certain
other sects," they still remained outside the Fold; "in the
essential act of heresy they are as far away as the rest. For
they, no less than the others choose from among Christ's
6 See CHORLEY, supra note 48, at 68, 187 (quoting an Episcopal journal that
"contrast[ed] the High and Low Church views on Episcopacy . . . [tihe former
regardin[g] it as of direct divine appointment, essential to the existence of the Church"
but '[b]y the other view Episcopacy is simply an apostolic ordinance, shown by
Scripture and ancient authors to have existed from the beginnings of the Church, but is
not made indispensable to Christian faith, and hence though essential to the Church's
perfection, is not essential to its validity"' and also stating that "Evangelicals accepted
the three orders in the ministry [i.e. bishops, priests and deacons], without impugning
the validity of other ministries and sacraments... [but n]ot so the high Churchmen").
635 Recall that Episcopalians had been through difficult times in the
nineteenth century keeping their own house in order. See supra notes 479-87 and
accompanying text. Now was not the time to allow outsiders to roil the troubled waters.
636 See Jared S. Moore, Letter, The Sincerity of Anglicans, 14 AMERICA 37
(1915); see also Jared S. Moore, Letter, The Anglican ' Branch" Theories, 14 AMERICA
181 (1915).
637 Moore, Sincerity, supra note 636, at 37.
&3 E.I.F., Letter, Mr. Moore and Anglican Claims, 14 AMERICA 229 (1915).
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doctrines, accepting and rejecting at their pleasure.639 The
colloquy also touched on the doctrine of Transubstantiation.
Moore made the tractarian argument that the Anglican
Articles of Religion only denied a certain extreme form of the
doctrine.640 He utterly failed to persuade George Rusk, one of
his Roman Catholic interlocutors.641 Moore replied, reiterating
his earlier arguments,6 42 but Rusk got the last word. While the
ostensible subject concerned the doctrine of
Transubstantiation, Rusk remarked that "Mr. Moore is a
thoroughly good Protestant; he, not Anglican formularies, nor
Anglican doctors, etc, may tell him what Anglicanism is; he'll
exercise his right of private judgment and believe just what
suits him .... [T]he result is a city of confusion."643
Medianism, therefore, sat at the center of the tension
between Episcopalians and evangelical Protestants and
between Episcopalians and Roman Catholics. However,
Catholic efforts to demean Anglicanism may ultimately have
had the effect, as noted above,644 of improving the image of
Episcopalians among evangelical Protestants: if the ancient
foe, the Roman Catholic Church, was attacking Episcopalians,
then Episcopalians had to be right about something, even if
they irked and annoyed evangelical Protestants. If the
Catholics were right, then Episcopalians were Protestants,
medianist, huffy, haughty, or otherwise.
And yet, both evangelical Protestants and Roman
Catholics found themselves paying homage to the cultural
hegemony of Episcopalians. Baptists noted, with envy perhaps,
that the Episcopal Church had raised "the magnificent sum of
$3,000,000" for its Pension Fund for its priests, and wondered
when "wealthy Baptists [would] begin their giving to our
Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Board?"645 Methodists
seemed drawn to the clout of Episcopalians. One Methodist
writer referred to the Episcopal Church as "a church with the
prestige, the culture and the influence," while bemoaning the
639 J. Harding Fisher, No Compromise with Heresy, 14 AMERICA 79, 80 ( 1915).
640 Jared S. Moore, Letter, The 'Articles" and the Sacraments, 14 AMERICA
108, 109 (1915).
641 George Rusk, Letter, Mr. Moore and Transubstantiation, 14 AMERICA 133
(1915).
642 Jared S. Moore, Letter, Mr. Moore and Transubstantiation, 14 AMERICA
228 (1915).
63 George Rusk, Letter, Mr. Moore and Transubstantiation, 14 AMERICA 275,
276 (1916).
644 See supra notes 600-04 and accompanying text.
645 Men and Things, 4 THE WATCHMAN-EXAMINER 1186 (1916).
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fact that "where Methodists cross over into that fold [the
Episcopal Church], they often get dangerously 'high,' and forget
their earlier training.646 A second writer described it as the
Church with "the unique advantages that a body with vast
wealth and high social standing can offer" even while accusing
the Episcopal Church of disseminating "misinformation."' 647
And a third writer observed, defensively, that evangelical
Anglicans taught the "uncultured classes of people, who were
unfitted to appreciate the High-church ordinances, . . . that
they had a right to understand God and the truths of the
Bible."648
d. Episcopalians Demanded Propitiation
Much of the materials in Subpart B of this section
tended to the proposition that Episcopalians would not lightly
accept prohibition of the religious use of wine. While the
Roman Catholics took the lead in both Arizona and Oklahoma,
there is the matter of Anglican style, a style shaped by history
and experience-medianism and first legal and then cultural
hegemony. The High Church journal, The Living Church, had
become exasperated with the liquor traffic, and concluded that
it needed to come to an end.649 Yet something in the Oklahoma
situation stiffened Anglican resolve. It might have been the
brazen bigotry of evangelical Protestants on the question that
moved Episcopalians to consider the possibility of civil
disobedience. 650
But propitiation was never far away either. Indeed,
Episcopalian anger at the situation in Oklahoma might well
have reflected the view that the evangelical Protestants in that
state had not accorded Episcopalians their accustomed due. An
editorial in The Daily Oklahoman, Sept. 13, 1917, objected to
the interpretation of the Oklahoma Bone-Dry law contended for
by the Drys: "[ijf the law is literally to be enforced it is only a
question of time when the Catholic and Episcopal churches will
be unable to conduct their beliefs and customs."651 The
Episcopal Church had not entered the fray in Oklahoma, for
646 Note, Prohibition in an Episcopal Convention, supra note 605.
647 John Alfred Faulkner, Some High Church Misinformation, 102 METHODIST
REVIEW 122, 123 (1920).
648 Brewton, supra note 606, at 696.
m9 See supra note 459 and accompanying text.
650 See supra notes 462-64 and accompanying text.
651 See DELIVER, supra note 9, at 126 (quoting the editorial) (emphasis added).
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aught that appears, when the editorial was written, but the
newspaper stood up not for Roman Catholics alone, but also
Episcopalians. The Daily Oklahoman, one notices, had nothing
to say about the religious needs of Lutherans, Eastern
Orthodox, Jews or anybody else who used wine for religious
purposes. Only Episcopalians, who had a seemingly culturally
hegemonic right to accommodation, and Roman Catholics, who
had actually taken the matter to court, earned any notice or
comment.
It would seem almost incontrovertible, therefore, that
the exemption for the religious use of wine contained in the
Volstead Act constituted the propitiation of Episcopalians.
However, the text of the amendment, in its § 6 form protected
not just the religious use of wine by Episcopalian priests but
also accommodated the religious practices of rabbis, ministers
of the gospel, and priests, whether Anglican or not.6 2 However,
the discussion in Subpart A clearly establishes that the
relations between Episcopalians and evangelical Protestants
rested on a special and unique history, captured by the logic
and structure of the Act of Toleration653 on the one hand, and
the logic and structure of Josiah Strong's critique of-and
appeal to-wealthy, elite, urban Protestants 654 on the other.
Roman Catholics had clearly been the victims of an
unremitting bias and prejudice that was at the center of the
Anglo-American Protestant Empire in the decades leading up
to National Prohibition.655 Whatever "relations" existed
between evangelical Protestants and Roman Catholics in 1919
could not be described as the same as the relations between
evangelical Protestants and Episcopalians. Eastern Orthodox
Christians, while few in numbers,656 were also the victims of
racial prejudice and intolerance.657 Lutherans were of two
minds on the question of temperance-prohibition. Lutherans of
Scandinavian ancestry largely favored it,658 whereas Lutherans
652 National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66, §6, 41 Stat. 305, 311 (Oct. 28,
1919).
653 Act of Toleration, supra note 478.
654 See supra Part IV.A.3.a.
655 See supra Part II.B.
656 See LATOURETTE, supra note 30, at 1230 (referring to the Eastern
Churches as "small minorities" in 1910). See also DEMETRIUS MAZACOUFA, THE STORY
OF THE GREEKS IN AMERICA 53 (1977) (noting that by the end of World War I, only 130
Greek Orthodox churches had been built in America).
657 See PAUL KOKEN ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE GREEKS IN THE AMERICAS, 1453-
1938, at 149-55 (1995); MAZACOUFA, supra note 656, at 44-45.
656 See, e.g., FREDERICK NORDQUIST, IS PROHIBITION JUSTIFIABLE 9 (1917)
(arguing for prohibition, so long as there is an exemption for the sacramental use of
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of German background strongly opposed it. 659 German-
American Lutherans, however, had the unenviable distinction
of being accused of disloyalty during World War I. 6 o They were
particularly vulnerable to this smear campaign 661 because
Lutherans tended to remain aloof from other Protestants.662 As
wine). One commentator on Scandinavian-American immigrant literature described
how Scandinavian Americans came to favor the Dry cause. See DOROTHY BURTON
SKARDAL, THE DIVIDED HEART: SCANDINAVIAN IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE THROUGH
LITERARY SOURCES 227-28 (1974). She captures nicely the social dimension of
Scandinavian American thought on the question of drink, revealing patterns strikingly
similar to those of white Protestant Americans generally. SkArdal wrote:
A fair number of prohibition stories by immigrant authors were laid in the
Old Country, attacking the Demon Rum in any setting; but the large
majority, tracing the calamitous effect of the American saloon on
Scandinavian drinking habits, recorded growing prohibitionist zeal within
the group. This can be traced in the attitudes of Lutheran ministers. High-
Church men, until the 1890s at least, opposed prohibition. They were against
drunkenness, of course, but argued for temperance in using all God's gifts.
During this period some more pietistic ministers joined and encouraged
teetotaler clubs only under considerable opposition from businessmen in their
congregations, who believed that saloons attracted shoppers to town. But the
moderates lost out. After the turn of the century no Scandinavian immigrant
minister could afford to be seen drinking so much as a glass of beer ....
A couple of stories referred to conflict within church groups over substituting
grape juice for wine in Communion service; the milder drink was always
adopted ....
Upper-class immigrant characters consistently advocated temperance rather
than prohibition, if they expressed any concern over the issue at all .... Both
extremes of the social scale were pictured on the whole liberal in regard to
drink. It was largely the growing middle class, especially in its rural setting,
which developed such thoroughgoing Puritanism toward drinking.
Id. See also ALTMAN K. SWIHART, LUTHER AND THE LUTHERAN CHURCH: 1483-1960, at
345 (1960) (noting that "[d]runkenness had become a national plague in Sweden during
the nineteenth century, and was equally prevalent in America among those Swedes
who worked in the lumber camps, mining towns, and in the larger cities" and that "[a]s
early as 1875 [the Swedish Lutheran Synod] denounced even moderate drinking').
659 See, e.g., DAVID W. DETJEN, THE GERMANS IN MISSOURI, 1900-1918:
PROHIBITION, NEUTRALITY AND ASSIMILATION 39-40 (1985) (noting that German-
Americans saw prohibition as an attack on their culture); ABDEL Ross WENTZ, A BASIC
HISTORY OF LUTHERANISM IN AMERICA 205 (1964) (stating that the "Swedes favored
prohibition, which the German element regarded as puritan legalism"). But see THE
LUTHERANS IN NORTH AMERICA 140 (E. Clifford Nelson ed., 1975) (arguing that
"German-speaking synods tended to avoid taking public stands ... usually because
their own membership was divided on whether or not temperance . . . [was an]
infallible indexf to a person's faith").
660 DETJEN, supra note 659, at 136-54; AHLSTROM, supra note 26, at 888
(noting that "German-Americans of almost every religious hue also became the objects
of suspicion, discrimination, and in many cases, even of violence").
661 Anti-German-American prejudice produced a United States Supreme
Court decision, fortunately in favor of German-Americans. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 390-91 (1923). It also bears noting that the Drys used the antipathy towards
German-Americans in forcing Prohibition on the United States. See DETJEN, supra
note 659, at 144.
662 See LATOURETTE, supra note 29, at 1243-44. See also RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE,
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such, it makes little sense to suppose that relations between
evangelical Protestants and German Lutherans were cordial.
Finally, we have seen that Jews were all too often ignored and
discriminated against in the formulation of exemptions for the
religious use of wine.663
It remains the stubborn fact, therefore, that there were
very good reasons for the Drys to accommodate Episcopalians,
reasons that did not extend to any other religious minority.
Similarly, it remains the stubborn fact that a decision to
accommodate other religious minorities might rest on any
number of pragmatic and strategic considerations, having
precious little, if anything, to do with religious liberty and
freedom. Such considerations will be explored more fully in
Subpart B, infra. For the nonce, there might be several ways to
explain what Congress did in crafting explicit language
regarding the beneficiaries of legislative grace. First, Congress
could have decided that if it was going to take care of
Episcopalians, it would have to take care of other religious
groups: singling out Episcopalians for special treatment,
regardless of their culturally hegemonic preferential right to
protection, might pose practical political problems and stir up
Catholics, Jews, Lutherans, and Eastern Orthodox Christians
even more than might otherwise be the case. In other words,
grant the right, but not the preference. Second, Congress might
have concluded that practical prohibition law enforcement
problems (as distinct from the larger and more general law
enforcement problems that widespread resentment of a law,
taking the form of civil disobedience and unrest might pose)
might be compounded if the law only accommodated
Episcopalians. Clergymen from other religious groups might
masquerade as Episcopalian priests or bishops in order to
obtain wine, or Episcopalian clergy might assist others in
obtaining wine for religious use no matter what the law
provided. Even if law enforcement could easily detect such
charades and evasions-narrow gauge civil disobedience,
detection and prosecution would cost money and might bog
down the prohibition law enforcement agencies and
supra note 197, at 138 (stating that "Lutherans, chiefly of Continental origin, were not
assimilated into the Protestant empire"); NOLL, supra note 26, at 216 (stating that
"Lutheranism in America remained a largely self-contained, European outsider until
the 1930s and the end of large-scale immigration from the European centers of
Lutheran strength").
663 See supra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
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institutions.664 Third, Congress might have decided that if it
were going to accommodate Episcopalians, it might as well
accommodate other religious groups in accordance with an
anti-discrimination principle. Fourth, Congress might have
decided to limit the protection of the exemption only to certain
religions, leaving those religions which could not fit within the
language of the exemption subject to the broad prohibitory rule
of the Volstead Act. And fifth, Congress might have decided
that it had to apply a broad principle of religious freedom and
liberty.
Some or all of the first four possibilities are sufficiently
plausible to warrant the conclusion that they might have
influenced the decision to accommodate the religious use of
wine by Jews, Catholics, Lutherans, and Eastern Orthodox
Christians. I shall demonstrate that the fifth possibility cannot
bear its own weight, that it lacks plausibility.665 But the first
four make suitable candidates for the background or anterior
argument that the interests of the Jewish and Christian
religious groups, including Episcopalians, that used wine for
religious purposes converged,666 even as the interests of
Episcopalians motivated the Congress to provide for an
exemption for the religious use of wine, a motivation manifestly
rooted in the central history and experience of the Protestant
Empire.
B. Pragmatic and Strategic Considerations
By 1919, American evangelical Protestants had fretted
for over eighty years that Catholics might overrun the country,
the great Protestant Empire, by sheer dint of numbers.667 The
influx of Catholics into America began in the early- to mid-
nineteenth century, largely from Ireland and Germany.668 After
the Civil War, immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe
began to arrive in the United States in large numbers, bringing
664 Indeed, law enforcement problems, both in the narrow and the broad sense
supposedly had much to do with the repeal of National Prohibition. See ENGELMANN,
supra note 237, at 188-227. But see KENNETH D. ROSE, AMERICAN WOMEN AND THE
REPEAL OF PROHIBITION 5, 137-47 (1996) (arguing that conservative Protestant women,
espousing a home protection ideology, played a decisive role in the repeal of National
Prohibition).
665 See infra Part IV.D.
666 See Bell, supra note 31.
667 See BEECHER, supra note 148.
668 See LATOURETTE, supra note 29, at 1234.
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with them non-Protestant religions. Catholics, or at least those
of Catholic heritage or background, figured prominently in the
wave of immigration that rolled across the Atlantic Ocean in
the forty years prior to the advent of National Prohibition.669
Many American cities in the Northeast and the
Midwest-or at least their centers or cores-became Catholic
enclaves of the Protestant Empire.670 While white evangelical
Protestants still constituted the large majority of Americans in
1919,671 religious minorities loomed large on the horizon.
Enough so, one supposes, that the Drys had to stop and think
long and hard about how far they wanted to push their social
reform program to dry up America, and about whether to use
National Prohibition to mount a sustained and deadly assault
on Judaism, Catholicism, Orthodoxy and liturgical
Protestantism.
Surely many Drys appreciated the fact that resistance
to their wiles from a now rather large aggregation of religious
minorities would not evaporate overnight, and that the specter
of open rebellion, particularly if fed or intensified by claims of
religious oppression, might present serious real world
problems. It did not require a belief in a broad, liberal theory of
religious freedom672 for Drys to conclude that undermining and
attacking cultures and ways of life that rejected the normative
theological dualisms that define evangelical Protestantism-
which siege or assault surely must lie at the heart of the
temperance-prohibition idea that had so captured the fancy of
American evangelical Protestants-presented enough problems
and that taking on religious practices in addition might simply
make the situation unmanageable. Tossing clergymen in jail
for using illegal wine in their religious exercises would, for
many, be an acute embarrassment-count Fletcher Dobyns
among them.673 But, of course, one has to decide what to make
of S. Prince Freeling, and others like him, who apparently were
perfectly prepared to prosecute clergy for making use of wine in
religious services.674
If the question were how many Drys would have lined
up with Dobyns and how many with Freeling, no clear answer
669 See id. at 1235, 1258.
670 See id. at 1253-54.
671 See id. at 1258.
672 A liberal theory of religious freedom would celebrate and value religious
diversity as a social and civic good.
673 See supra notes 433-39 and accompanying text.
674 See supra notes 385-89 and accompanying text.
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would emerge. It suffices, however, to suppose that Drys
divided on the question in one manner or another, and for one
reason or another. Indeed, it may make sense to read the
Arizona 675 and Oklahoma676 cases as struggles between Drys!
The fact that Catholics were the plaintiffs in the two lawsuits
does not gainsay the proposition.
Catholics lost the Arizona case, with only a stipulation
of the Arizona Attorney General lying between them and
theological disaster. Arizona Drys took it upon themselves to
ask the Arizona voters to approve a new constitutional
amendment that would accommodate the sacramental use of
wine by clergymen from churches.677 There would be no need
for stipulations from attorneys general not to prosecute
clergymen for the religious use of wine. One could say, with a
great deal of force, that Drys were merely propitiating
Episcopalians. There may, however, have been some number of
Drys who may or may not have cared much about
accommodating only Episcopalians. Nevertheless, their interest
in granting some sort of protection for the religious practices of
those who were not evangelical Protestants stemmed, not from
some liberal theory of religious liberty, but instead from a
concern for appearances and civil peace and decorum. Jews
may have been left in the lurch, since only the "sacramental"
use of wine was protected, even while clergymen from
"churches" could obtain wine for "sacramental" uses, although
a liberal construction of the word "church" could easily lead to
another result.678 However far the concern extended, it is
difficult not to conclude that concern for appearances, avoiding
the spectacle of arresting, at a minimum, Christian clergy for
using wine in their religious services had much to do with the
result in Arizona.
Oklahoma presented, inter alia, the spectacle of an
Oklahoma City newspaper editorial criticizing utraist Drys for
what the newspaper clearly saw as overreaching on their
part.6 79 De Hasque68o may have been the response of a court
interested in making sure that Drys would not become
embroiled in squabbles over how far to push religious
676 See supra notes 367-84 and accompanying text.
676 See supra notes 385-407 and accompanying text.
677 See supra notes 380-85 and accompanying text.
678 See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
679 See supra note 651 and accompanying text.
680 De Hasque v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 173 P. 73 (Okla. 1918).
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minorities,681 and seeking to recast the question in terms of
what the court believed to be the intention of the Oklahoma
constitutional convention: do not overreach.682 That the
disagreement in Oklahoma involved, as a matter of
institutional structure, the Oklahoma legislature and the
Oklahoma Supreme Court cannot mask the fact that
Protestants constituted the overwhelming majority of both
bodies. One can still see, therefore, a struggle between Drys in
Oklahoma over how far to impinge upon the religious practices
of those who were not evangelical Protestants, and a triumph
of those Drys concerned with seemliness.
The addition of the § 6 form of the Volstead Act
exemption also represents the handiwork of Drys desirous of
avoiding extreme results. The House of Representatives had
been satisfied with the protection of the "sacramental" use of
wine, as the §3 form of the exemption makes perfectly clear.
However, some number of Senators must have seen the matter
differently and wished to provide for a more explicit protection
of the religious use of wine by Jews and by non-evangelical
Protestant Christians. Some or all of the considerations
suggested at the beginning of this Subpart can explain what
the Senate did. Seemliness and appearances counted.
Political theory can also help to explain the dynamics of
the Arizona and Oklahoma cases and, most importantly, the
dynamics of the legislative process that yielded up the § 6 form
of the exemption. Moreover, it can explain the powerful appeal
of some sort of moderation on the question of the religious use
of wine. The theory ultimately rests upon the proposition that
with respect to proposed legislation, three groups matter: those
for it, those against it, and those who fall somewhere in
between:
Legislation is the product of choices made by legislators pursuing
strategic aims within the structure of legislative institutions, rules
and norms. The principle of majority rule requires that legislators
collect a majority of votes to transform their hopes into law. For most
contemporary social legislation, this democratic imperative is hard
to achieve. On important legislative issues, ardent supporters and
ardent opponents can fulfill their objectives only by collecting enough
support from moderates and undecided legislators - legislators
681 One notes, with considerable interest, that the sole Catholic member of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, Chief Justice Matthew J. Kane, did not participate in the
decision in De Hasque. See id. at 78. See also BROWN, supra note 386, at 85; DIARY OF A
FRONTIER BISHOP: THE JOURNALS OF THEOPHILE MEERSCHAERT 489 n.16 (James D.
White ed., 1994).
682 De Hasque, 173 P. at 77.
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whose support is pivotal to the final outcome. As a price of this
support, ardent supporters must typically accept compromises to
their legislative vision. 68
3
These "compromises" typically take the form of "limiting
[the] scope [of the proposed legislation]; redefining its coverage
or including exemptions."' 684
The exemption in its nineteenth century form clearly
served a majoritarian function. It applied to all Christian
religious observances, although there is great doubt as to
whether it applied to Jewish religious observances,65 or the
observances of any other non-Christian religion that used wine.
It goes without saying, of course, that the exemption did not
cover the religious use of any non-vinous alcohol. The dawn of
the twentieth century saw a different situation. Evangelical
Protestants had largely given up the religious use of wine.686
The exemption, therefore, took on an entirely new meaning,
largely serving to protect the use of wine by minority religions.
Habit and custom in the drafting of temperance-prohibition
laws cannot easily explain the continued appearance of
exemptions in twentieth century prohibition statutes. 68 7
Drys had to decide whether or not to accommodate the
practices of minority religions. Given demographic and other
trends, failure to accommodate those practices could give rise
to social disruptions, to say the least. We have seen that the
Drys were not of one mind, as the exemptions appearing in the
prohibition laws adopted in the first two decades of the
twentieth century fell into four groups, 688 and in Arizona and
Oklahoma, at least for a while, there was no exemption at all.
The question at hand concerns the two different forms of
the exemption that appear in the Volstead Act. The § 3 form,
the form contained in virtually all of the bills introduced in
Congress to implement the Eighteenth Amendment,69 followed
the nineteenth century, Group I form.690 So consideration in
683 Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its
Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1420-21 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
684 Id. at 1444.
85 See supra notes 284-96 and accompanying text.
686 See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
687 Habit and custom can explain the continued presence of the exemption as
propitiation of Episcopalians. See supra Part W.A.
688 See supra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
689 See H.R. 3458, 66th Cong. § 7 (1919); H.R. 5549, 66th Cong. § 4 (1919); S.
555, 66th Cong. § 7 (1919); S. 611, 66th Cong. § 7 (1919).
690 See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
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Congress "began" with a rather pinched view of the religions
whose practices it wished to accommodate. But the § 6 form,
introduced in the Senate, parallels the Group IV form, 691 the
most liberal of the exemption forms found in American law at
the time.
It is this journey or progression in Congress from the § 3
form to the § 6 form that positive political theory might
explain. The relevant inquiry does not involve the question of
prohibition vel non, but whether there is to be an exemption for
the religious use of wine, and, more to the point, for which
religions. Those most intent upon "purifying"-i.e. drying up-
America as quickly as possible, particularly given demographic
trends, would want as narrow an exemption as possible. Those
perhaps sharing the ultimate goals of the extreme Drys, but in
fact more concerned about the implications and the
ramifications of demographic and other realities, and the
potential for disorder and disruption, would favor a broader
exemption. The price for the support of the moderates would
be, according to this theory, the acceptance of the more liberal §
6 form.
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the Volstead
Act is remarkably opaque on the point. The text of the § 6 form
plainly established that Congress had acceded to a liberal view
of the scope of the exemption. But it makes perfect sense to
suppose that "ardent supporters" had negotiated with
"moderates" and reached a compromise. Pragmatic and
strategic considerations, therefore, plausibly explain the
exemption found in the Volstead Act. These considerations
differ from the embedded cultural and theological
considerations that shape the thesis discussed in Subpart A
that the exemption reflected the needs of Episcopalians, and
that other religions merely benefited from interest
convergence. It is possible to put these two readings together.
Taking care of Episcopalians makes the pragmatic and
strategic problems presented by other non-evangelical
Protestant religions all the more compelling. But it is also
possible to leave these two readings as alternative
understandings of the Volstead Act exemption.
691 See supra notes 355-60 and accompanying text.
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C. Attrition and the Supposed Virtues of National
Prohibition
Anglo-American evangelical Protestants have displayed
a remarkable admixture of optimism and pessimism. The
Church of England never "purified" itself to the satisfaction of
the evangelical Protestants.692 The Seventeenth Century Civil
War proved to be a disaster, and evangelicals were forced to
accept a second-class position, thanks to the Act of
Toleration.693 But America was different. Evangelical
Protestants found themselves in the majority, and by the end of
the nineteenth century, were making confident claims of
manifest destiny.694 But the conceited optimism of the Gilded
Age evangelical Protestants never completely escaped the orbit
of a deeply entrenched pessimism. Even a stalwart minion of
the Protestant Empire, Josiah Strong, could not avoid holding
his readers spellbound with stories of great and menacing
perils of various and sundry sort.695
At the same time, evangelical Protestants could not
resist the notion that conversion-Protestantization-would
come about because of, among other things, Sunday schools
and evangelical Protestant preaching.96 Experience proved
that prescription to be wrong. But naive, even silly, optimism
persisted. In Subpart B, I suggested that Drys read the
demographic and other social trend data differently.697 Some
believed that the trends were working against the interests of
the Protestant Empire and National Prohibition, thus
providing the occasion to strike a mighty blow in defense of the
Empire, even if that meant not accommodating the religious
practices of some if not all of those who were not evangelical
Protestants. Others read the data the same way, but, drew a
different conclusion from them: too much social disruption
would result if the religious practices of those who were not
evangelical Protestants were legally proscribed.
But the optimistic strain in evangelical Protestant
thought suggests another possible reading of the exemption
692 See Conrad Russell, Introduction to The Origins of the English Civil War,
in THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER: ENGLISH HISTORY, 1550-1720, at 317, 333 (John M.
Beattie & Michael G. Finlayson eds., Canadian Scholars' Press 1987) (noting that
"Puritanism was the heir of all the disappointed hopes raised by the Reformation").
693 Act of Toleration, supra note 478.
694 See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
695 See STRONG, supra note 27, passim.
696 See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
697 See supra note 688 and accompanying text.
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found in the Volstead Act. Some Drys believed that the fact of
National Prohibition would persuade those not persuaded, and
that those who were not evangelical Protestants would make
the necessary adjustments to their religious practices, if not
their beliefs as well.698 Given this view, the exemption
represents nothing more than a decision to rely on suasion,
rather than coercion! The fundamental trait or inclination of
the Anglo-American Protestant Empire to rely on suasion, even
with coercion lurking in the background,69 now comes into play
and provides the basis for a third possible reading of the
exemption. Suasion had gotten, or, depending upon one's time
perspective, suasion would get, a new lease on life, thanks to
National Prohibition. There was no need to destroy Christian
and Jewish rites that depended on the use of wine. Users of
wine would come to see that they did not need wine, and thus
would abandon it, ultimately embracing evangelical
Protestantism.
This reading also fits with the dynamic relation between
Episcopalians and evangelical Protestants. Ever since 1688, if
not earlier, evangelicals had been waiting out Anglicans, and
vice versa. The exemption becomes, in this light, merely one
more example of the deeply embedded cultural instinct of
evangelical Protestants to wait out Episcopalians. Given the
demographic realities of America in 1919, however, the
exemption also functioned as a part of the strategy to wait out
not only Episcopalians, but Jews, Lutherans, Catholics and
Orthodox Christians. The exemption, under this reading,
generated an instrumentalist view of religious freedom: those
who were not evangelical Protestants were "free," but they
would convert, and if they did not do so soon enough, the
American Protestant Empire would resort to coercion to help
the process along.
Enforcement of National Prohibition proved to be an
enormous problem. Indeed, one could say that in important
ways, National Prohibition was simply unenforceable700 and
that it was its unenforceability that probably led to its
demise.701 After the fact, as it were, one could say that the idea
that Prohibition itself would aid in the work of conversion, of
698 See supra notes 673-74 and accompanying text.
699 See Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 23, passim.
700 See PINNEY, supra note 116, at 435-36. See also THE DRY YEARS, supra
note 226, at 110; ENGELMANN, supra note 237, at 149-51, 178; FRANKLIN, supra note
123, at viii, xiii; GUSFIELD, supra note 118, at 114; MCCARTY, supra note 188, at 11.
701 BLOCKER, supra note 226, at 243.
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Protestantization, was silly and absurd. But the question here
is whether, at the time that the Volstead Act was enacted in
1919, Drys nevertheless believed that National Prohibition
would aid in the work of conversion. There is evidence that at
least some Drys so thought, and that the exemption for the
religious use of wine merely represented an aspect of a larger
strategy, reaching back to 1534, to rely on suasion, drawing on
coercion only when suasion failed in effect.
D. Celebration of Religious Diversity and Pluralism as Pro
Bono Publico
It is difficult to see how a commitment to principled
religious liberty, a theory of religious liberty that celebrates
religious diversity and pluralism as a public good, can easily
explain the Volstead Act exemption. But, no matter how anti-
Catholic the Drys might have been,702 no matter how angry the
Drys might have become when those who were not evangelical
Protestants proved to be highly resistant to the protestantizing
importuning of the Anglo-American Protestant Empire,73 no
matter that some Drys might have sought to destroy the
religious exercises of religious minorities,704 no matter that
some Drys might have wished to see religious minorities beg
routinely for judicial or administrative grace, 705 it remains
theoretically possible that the evangelical Protestant Drys-or
at least a significant number of them-had embraced a broad,
generous and principled theory of religious freedom and liberty,
and drew upon it when they decided to exempt the religious
use of wine from the reach of National Prohibition.
However, we have seen that the question whether or not
to exempt the religious use of wine was abroad in the first two
decades of the twentieth century, and caused little difficulty
and dissension.706 And yet, if such a broad and liberal principle
existed, Roman Catholics did not see it, or if they saw it,
believed that it was neither real nor meaningful.77 They
702 See supra Parts ILA, I1B, and I.C.
703 See supra Parts II.D and II.E.
704 See supra Part III.
705 See supra notes 436-41 and accompanying text.
706 See supra Part III.B.
707 One Catholic writer insisted that constitutional principles going back
before the United States Constitution protected the religious use of wine. See Kenny,
supra note 457, at 6 (declaring that "we find that unrestricted religious freedom has
been repeatedly and consistently imposed by the United States Government, as an
organic article and essential condition to admission, on all the States, generally and
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continued the fight for religious freedom and liberty in the
Catholic religious journals of the day. Fear, bravado, arrogance
and despair, not to mention, perhaps, distrust, do not paranoia
make. There had to be something that kept Roman Catholics
on edge. And this must have been true even though religious
freedom ultimately won out in Arizona, Oklahoma,708 and
elsewhere where providing for the religious use of wine had
troubled the waters.7 09 And yet, it may well be the case that
most American evangelical Protestants believed in a principled
religious freedom and liberty for religious minorities even
though the bluster and fulminations of the ultraist Drys kept
Catholics off balance.
So the matter appears to be unresolved. However, other
considerations may tip the scales in one direction or the other.
The question presents itself as to whether, anterior to any
lawmaking process, American evangelical Protestants had
developed a principled theory of religious freedom celebrating
religious diversity and pluralism either on their own motion, so
to speak, or as a result of the struggle of religious minorities for
religious liberty.
1. The Possibilities of a Principled American
Evangelical Protestant Theory of Religious Freedom
Celebrating Religious Diversity and Pluralism
Sidney Mead insisted in 1963 that "[t]he major piece of
the [American evangelical Protestant] churches' unfinished
intellectual business ... is religious freedom.710 This position,
if correct, strongly counsels against the conclusion that the
Volstead Act exemption reflects fidelity to a principle of
severally, formed since 1790 . . . [and w]ho will contend that the Congress of Thirteen
States ... exempted themselves from the law" and that the First Amendment was not
intended as a prohibition on Congress since most of the original thirteen states had
enacted religious freedom).
708 The Arizona victory arguably turned on a claim of what the law required,
perhaps a broad principle of religious freedom. See supra notes 380-83 and
accompanying text. One must note, however, that the decision in favor of the State of
Arizona apparently did not rest on any such principle. The Oklahoma victory in De
Hasque was based on the Oklahoma court's "construction" of the mind of the Oklahoma
constitutional convention, although the court did note that the Oklahoma constitution
in fact contained a religious freedom clause. See supra notes 401-02 and accompanying
text.
709 The question surfaced in Kansas in 1917. While the Women's Christian
Temperance Union took no stance on the "controversial proposal that communion wine
be exempted," the bill as enacted did exempt communion wine. BADER, supra note 121,
at 186.
710 See MEAD, supra note 270, at 55.
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religious freedom, if that principle does not exist either at all or
in any coherent recognizable and generally accepted form.
William G. McLoughlin offered one reason why the
business of religious freedom remained unfinished:
Between 1730 and 1830 Americans moved 180 degrees from a
patriarchal to an egalitarian view of politics .... They did not,
however, reject the European belief that loyalty to the state required
loyalty to the religion of the sovereign of the nation. Sovereignty in
British North America [in 1730] rested in the king as God's vice-
regent on earth; sovereignty in the United States of America in 1830
rested in 'the people,' or at least in the majority of them. 711
This renversement came to pass because by 1830
"romantic ideology, romantic nationalism, and romantic
Christianity gradually gained power [and] the will of the nation
came to rests in precisely the same place as the spirit of God,
namely, in the people."'712 On the point of the meaning of
religious liberty that resulted, McLoughlin noted:
Under the epistemology of romanticism, external checks upon the
people seemed unnecessary .... Thus the voice of the people became
the voice of God and of the nation. From this there could be only
limited dissent, mere tolerance, not true religious liberty. The new
nation, as de Tocqueville saw, substituted one form of tyranny for
another ... 713
His conclusion, worth pondering, is that ever since then
"we have been testing the limits of religious liberty under
popular sovereignty." 714
Robert T. Handy reached largely the same conclusion:
when evangelical Protestants "worked with other evangelicals
on the basis of common ideas about a Christian civilization,
they were more ready to limit freedom of the opposition."'715
Most importantly, "[t]he great devotion to religious freedom
showed its limitation when the hope for a Protestant America
seemed in jeopardy,716 and the Protestant Empire was under a
great deal of stress in 1919 if only because of the persistent
resistance of non-evangelical Protestants to Protestantization.
Mead, McLoughlin, and Handy have, of course, merely
described the interior logic of the Protestant Empire. If the goal
711 McLoughlin, supra note 196, at 174.
712 Id. at 175.
713 Id.
714 Id. at 190.
715 HANDY, supra note 26, at 58.
716 Id. at 59.
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of the Protestant Empire is conversion to evangelical
Protestantism, 717 then any idea or theory of religious freedom
would have to be entirely strategic or tactical, a reflection of
the complex dynamic of suasion and coercion. Religious
freedom means merely the privilege to practice one's religion
until conversion to evangelical Protestantism shall take place.
And that freedom might or might not include the right to resist
conversion but only for so long.
Mead, therefore, was spectacularly wrong, at least in
part: the intellectual business of religious freedom was
finished, and finished a long time ago as the Anglo-American
Protestant Empire took shape-religious freedom was an
instrumental concept, designed to accomplish the overarching
goal of Protestantization in a religious polity disinclined to
resort solely to brute force. Not even the incorporation of the
Religion Clauses via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment changes that fact. Incorporation merely entailed a
shift in the dynamic of suasion and coercion in response to the
felt political and national security needs of the time.718
McLoughlin and Handy, having seemingly accepted the
stubborn reality of the Protestant Empire, were far closer to
the truth.
One could lay all of the foregoing to rest if there were
some credible evidence that Drys, or at least many of them,
nonetheless believed in a broad principled doctrine of religious
freedom and liberty. No such evidence, however, exists. The
pious preachments of the Anti-Saloon League 719 do not make
the case for reading the exemption as stating such a principle.
The legislative history of the Volstead Act is silent on the point.
Indeed, in light of the horrid doctrine that sprang forth from
the Court in Smith,720 one would be hard-pressed to argue that
the Court, at least, has finished the intellectual business of
religious freedom even today, much less in 1919. Congress did
respond to Smith, of course, with the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act,721 which sought to establish a sounder free
exercise doctrine, one that offers religious minorities more
protection from the whims of the majority than the doctrine in
Smith does. However, the Court gutted that law in City of
717 See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
718 See Newsom, Protestant Empire, supra note 23, at 259-63.
719 See supra note 430 and accompanying text.
720 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
721 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
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Boerne v. Flores,722 taking an overly broad view of Marbury v.
Madison723 along the way.
2. A Liberal Conception of Religious Freedom and the
Struggle of Religious Minorities
The failure of evangelical Protestants to develop a broad
and liberal theory of religious freedom does not settle the
question. It is possible that other Americans might have done
so, and might have persuaded or compelled the majority to act
in accordance with that principle. What seems clear is that
religious minorities have struggled mightily throughout our
national experience to find acceptance as Americans without
having to become evangelical Protestants.724 The story of the
struggle against common school religion has been told.725 By
1919, however, the case law stood largely against, not for, the
claim of Catholics, Jews, Free-Thinkers and others, that their
children should be able to attend public schools without being
forced to hear, participate in, or to opt out of the reading of
King James Version, a Protestant version, of the Bible or the
saying of an evangelical Protestant prayer. 726 A minority of
judges had, however, given support to the claims of the
religious minorities, and did so largely in terms that reflect or
mirror a theory of religious freedom, be it principled, strategic,
or both.727 The struggle had, in other words, yielded up a
response, albeit a minority or dissenting response. But it was
impossible to find a widely-held, broad, liberal, American
conception of religious freedom that celebrated religious
difference, at least in the context of the common schools.
With regard to accommodating the religious use of wine,
the situation stands differently. While common schools and
houses of worship had much in common as critical participants
in the formation and development of children, one saw far more
determination to use the common schools to protestantize
American school children than determination to interfere with
the religious use of wine by those who were not evangelical
Protestants. The overzealousness that one saw in 1917
722 Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507-09 (1997).
723 See generally Marbury, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
724 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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Oklahoma728 appears to be the exception rather than the rule
when it came to what material substances could or could not be
used in the houses of worship, or even the private homes, of
those who were not evangelical Protestants. Perhaps because
evangelical Protestants had themselves just recently come to
the decision to use grape juice instead of wine in their
communion services,129 and perhaps because the law had just
recently stripped beverage alcohol of its protection as an article
of interstate commerce, and thus its immunity from state
prohibition laws when alcohol was in interstate commerce, 730
religious minorities had struggled but for only so long to
protect their religious use of wine from the reach of prohibition
laws. Perhaps there was simply not enough time to teach
evangelical Protestants a lesson in religious freedom. But
Oklahoma and Arizona must mean something. They taught
something about the subject of religious freedom.
However, the review of the state statutes undertaken
above731 shows a decidedly mixed response to the free exercise
claims of Jews. Catholics and other liturgical Christians may
have been protected by virtually all of the laws,732 but
Sweene7 33 may well have represented the attitude of a
substantial number of people in the early twentieth century
with regard to Jewish religious practices. No broad and liberal
theory of religious freedom can emerge from a setting or
context in which the religious claims of Jews are treated with
such disrespect, notwithstanding the fact of struggle by
religious minorities to gain acceptance in America.
The struggle of religious minorities is worthwhile,
however, because a theory of religious freedom invariably flows
from it-whether liberal and broad or not. 3 However, one
cannot easily say that the struggle of religious minorities to
protect the religious use of wine yielded up a coherent,
generous, and liberal principle of religious freedom celebrating
728 See supra notes 420-23 and accompanying text.
729 See supra Part II.A.4.
730 See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
731 See supra Part III.B.l.b.
732 There surely is some question whether a law exempting the religious use of
wine for the commemoration of the Lord's Supper reaches the Catholic Mass. See supra
notes 284-91 and accompanying text.
733 Sweeney v. Webb, 76 S.W. 766, 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
734 The great intellectual dilemma of freedom flowing from the struggle of
minorities is that the principle that emerges may only protect the minorities engaged
in the struggle, leaving out or ignoring the struggles of other minorities. Consider
Scalia's execrable opinion in Smith. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 874
(1989). One is reminded of the old saw "I'm aboard, Jack, pull up the rope!"
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the virtues of religious pluralism and diversity which the
majority felt bound to accept, and which it did accept in carving
out the exemption in the Volstead Act. The struggle of religious
minorities for religious freedom may have merely produced a
strategic or pragmatic response, rather than an intellectual or
ideological acceptance of the premise on which the struggle
rested.
Most importantly, any analysis of the Volstead Act seen
through the lens of any supposed theory of religious freedom
that resulted from the struggle of religious minorities must
take into account the role of Episcopalians. The interests of
Episcopalians, who may or may not easily fit the description of
"religious minority," may well have controlled the question, as I
have suggested earlier.735 It becomes difficult, if not impossible,
to determine whether religious minorities, excluding
Episcopalians, generated a liberal theory of religious freedom
that the Congress adopted when it passed the Volstead Act. If
one includes Episcopalians in the equation, then the social
dynamics and mapping of Episcopalians must be taken into
account as there is a real possibility that the interests of
Episcopalians mattered greatly, if not decisively, in shaping the
Volstead Act. Precious little justification exists for a reading of
the exemption as based on a broad and liberal principle of
religious freedom, whether one looks at the question from the
point of view of evangelical Protestant doctrine or theory or
evangelical Protestant response to the claims of religious
minorities.
V. CONCLUSION
Context and setting trump text. This is the intellectual
conclusion that seems inescapable. As exemptions for the
religious use of wine go, the § 6 form of the exemption found in
the Volstead Act represents a significant achievement, advance
and improvement over the exemptions found in many other
state and federal statutes. Something caused the United States
Senate to think about the religious use of wine and to propose
language that specifically protected non-Protestant Christians
and Jews. Many state and federal statutes arguably only
protected Christian religious uses of wine,736 and a few state
statutes arguably only protected evangelical Protestant
735 See supra Part IV.A.
736 See supra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
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religious uses of wine. 71 As a matter of formalist thought, one
might well conclude that the § 6 form represented a broad,
generous, and liberal conception of religious freedom.
Furthermore, a formalist interpretation of the
exemption arguably finds some support in the context. For
openers, National Prohibition represents one of the great
American blunders. This vaunted Protestant Empire social
reform fell on its own sword in 1933,738 after only 13 years. The
attempts of contemporary commentators to rehabilitate the
temperance-prohibition idea flounder on the shoals of the
Anglo-American Protestant Empire.739 Whatever virtue may
have existed in the temperance-prohibition idea was seemingly
apparent only to the white evangelical Protestants who
promoted it. Others knew better. We are well rid of National
Prohibition. Problems of alcoholism call for regulation and
treatment, not mindless and unenforceable prohibition.740
Second, as a matter of theology, there was no basis for granting
an exemption. If the Drys were right about alcohol, given their
dualistic, Manichaean view of the world, a view deeply
embedded in normative evangelical Protestant Eucharistic
737 See supra notes 281-88 and accompanying text.
738 The Twenty-First Amendment, entitled the National Prohibition
Amendment, repealed the Eighteenth Amendment and reads as follows:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified
as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the
several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven
years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the
Congress.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
739 See, e.g., THE DRY YEARS, supra note 226, at 6-7 (arguing against the thesis
that Prohibition reflected a "stern and repressive paranoia, a driving intolerance of
individual differences and sacred personal freedoms" by suggesting instead that such a
view ignored "Puritan morality .... the terrors of nineteenth century drunkenness and
debauchery, and . . . the progress in solidly scientific revelations-many of them
discretely concealed since repeal-about the impact of alcohol on the human organism
and the modern American" but betraying a bias in favor of middle class white
evangelical Protestants by treating their fears as if they were or should have been the
fears of all Americans); TIMBERLAKE, supra note 9, at 1-3 (like Clark, treating
Progressivism, which he conceded was a white middle-class Protestant phenomenon, as
if it were normatively American).
740 See, e.g., PETER ANDERSON, ALCOHOL AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 2 (1996)
(stating that "[p]rimary health care is seen as an important setting for identifying
individuals at risk from heavy drinking and helping them to reduce consumption").
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theology, 74 then one cannot make a case for an exemption for
the religious use of wine. Liquor is liquor, it is malum in se,
and it matters not when one drinks it or for what purpose.
Accommodations undermine the logic of the evangelical
Protestant theological nomos. 742
Given the foregoing, one could argue that the § 6 form
must represent a broad and liberal theory of religious freedom
precisely because it speaks in spite of monolithic support that
evangelical Protestants gave National Prohibition. The
exemption, one might argue, surmounted the deeply held views
of those who gave it birth, and therefore must have reflected a
broad and liberal conception of religious liberty. But such a
conclusion is untenable: the question still remains why Drys
might wish to accommodate and propitiate religious minorities.
Rising above the religious bigotry of the Protestant Empire, as
the § 6 form surely does, does not mean that religious diversity
had become a social good in the Protestant Empire of 1919.
There might have been, and indeed there were, less exalted
reasons.
Accommodate and propitiate the Drys did. But there is
every reason to believe that they did so because accommodation
and propitiation served a useful purpose for the Protestant
Empire: they kept Episcopalians in the Protestant fold. The
Protestant middle and upper classes came to know, if they had
not already known it, that they needed each other if they were
to have any chance of keeping the laboring classes under
"control." After all, Josiah Strong had spelled it all out a
generation earlier743
But the § 6 form of the exemption, of course, does far
more than merely accommodate and propitiate Episcopalians.
It explicitly protects liturgical Christians, Protestant, Catholic
and Orthodox, and also protects the religious practices of Jews.
Many states, and indeed, the federal government, had
demonstrated an unfortunate inclination to protect only the
"sacramental" use of wine.744 If one takes Sweeney v. Webb 745
seriously, such a limitation left Jews unprotected. Some states
71 See supra Part II.A.2.a.
742 Congress also exempted sweet cider from the reach of the law, see Volstead
Act, tit. II, § 4(f), 41 Stat. 309 (1919), and permitted those capable of laying by large
provisions of beverage alcohol-the wealthy-to keep the same, see id. at § 33, 41 Stat.
317 (1919).
743 See supra Part IV.A.I.a.
744 See supra notes 316, 361-66 and accompanying text.
745 76 S.W. 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
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even managed to limit the exemption to Protestant religious
uses only,746 leaving Catholic usages of wine unprotected.
Congress, to its credit, had something in mind when it
explicitly protected the religious practices of Catholics and
Jews. Some kind of religious freedom was clearly at stake.
Perhaps the problem implicates scale. It might be one
thing for a state, or even some number of states, to take a
niggardly view of the scope or application of the exemption, but
it might be quite another thing for the United States to do the
same. Backwards states could be persuaded, perhaps, to
change their laws, or the interpretation of their laws, to
conform to a more enlightened, i.e., broader, exemption for the
religious use of wine. In a sense, this would be nothing more
than federalism at work. But if the United States took a
pinched view of the exemption, to whom could those offended
by that view seek recourse? Such a view would, in effect,
eliminate any safety valve. Thus for National Prohibition to
save Episcopalians while destroying other minority religions
might well lead to disorder, unrest, resistance, and worse
somewhere in the United States. 747 It is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the exemption took the form and shape that it
did for largely pragmatic and tactical reasons. The problem
with resting the exemption on some broad and liberal theory of
religious freedom, its formalist or textualist liberality
notwithstanding, is that the Protestant Empire had no such
theory.
In the end, it was the very logic and character of the
Protestant Empire that explained the decision to explicitly
76 See supra notes 285-91 and accompanying text.
747 It may well be that there is an international dimension or aspect to the § 6
form of the exemption for the religious use of wine. Having fought in the First World
War, the United States found itself, strangely perhaps, given its silly notions of
Manifest Destiny, see supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text, connected with the
wider world in ways that it had not been before. It could not cavalierly dismiss the
religious interests of Catholics and Jews without doing great damage to its national
interests in the world at large. Perhaps, therefore, the Senate had the great good sense
to understand this when it inserted the § 6 form of the exemption into the Volstead Act,
and Congress, as a whole, had the great good sense to agree. The connection between
the concession of minority rights in shaping American domestic law and international
relations has been noted before. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War
Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 66 (1988). The thesis of this paper does not turn on
this hypothesis, there being enough in the domestic history of the United States to give
the exemption found in the Volstead Act meaning. However, one cannot gainsay the
possibility that there was indeed an international dimension to the problem. The fuller
implications of this possibility lie beyond the scope of this paper. The full dimensions of
early twentieth century international relations on American domestic law, particularly
National Prohibition, await the ministrations of others.
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accommodate the religious use of wine by those who were not
evangelical Protestants. Everything came down to the
characteristic tendency or inclination of Anglo-American
Empires to moderate coercion with suasion, to wait out those
who were not yet evangelical Protestants because, with a little
help from suasion and, if necessary, coercion, they would die
off, come around, or both. In the end, so the minions of the
Protestant Empire believed, evangelical Protestantism would
triumph and reign supreme. One finds some kind of religious
liberty here, but not one that values religious diversity as a
social good.
Justice Blackmun only scratched the surface of the
enormously complex and difficult problem of social and
religious dynamics in the Protestant Empire. The Catholic
Mass is the "obvious" beneficiary of the exemption, given the
culturally embedded anti-Catholicism of the Anglo-American
Protestant Empire. But had he paid any attention to the § 6
form of the Volstead Act exemption, Justice Blackmun would
have discovered that the exemption in substance, power, and
effect was far more revealing about the meaning, nature,
purpose, and function of the exemption, about who we are as a
nation, and, most importantly, that the exemption was not
"about" the Catholic Mass. The exemption was "about" a
problem that evangelical Protestants found facing them which
demanded a pragmatic solution, one which comported with the
characteristic trait of Protestant Empires to rely on an
admixture of suasion and coercion. I doubt that he would have
persuaded the majority to look at the question before the Court
in Smith748 sensibly and intelligently, had he explored the true
dimensions of the problem that the exemption was meant to
solve, but he surely could have made the majority look even
sillier and more mean-spirited and bigoted than he managed to
do. Justice Scalia's insensitive referral of religious minorities to
the legislative process is even less defensible than it might
otherwise appear to be because Roman Catholics did not save
the Mass from the clutches of National Prohibition, their
valiant struggles notwithstanding. For aught that one can tell,
Episcopalians, the quintessential elite and privileged minority,
if there ever was one, and if not them, then evangelical
Protestants, composing their differences over strategy and
tactics of Protestantization, did!
748 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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SOME KIND OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The exemption in the Volstead Act for the religious use
of wine indeed represented "some kind of religious freedom." It
may have been a generous form of religious freedom, it may
have reflected a broader theory of religious freedom than many
of the states were prepared to grant. It may even have been,
implausibly, a principled, liberal, religious freedom to a degree.
But it was surely a religious freedom that satisfied and
responded to the needs of Protestants. The only real question
is which Protestants. One reading, the most plausible one,
suggests that the theory of religious freedom embedded in the
exemption rested on the need to propitiate Episcopalians.
Other plausible readings suggest that that the intra-Protestant
dynamic was perhaps more subtle and complicated, that
evangelical Protestants, the backbone of the drive towards
National Prohibition, concluded, albeit reluctantly, that a
relatively broad exemption best served their interests in
"purifying" those who were not yet evangelical Protestants. But
in any event, one sees the workings of the Protestant Empire
here, whether one focuses on Episcopalians or on the strategies
and sensibilities of evangelical Protestants. The appalling
dishonesty of the majority opinion in Smith grows even deeper
and broader, fouling everything that it touches.
Since the goal of the Protestant Empire continues to be
the Protestantization of the people subject to its reach or
jurisdiction, one cannot read the exemption as a statement of a
broad and liberal theory of religious freedom that celebrates
the social value of religious diversity and pluralism. Perhaps
the six Justices comprising the majority in Smith understood
all of this. But their arrogant, petty triumphalist approach in
Smith suggests that they failed to appreciate the stakes.
Perhaps the six simply did not care. Perhaps they, along
with the three dissenters, simply had not adequately explored
or pondered the questions posed by the exemption in the
Volstead Act, and thus could not fully appreciate the stakes. If
this is in fact the case, we are left to consider whether the
Court has demonstrated the institutional competence
necessary to decide questions which are rooted in what I have
described above as "an enormously complex and difficult
problem of social and religious dynamics. 749 Whether or not
one accepts my claims regarding the Protestant Empire, one
cannot gainsay the complexity of the question at issue. And
749 See supra note 748 and accompanying text.
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thus we are ultimately left to consider the proper role of the
Court in deciding questions, the proper disposition of which,
requires a careful consideration of a wide range of historical,
religious, cultural, political, and economic factors. 750
750 This enormous question concerning the institutional competence of the
Court lies beyond the scope of this Article. It is a question that I will take up in a
future article.
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